

DL

220

H67

1812

THE
HISTORY
OF
THE CAMPAIGNS
IN THE YEARS
1796, 1797, 1798, and 1799,
IN
GERMANY,
ITALY, SWITZERLAND, &c.
ILLUSTRATED WITH
SIXTEEN MAPS AND PLANS
OF
THE COUNTRIES AND FORTRESSES.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

THE SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:

Printed for T. GARDINER, Princes-Street, Cavendish-Square;
EGERTON, Charing-Cross; CADELL and DAVIES, Strand; MILLER,
Albemarle-Street; LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME, and BROWN;
SHERWOOD, NEELEY, and JONES; GALE and CURTIS, Paternoster-
Row; BLACK, PARRY, and KINGSBURY, Leadenhall-Street;
RICHARDSON, Cornhill; and BOOTH, Duke-Street, Portland-Place.

Printed by J. BARFIELD, 91, Wardour-Street.

1812.

Lib
Gregory
11-18-27
15779

CONTENTS

OF THE
CAMPAIGN OF 1799,
IN
ITALY.

CHAPTER I.

Situation of the French in Italy, in the beginning of the year 1799—They have there 130,000 men, in two armies, one called the Army of Italy, the other, that of Naples—Force and position of each—The Austrian army amounts to about 60,000 men—The French have the numerical, but the Austrians the relative superiority—The war breaks out in Germany, and in the Country of the Grisons—The greatest part of the month of March passes over without any thing being done in Italy—Reasons for that inactivity, and plan of the French - Page 1

CHAPTER II.

Advantageous position of the French upon the Mincio—That of the Austrians on the Adige—Events which Scherer waited for before beginning the campaign—He makes a general

attack on the 26th, is victorious upon his left, his success is uncertain in the centre, and he is completely defeated on his right—Rapid march of General Kray towards Verona, and the great danger which that place is in, on the 30th—On the same day, the French are driven with great loss from the left bank of the Adige—Scherer abandons that river, and retreats to the Tartaro—The Austrian army follows, and encamps opposite to him—Respective losses in the seven first days of the campaign, and reflections upon them—Operations of the Austrians upon the flanks of the French army—The two hostile Generals form the project of attacking each other on the same day, the 5th of April—Order of battle on both sides—The French have the advantage at first, but end by being entirely defeated—Loss on both sides—Observations on this battle

CHAPTER III.

On the 6th, Scherer retires to the Mincio, and on the 7th, passes beyond that river—Operations of General Klenau upon the two banks of the Po—The inhabitants arm against the French—Important success obtained by General Wuckassowich at the other extremity of the line—He forces Scherer to quit the Mincio and to retire upon the Chiesa—General Melas, who had taken the command

of the Austrian army, sends his vanguard over the first of these rivers, and causes Peschiera to be blockaded—He passes the Mincio in person, with all his army—The 23,000 Russian auxiliaries arrive, with Marshal Suworow, who takes the chief command of the troops of the two Emperors—General Kray invests Peschiera and Mantua—Scherer continues to retire, abandoning the Chiesa and a part of the course of the Oglio—The vanguard of the Allies follows the French, and very soon after the whole army marches forward—The town and citadel of Brescia are taken—The Allies march to the Oglio, which the French abandon—Progress made by Colonel Strauch—View of the events already described—Divers causes of the rapid success of the Imperial armies—Moreau succeeds to Scherer, who was become the object of public animadversion—The French army is reinforced—The allied army passes the Oglio in two columns, and in three goes to encamp upon the Adda—Distribution of the Republican forces upon that river—Marshal Suworow resolves to dislodge them on the 27th—The day before, General Wuckassowich passes the river by surprise, and takes post at Brivio—The Marquis de Chasteller throws over a bridge at Trezzo during the night—Battle of Cassano—The French lose it, and are compelled to fly towards Milan—The

<i>Allies enter that town on the 28th—On the same day, General Serrurier is made prisoner, with the wrecks of his corps—Losses suffered by the opposed armies in the battle of the 27th and the combat of the 28th</i>	-	36
--	---	----

CHAPTER IV.

<i>View of the battle of the 27th of April—Examination of the conduct of the opposed Generals—Biographical note upon the Marquis of Chasteller—Account of two other battles fought upon the Adda, that of Flaminus against the Insubrian Gauls, and that of Prince Eugene against the Duke de Vendome—Points of similitude or dissimilitude between these battles and that of the 27th of April</i>	-	-	66
---	---	---	----

CHAPTER V.

<i>Embarrassing situation in which Moreau found himself—The point towards which he directed his retreat—Explanation of the two courses between which he had to choose—He adopts the best—Motives which determined him—Direction taken by the different columns of the Allies—Reduction of the fortresses of Peschiera and Pizzighetone—Plan of operations pursued by Marshal Suworow—Capture of the city of Tortona—Unsuccessful attacks made by the Russians on the Po—Manœuvres which are made on</i>

Moreau's flanks—That General passes the Bormida—Battle of Marengo—Moreau abandons his position, and retreats towards Coni—The allied army marches to Turin, and gets possession of that city on the 27th—Corps left in the Tortonese and the Alexandrino—Expedition and success of General Hohenzollern in the Italian bailiwicks—Rapidity of his marches—He reduces the castle of Milan—General Klenau possesses himself of the citadal of Ferrara—The Republicans are driven from Ravenna—General state of affairs at the end of May 82

CHAPTER VI.

State of the kingdom of Naples when General Macdonald received orders to evacuate it—His political and military measures—His arrival in Tuscany, where he unites 25,000 men—Task which he has still to perform, and the two ways of executing it—Part which he adopts, and projects which he forms in concert with Moreau—On the 26th of May, he begins to act with success on both sides of the Apennines—Movement made and position taken by Moreau, to facilitate a junction with the army of Naples—He goes to Genoa, and there receives some reinforcements—Occupations of the Allies after the taking of Turin—Distribution of their forces, and countries which are in their possession—Multiplicity

<i>of their enterprizes—Situation of Marshal Suworow—He makes himself be joined by General Bellegarde and 12,000 men—Macdonald and all his army cross the Apennines—Combats near Modena on the 10th, 11th, and 12th of June—He is repulsed in the two first, but victorious in the last—He makes himself master of Modena, Reggio, Parma, and Placentia—Marshal Suworow quits Turin with his army, he marches first against Moreau, and then with great rapidity against Macdonald—He meets with him on the little river Tidone—Battles of the 17th, 18th, and 19th of June, on both sides of the Trebbia, all of which terminate to the advantage of the Allies—Macdonald, after having lost more than a third of his army, returns to the same spots from whence he had set out—Generals Hohenzollern and Klenau are left to oppose him—Marshal Suworow hastens back to engage Moreau, who had passed the Apennines, raised the blockade of Tortona, and forced General Bellegarde to retreat behind the Bormida—He retires to Genoa on the approach of the Russian Commander—Account of the siege of the citadel of Turin—Its reduction, and remark on two articles of the capitulation</i>	-	-	-	110
--	---	---	---	-----

CHAPTER VII.

Short view of the events described in the preceding chapter—Examination of the conduct of Marshal Suworow at two periods of the campaign—Difference of opinion that may be entertained about it—Judicious operations of Moreau—Subsequent faults committed by that General—Blame that may also be imputed to Macdonald—Comparison between the battle of the Trebia with that which Hannibal gained on the banks of the same river over Sempronius, and with that also in which Marshal Maillebois was defeated on the same ground, by Prince Lichtenstein 154

CHAPTER VIII.

Change which took place in the nature of the war at the end of June—State and distribution of the respective forces at this period—Twofold aim of the Allies—Insurrection of the inhabitants of Tuscany—Defection of the Cisalpine General Lahooz—Situation of Macdonald—He is forced to evacuate Tuscany—Rising in the city of Florence—The French withdraw to Lucca and Leghorn—Embarkation which takes place in the port of the latter city—The French evacuate it by capitulation—Macdonald accomplishes his retreat and his junction with Moreau—The line of conduct to which the latter is reduced—Respective situations during the month of

July—The Allies besiege at the same time Alexandria and Mantua—Account of these two sieges—These places surrender by capitulation; the first on the 21st, and the second on the 30th of July—Events which take place in the Kingdom of Naples—Cardinal Ruffo makes himself master of the capital, the 20th of June—The English fleet disembark there English, Portuguese, Italian, and Sicilian troops—They get possession of the castle of Nuovo, and of Ovo, and besiege that of St. Elm—The English Captain Trowbridge takes possession of it, by capitulation, on the 12th of July—He completes the deliverance of the Kingdom of Naples, by making himself master of Capua on the 29th, and of Gaeta on the 31st of the same month—A view of the glorious and fortunate character which England sustained at this time in the world - - - 170

CHAPTER IX.

Objects which Marshal Suworow had to accomplish after the surrender of Alexandria, and account of his conduct—What remained for Moreau to do, and what he did—He is superseded in the command of the army of Italy by General Joubert—Macdonald returns into France—Military measures taken by the new French Directory, and general plan of attack formed by them—Joubert arrives in Italy,

and prevails on Moreau to remain there—Preparations made, and positions taken by the Republican army—Counter operations and positions of the Allies—Success of General Klenau in the Riviera di Levante, and taking of the fort of Serravalle—Order in which Joubert assembles his army—It is put in motion on the 11th of August, and, two days afterwards, arrives on the Orba and the Scrivia, in the presence of the enemy—Dispositions made by Marshal Suworow, and the order in which he arranges his army—Instead of waiting for Joubert, he determines to attack him—Battle of Novi—The victory long doubtful, at last is decided in favour of the Allies—Enormous loss on both sides—Reflections upon this event. - 209

CHAPTER X.

After the battle of Novi, Moreau continues his retreat towards the state of Genoa, and goes to resume the position which he occupied before the offensive movement made by Joubert—The line of conduct which remained for him to observe—Movements of the army of Championnet in the French Alps—They induce Marshal Suworow to march to Asti—Conditional capitulation of Tortona—Operations of General Klenau—New progress made by Championnet—Objects which he had in view—Schemes of the Allies—They prepare to

carry them into execution—Moreau endeavours to prevent them, and again makes a movement in advance—He is forced to make a retrograde movement—Tortona falls—Marshal Suworow sets off for Switzerland—Summary of the history of this General's life—View of his long and surprising career—Caprice of his destiny—Different opinions which have been formed concerning him—Judgment which appears best founded respecting his character as a military man 234.

CHAPTER XL.

Change operated in the relative situation of the Belligerent armies in Italy, by the departure of Marshal Suworow—Coni becomes the sole object of the campaign—General Melas marches from the Bormida and Scrivia to the Tanaro and the Stura, and takes up a position at Bra—Opposite movement made by Championnet—He dislodges the Imperial vanguard from Fossano and Savigliano—Is himself driven from those places, the day after, by Generals Melas and Kray—Signal advantage obtained by Prince Rohan upon the frontier of the Valais—The French are driven from Pignerol and Rivoli—Moreau gives up the chief command to Championnet on the 26th of September—Posture of affairs upon the Riviera di Levante and in the upper valleys of the Scrivia and the Bormida—

March of the Neapolitans and the Aretines against Rome—Commodore Trowbridge blocks up the harbour of Civita Vecchia—General Garnier, commanding the Republican troops in the State of the Church, is compelled by degrees to shut himself up in Rome and the neighbouring strong places—General Frælich is sent into the Roman territory—He summons to capitulate with him General Garnier, who had already capitulated with Commodore Trowbridge—Conditions of the capitulation—General Frælich at first refuses his assent to it, afterwards agrees to it, and sets off to besiege Ancona—Alternate success of the French and Imperialists in various valleys of the Alps—General Melas makes a movement upon his left in the Mondovi—Observations upon the topography of Piedmont, and the influence it had upon the latter operations of the campaign—This and the events that had taken place in Switzerland oblige General Melas to remain inactive during a part of the month of October—The French do not employ it more actively—Championnet unites a greater force near Coni—Movements and engagements between Coni and Mondovi—Slight success gained by the French in the Riviera di Levante—Important advantage obtained by them near Novi—Coup-d'œil upon the six weeks comprised in this chapter 267

DIRECTIONS to the BINDER

FOR

PLACING THE PLATES.

VOL. I.

No. 1. to face page - - -	208
No. 2. - - - - -	208
No. 3. - - - - -	208
No. 4. at the end of the Volume.	

VOL. II.

No. 5. to face page - - -	80
No. 1. - - - - -	144
No. 3. - - - - -	144
No. 6. at the end of the Volume.	

VOL. III.

No. 7. at the end of the Volume.	
No. 1. Ditto	

VOL. IV.

No. 8. to face page - - -	148
No. 9. - - - - -	187
No. 10. - - - - -	190
No. 11. - - - - -	330
No. 4. at the end of the Volume.	
No. 6. Ditto	

C A M P A I G N

OF

1799,

IN

I T A L Y.

CHAPTER I.

Situation of the French in Italy, in the beginning of the year 1799—They have there 130,000 men, in two armies, one called the Army of Italy, the other, that of Naples—Force and position of each—The Austrian army amounts to about 60,000 men—The French have the numerical, but the Austrians the relative superiority—The war breaks out in Germany, and in the Country of the Grisons—The greatest part of the month of March passes over without any thing being done in Italy—Reasons for that inactivity, and plan of the French.

IF the account which has been given of the state of affairs in Italy, at the time when the Directory resolved to recommence the war, has

not been lost sight of, it will be remembered, that at that moment, that vast country was entirely in the power of the French, excepting that part of the state of Venice, ceded to the Emperor by the treaty of Campo Formio, the Duchy of Parma, Tuscany, and nearly the half of the Kingdom of Naples. They hastened to treat the southern parts of that country in the same way that they had done the northern for the preceding years, that is to say, to despoil its territory, and to corrupt the principles of its inhabitants, the double blessing which has always accompanied the apostles or defenders of French liberty. Nearly 80,000 French soldiers, and more than 50,000 Poles, Swiss, Piedmontese, Genoese, Romans, or Neapolitans, dispersed from the frontiers of Piedmont to that of Calabria, strove who should devour most greedily this new prey of the rights of man. Their conduct recalled to mind that of the Vandals, which they surpassed. These 130,000 soldiers, which composed eleven French and four Italian divisions, formed two armies, of which one was called the army of Italy, and the other that of Naples. The latter, amounting to about 40,000 men, occupied the capital and the conquered

part of his Sicilian Majesty's dominions, as also Rome, and the different provinces of the Church. Though it had not to contend with regular troops, yet it was not without enemies, nor free from danger; on the one hand, it had to guard against the Vesuvian population of Naples, while on the other, it had to combat the inhabitants of Calabria, Basilicata, Tarentese, Puglia, and, in a word, of all the provinces situated to the south and east of those of Abruzzza and Benevento, who, guided by faithful subjects, and principally led by Cardinal Ruffo, at once a priest, a politician, and a warrior, had taken arms in favour of their lawful sovereign. On a third side, the same army had to defend itself against the insurrections in a great part of the States of the Church, which were often checked, but never totally suppressed. If the French army reigned in the south of Italy less tranquilly than their countrymen had done in the 15th and 16th centuries, they likewise reigned with infinitely more licentiousness. An insatiable thirst for plunder distinguished that army; it had lost all spirit of discipline; and, if from the sameness of place, the comparison may be admitted,

it may be said, that a residence at Capua had been as fatal to the army of France, as to that of Hannibal. Officers and soldiers, all thought of nothing but plunder, not for the Republic, but for themselves: in vain the Commander in Chief, Championnet, had wished to put a stop to these disorders, and to render the plunder more systematic. Opposed in that act of authority, by the Civil Commissioner, Faypoult, he became the victim of that conflict of powers, was deprived of his command, and recalled into France, where he was sent before a council of war, and threatened with the loss of his head. He was succeeded by General Macdonald, who knew better how to submit to the despotism of the Directory, to the pride of their Proconsuls, and to the insubordination of the army.

About the same time, and nearly for similar reasons, General Joubert had lost the command of the army of Italy, which had been given to General Scherer, who, to accept of it, quitted the place of minister at war, and arrived in Italy about the end of February. The 90,000 men who were under his orders, occupied the Modenese, the State of Genoa, Piedmont, the Milanese, the Valteline, and the countries

of Brescia, Bergamo, and Mantua. This dispersion of force, rendered necessary by the general hatred in which the French were held, reduced to about 50,000, the number of men whom they could employ in active operations.— They were in cantonments, on the banks of the Lake of Garda, of the Mincio, and of the Po, from the frontier of Tyrol to the mouth of the last mentioned river.

The Austrian army occupied, at a short distance, the parallel line of the Adige, from the Italian Tyrol, to beyond Rovigo. About 30,000 men were distributed along this line, while the army of reserve, consisting of about the same number, were cantoned in the Trevisano, Friuli, and Carniola.—All these troops were under the orders of Lieutenant-General Kray, until Lieutenant-General Melas should come to take the chief command.

From this statement of the respective forces and positions, it appears, that the French had a vast superiority in point of numbers, but that the Austrians had their forces concentrated upon a short line, and that they could not be attacked but upon that line; while the French and their auxiliaries, who were scattered over the surface of

Italy, from the foot of the Alps to the Gulfs of Naples and Manfredonia, had constantly to keep in subjection, and often to combat, a population of above ten millions of souls, and were obliged to guard the coasts of the Mediterranean and of the Adriatic, upon which, hostile troops might at any time be landed by the English, Russian, and Turkish fleets, which held the dominion of the two seas, blocked up the ports of Corfu,* Ancona, and Malta, and frequently appeared before those of Leghorn, Civita Vecchia, and Naples.—It may then be said, that the Austrians, concentrated in a good position, having their left upon the Adriatic, and their right upon the Alps, and communicating with the army of the Tyrol, from whence they could receive succours, having nothing to think of but

* This island surrendered, on the 3d of March, to the Russian and Turkish Admirals, who had, two days before, made a successful attack upon the harbour of Corfu.—The French troops, which occupied this town and the forts, were sent back to France, upon condition that they should not serve, for eighteen months, against the Conquerors, or their Allies.—The Austrians were not included in the number, because they were not yet known by the Admirals to be at war with France.

to oppose the enemy in their front, had the relative superiority.

The turn which affairs had taken, during the winter, at the Congress of Radstadt, and the dilemma in which the cabinet of the Luxemburgh had dared to place that of Vienna, leaving little doubt of the renewal of the war, both parties had prepared for it in Italy, in the month of February.—Magazines had been formed—positions had been chosen and fortified, and posts of observation had been established between the Adige and the Mincio.—The preparations of the French had been still more effective than those of the Austrians, General Scherer, who enjoyed the confidence of the Directory, not only knowing that war was about to break out, but having his plan of attack already formed. In consequence, he concentrated his troops upon the Po, the Mincio, and the Lake of Garda, and stationed a division of his army in the Valteline, in such a manner, that it should be ready to second the attack which Massena was to make upon the country of the Grisons, and on the Tyrol.—Although it may be said, that they were in presence of one another, and that every day a

rupture of the peace was expected, yet no act of hostility took place before the 1st of March. The French had, indeed, a few days before, sent an armed boat down the Po, which was contrary to the articles agreed to, at Campo Formio, but the Austrians, who had orders not to draw their swords, contented themselves with sending an officer to the head quarters at Milan, ostensibly to complain of this infraction of the treaty, but who privately had other objects in view.

Such was the situation of affairs, when, on the 1st of March, General Jourdan passed the Rhine, which was the Rubicon for Europe, and again put an end to peace. This act of real aggression, which the French denied to be such, did not make hostilities begin in Italy. The unexpected attack which Massena, six days afterwards, made on the country of the Grisons, had not even that effect, although it was a most decided commencement of the war. General Kray had orders only to act on the defensive—the half of his army was, besides, still far behind his line, and it was not till the 12th of March, that the troops of reserve, stationed in Friuli, and in the neighbouring hereditary provinces, received orders to repair to the Adige, orders

which they executed immediately, and with much celerity.—On the other hand, General Scherer was in no hurry to open the campaign, either because his preparations were not completed, or because, though the war was begun, there was no declaration of it; or, more probably, because the execution of his plan depended, in a great measure, upon the success of the first operations of Massena and Jourdan. It was necessary that these Generals should be masters of certain positions, in order that the success of Scherer might be more easy, and that he, in his turn, might be able to assist them.

After what has been said, in the preceding volume, respecting the plan for the campaign formed by the French, it is hardly necessary to mention, that the task allotted to the army of Italy, was, to pierce through the line of the Adige, to drive the Austrians behind the Brenta, and even, if possible, entirely out of Italy, and at least to penetrate into the southern parts of the Tyrol, while Massena should attack it on the east, and Jourdan on the north; in a word, to surround and conquer that province, which is at once the key of Germany and of Italy, and the rampart of the Hereditary States.

In 1796, and in 1797, the French had been able to take but a part of this vast natural fortress they flattered themselves, that, upon this occasion, they would be able to get possession of the whole, and thus to open to their three armies, a common road into the heart of the States of the House of Austria. For this purpose, they concerted, for the end of March, a general attack, which was to decide whether or not they could realize their ambitious projects. In the following chapter will be seen, what was its result in Italy.

CHAPTER II.

Advantageous position of the French upon the Mincio—That of the Austrians on the Adige—Events which Scherer waited for before beginning the campaign—He makes a general attack on the 26th, is victorious upon his left, his success is uncertain in the centre, and he is completely defeated on his right—Rapid march of General Kray towards Verona, and the great danger which that place is in, on the 30th—On the same day, the French are driven with great loss from the left bank of the Adige—Scherer abandons that river, and retreats to the Tartaro—The Austrian army follows, and encamps opposite to him—Respective losses in the seven first days of the campaign, and reflections upon them—Operations of the Austrians upon the flanks of the French army—The two hostile Generals form the project of attacking each other on the same day, the 5th of April—Order of battle on both sides—The French have the

advantage at first, but end by being entirely defeated—Loss on both sides—Observations on this battle.

IT has been mentioned that the French and Austrians occupied two lines, nearly parallel to one another, the former on the Mincio, and the latter on the Adige. The strength of the two lines was far from being equal: the first was not only shorter, but its left was also supported by the fortress of Peschiera, and its right by the much more important one of Mantua, from which it reached to the Po. While the frontier of the Cisalpine Republic was thus defended by two strong places, situated upon the same river, and at a short distance from one another, the new possessions which the treaty of Campo Formio, had given to the Emperor, were only defended by the river Adige; for the castles of Verona could not be considered as having any military value. The Austrians had perceived the comparative weakness of their situation, and in order to remedy it, they had taken three principal positions on the Adige, which were well chosen and well fortified. The first was an entrenched camp at Pastrengo, near to Bus-

solengo, and three leagues from Verona, which commanded the entrance of the valley of the Adige, and thus covered the right of the line. Above this camp, and along the Adige, there were posts which established the connection with the army destined for the particular defence of the Tyrol.—The second position was opposite to Verona, and consisted of entrenchments thrown up on all the avenues to that place; it was intended as a point of support both for the right and left, and therefore it was the most important; for which reason a camp had been established behind it upon the road of Vicenza, intended to be occupied by the troops of reserve, who were quartered in the Trevisano and Friuli.—The left-hand position was the fortified town of Legnago, and as it was the most detached of the three, nothing had been neglected to put it in a state of defence. A corps of troops which were to support it, was quartered at Bevilaqua.—Such were the situations of the Austrian and French armies, about the middle of March. The similarity between them, and those occupied by Prince Eugene and Marshal Catinat, at the opening of the campaign of 1701, must be strikingly felt, and it

will be seen that this similarity produced a nearly similar result.

Nothing material happened between the two armies, till the 25th of March, and on both sides they employed themselves in gaining perfect information of the force and position of their enemy.—General Kray had orders not to strike the first blow, and General Scherer waited the moment when he could do it with the best effect, according to the general plan which was to be executed by him in concert with Generals Massena and Jourdan. This moment was now come; the army of the Danube had its left upon that river, and its right upon the Lake of Constance. That of Switzerland had got possession of all the country of the Grisons, and had even penetrated into the Tyrol. It was the duty of Scherer to favour its operations, and to endeavour to deprive that country of the protection of the Austrian army in Italy. It was with this intention, that this General, who had placed his head quarters at Castelnovo, and had assembled his army, on the 24th, between that little town and Villa Franca, directed his plan of attack.

On the 26th, his army formed in six divisions,

and, consisting of about 45,000 men, was put in motion, and marched against the three principal positions of their opponents. The left, composed of three divisions, which attacked the right of the Imperialists, was commanded by Moreau, at that time Inspector-General, and who had been sent into Italy to assist Scherer with his advice. One of his divisions, supported by an armed flotilla upon the Lake of Garda, drove the enemy from all the detached posts they had on the heights between the Lake and the Adige. The two other divisions attacked with fixed bayonets, and carried, the entrenched camp of Pastrengo, where the Imperialists had nearly 5000 men, one-half of whom were either put to the sword or made prisoners. These divisions pursued the flying enemy so quickly, that they did not give them time to destroy two bridges which they had at Polo. They passed the river, and spreading themselves upon the left bank, both towards Verona and towards the Tyrol, they cut the line by which the Austrians had their communications from the Upper to the Lower Adige. The centre of the French army, commanded by Scherer in person, and consisting of two divisions and a body of reserve, attacked

the chain of posts which covered Verona, the pillage of which place had been promised to the army in Public Orders, to satisfy them for the arrears of pay due to them. The French met with an obstinate resistance from General Kaim, who commanded the centre and the right of the army, and who had called to his aid the troops of reserve stationed behind Verona. The battle was very obstinate during the whole day: several posts were taken and retaken. The Austrians, by extraordinary efforts, succeeded in preserving those which constituted the principal strength of their position, and amongst others that of St. Maximin: the only one of importance which remained in the hands of the French, was that of St. Lucie. This obstinate action was bloody on both sides. Three Austrian Generals, of which number was the brave General Kaim himself, and the no less brave General Lyptay, were slightly wounded. The Austrians acknowledged the loss of 2800 men, killed and wounded, in the centre and on the right, in this day's battle. The French suffered as severely, but they lost only 300 men in prisoners.

Though Scherer had complete success on his

left, and maintained his equality in the centre, it was very different on his right.—The division which composed it, and which was ordered to take and burn Legnago, attacked twice with great vigour, but without success, the Austrian advanced posts, which were protected by the fire from the ramparts of the town. Their resistance gave time for the troops of reserve to come up from Bevilaqua, and then General Kray, with superior forces, attacked, in his turn, the French upon the roads to Cerea and Anguiary. Notwithstanding a very brave resistance, they were completely routed, and obliged to fly towards Mantua, leaving above 2000 men killed and wounded, with 600 prisoners, 11 pieces of cannon, and 32 tumbrils: one of their Generals was killed, and another wounded. The Polish legion of Dombrowsky, composed almost entirely of Austrian deserters, having been at this affair, the Austrian soldiers, to whom their officers called out *Parce ferro*, as in vain as Hannibal called to his at Thrasymane, would give no quarter, and exterminated with their bayonets, and with the butt-ends of their muskets, all the men of that legion who fell into their hands.

It was that which made the loss in killed and wounded, mount so high in that affair.

It had been so decisive in favour of the Austrians, that General Kray was on the point of pushing on to Mantua, when a courier brought him intelligence of the disaster experienced on his right, and of the perilous situation in which Verona still found itself, in spite of the brave defence of General Kaim. Seeing then, from the result of the day's action, that the greatest number of the enemy's troops were on the Upper Adige, notwithstanding the fatigue of his own, he marched them, the same evening, to the assistance of the centre and of the right, leaving, however, a sufficient corps of observation between Mantua and Legnago. A part of these reinforcements arrived at Verona on the 27th, and the rest on the 28th.—During these two days, Scherer, disconcerted, no doubt, with the severe check which he had received on his right, and wishing to see what advantage General Kray would endeavour to draw from his victory, attempted nothing decisive against Verona, which he menaced, as has been seen, on both sides of the Adige. He made only partial attacks, which caused very little alteration in

the situation in which the two parties were left after the action of the 26th. They were so near to one another, that, on the 29th, they were obliged to agree upon a suspension of arms, to bury their dead, who lay upon the field since the 26th, and began already to infect the air. Two armies could not remain long so close to one another, without coming to an engagement, especially as it was their mutual interest so to do; the French, in order to dislodge the centre of the Austrians, which would have decided in their favour the opening of the campaign; and the latter, to repossess themselves of the left bank of the Adige, and re-establish their direct communication with the principal valley of the Tyrol.

On the 30th, two hours before the expiration of the truce, according to the assertion of the Austrians, the half of the corps commanded by Moreau, that is, about 10,000 men, with General Serurier at their head, having passed the Adige by the bridges of Pôto, attacked the posts of the enemy which guarded the left bank, overcame them, and advanced till within half a league of Verona, while another column en-

deavoured to gain the heights, which flanked the right of the Austrians and the road of Vicenza, upon which General Kray had wisely posted his reserve, or, more properly speaking, the main body of the army.—This General took from it, seven battalions and two regiments of cavalry, formed them into three columns, and sent them, one along the Adige, another on the road from Verona to Roveredo, and the third towards the heights on which the French were forming: the latter were already come as far Parona, within half a league of Verona. At that moment of so much danger for that town, the three Austrian columns came up with the enemy, and attacked them with such spirit, that they could not resist, but were obliged to retire towards their bridge, which was full three leagues distant. The Austrians followed them very closely, and this retreat was nothing but continued fighting. The French conducted it for a long time in good order; but when the left Austrian column saw that they approached the bridge, two battalions of grenadiers were detached from it with the greatest rapidity, along the river, who, without firing, and using only the bayonet, overcame all resistance, and seized the head of the bridge,

and thus, all those who had not already passed, were cut off.—The enemy, fearing to be pursued, hastened to break down their end of the bridge, while the Austrians did the same on their side. The French column which had been sent by the mountains, and had more ground to traverse in order to arrive at the bridge, was entirely cut off; a part of it immediately laid down its arms, and the rest, in endeavouring to escape across the mountains, were likewise almost all taken; 2000 men fell into the hands of the Austrians on this day, and the French lost all the local advantages they had gained on the 26th. No cannon were taken by the victors, for early in the day, General Serrurier had sent to the other side of the Adige, the few pieces he had with him.

On the 1st of April, Scherer, giving up hopes of penetrating by the Upper Adige, and fearing that the Austrians, in their turn, would pass that river with sufficient force to break through his line, which was too extended, abandoned, on his left, all the posts which he occupied between the river and the Lake of Garda; and having placed a strong garrison in Peschiera, went with his left and centre to take a position

beyond the Tartaro, between Villa-Franca and Ysola della Scala, where he placed his head quarters, his right wing being before Legnago. The advanced guard of the Austrians, on the same day, occupied the posts abandoned by the enemy on the other side of the Adige, and pushed on to Castelnovo. On the following day, all the army encamped upon the right bank, before Verona, and upon the road to Villa-Franca.—It was calculated at the time, by judicious eye-witnesses, that these first seven days of the campaign had cost the French the immense loss of more than 10,000 men, in killed, wounded, taken, or deserted, and that that of the Austrians amounted to half the number, a loss which can only be called small, when compared to the other; for it was nearly 700 men for each day. So much was the French army already discouraged, that, on the 2d, 190 Republican soldiers and 23 officers laid down their arms at Villa-Franca, to 17 Austrian light-horsemen. The desertion too, was very great, especially among the Swiss and Piedmontese, whom the French had incorporated into their army, after having disbanded that of the King

of Sardinia: every day they arrived in small bands at the Austrian advanced posts.

This narrative must not be continued, without remarking upon the very extraordinary commencement of this campaign.—It had now been opened but six days, and already a general battle, a great partial engagement, several other actions less important, and two passages of rivers in face of the enemy, had taken place. In almost all former wars, in a like space of time, some marches, some reconnoitring parties, and the attack of some posts in front, to discover their mutual plans, would have been sufficient occupation for the contending armies.—The plan of Scherer seems, in all the principal points, to have been well concerted, and to have been formed in consequence of a very thorough knowledge of the position, and of the distribution of the force of the enemy. He directed his attack against the weakest part, and deceived General Kray with regard to his offensive operations. He sent 30,000 men against General Kaim, who had not above 18,000 to oppose him, and he dislodged, in consequence, all the right of the enemy, piercing their line, and gaining a footing upon the left bank of the Adige, by which

he cut off the communication between the Austrian armies. If the success which he had on his left be allowed to have been the natural consequence of his good conduct, the disasters he met with on his right were as certainly the just punishment of his faults. There would not have been ground for this remark, if, as he wrote to the Directory, his sixth division had only masked Legnago. If it had done nothing else, it would have held General Kray in suspense, who probably would not have attacked it, or if he had shewn a disposition to do it, the combat might have been declined, and a retreat towards Mantua effected in good order. In either of these cases, the Austrian General would have lost the day, and the opportunity of compensating for the defeat sustained at the same time by his right wing—he would not have flown to its assistance with so much confidence, nor probably with so great a number of troops as he did, after having destroyed the division opposed to him, which, by attacking, sacrificed its advantages, and lost to Scherer the fruits of his successes elsewhere. The defeat of this division does not, however, appear a sufficient excuse for the little vigour with which that

General pushed these successes. If, after possessing himself of the bridges of the Adige instead of placing only two battalions on the left bank, he had established there all the left of his army, or even as many troops as he afterwards sent over on the 30th, and had attacked immediately the front and rear of Verona, General Kaim being reduced to his own forces alone, it is probable that he would have carried that position by the superiority of his numbers.— He would at least have had much more chance than on the 30th, when reinforcements were arrived, not only from the Lower Adige, but likewise from the Brenta. What has been just remarked, has, it is said, been sanctioned by the authority of Moreau, who, as early as the 27th, wished to attack the position of Verona in flank, with his three divisions.

In speaking of General Kray, there is no blame to be mingled with praise. He did nothing to expose himself to the first, and too much of the second cannot be lavished on him. No fault is to be attributed to him, on account of the defeat experienced by the right of the army, and if that part of his line was weak in comparison with the number of forces sent against it,

by Scherer, it was, nevertheless, the part possessed of most natural means of defence; it was, besides, well entrenched, and it was not to be supposed that the enemy would venture to place themselves between the Austrian armies of the Tyrol and of Italy. It was much more probable that they would have endeavoured to dislodge the left wing, which had nothing to support it, and which they might have attacked without any risk for the flank or rear: General Kray was therefore in the right, to compensate for local disadvantages by an addition of force.— Nothing shall be said of the battle of Legnago, for it speaks, of itself, sufficiently in favour of him who gained it; but what appears still more glorious for him, was the resolution which he took, and which he executed immediately, of marching with his victorious troops towards Verona. It was a masterly stroke, and was similar to what Bonaparte did two years before, when, after having conquered at Rivoli, he hastened to go and conquer at Mantua. These are the kind of actions which determine the reputation of a General and the event of a campaign, and such was the conduct of the great Generals of the age of Louis XIV.

General Kray again imitated them on the 30th, when, not only desiring, as an ordinary General would have done, to drive the French back again over the Adige, he aspired, and succeeded in forcing a great part of those who had passed it, to lay down their arms. He knew how to find, in danger, an opportunity for victory. It is in drawing good from evil, that the genius of great Generals, as well as great Ministers, is to be discovered.*

This digression cannot be terminated, without remarking the great resemblance which existed between the respective position of the Austrians and French on the 30th, and that in which were

* General Kray was born in Hungary, and has served since his infancy in the Imperial army. He has obtained the rank he now holds, by long and useful services. He has always shewn himself possessed in an eminent degree of that qualification, which distinguishes the Hungarian officers, viz. a perfect knowledge of the kind of war to be carried on with light troops, and on the advanced posts. He commanded with distinction, those of the great Imperial army, in 1794, and it may be remembered, that he was also at the head of the advanced corps of the army of General Werneck, at Neuwied, in 1797. General Kray is now about 60 years of age, but he is robust, active, and likely to be long able to exert his talents for the defence of his country and of his Sovereign.

the French and the Russians on the 25th of September, when the latter were driven from Zurich.—The Russians were posted before and behind the Limmat, as the Austrians were before and behind the Adige. Scherer and Masena had the same views, and made the same kind of attack. The resemblance goes no farther, for there was as much difference in the result as there is between Generals Korsakow and Kray.

It has been said, that, on the 2d, all the Austrian army encamped beyond the Adige. Its right extended to St. Lucie, and its left to Tomba. On the same day, its advanced guard, commanded by General Hohenzollern, and composed of five battalions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, extended itself on its left to Villa Nova, where, as has been seen, two hundred prisoners had been made, and on the right to Peschiera, into which they threw some bombs.

All the detachments which the French had between the Adige and the Lake of Garda were likewise driven into that fortress by a brigade, detached from the army of the Tyrol, under the orders of Colonel St. Julien. In like man-

ner, the flotilla of the Austrians forced that of the French to seek an asylum under the cannon of the place. General Wuckassowich whose corps, as has been seen in the preceding volumes, formed a part of the same army, had defeated and driven back a small body of French which had attempted to advance into the country of Trent, between the Lakes of Garda and of Idro, in order to make a double diversion in favour of the armies of Massena and of Scherer. It appears then, that not only the communication of the latter with Peschiera was become very precarious, but that his rear upon the left was much threatened.—It was much the same upon his right. General Klenau, with a small flying corps, detached from the left wing of the Austrians, had reconnoitred along the Po, sunk several armed boats, alarmed both banks of that river, and forced the piquets of the enemy in that quarter to shut themselves up in Ferrara, or to retire as far as Ostiglia.

Defeated twice, and pretty severely, in the space of six days—finding himself already almost outflanked on both sides, and principally on the left—having before him an enemy become superior, partly by his victories, and partly

by the reinforcements arrived from the Hereditary States—and knowing that the 23,000 Russian auxiliaries, which the Emperor of Russia had sent to the Emperor of Germany, and which it may be remembered were the cause, or the pretext for the renewal of the war, had left Austria on the 20th of March, and were advancing by forced marches—Scherer, seeing that the Austrians already acted partially on the offensive, and perceiving that they would attack him with an irresistible superiority when they should be joined by the Russians, judged that but little time remained to him to give the campaign a favourable turn. He resolved, therefore, to make a new effort to drive the Austrians back over the Adige, and to establish himself on the other side of that river.

At the same moment, General Kray formed on his side, the project of forcing the French beyond the Mincio. Judging their position to be insecure, and knowing that they were not in good order, or well recovered from their defeats, he flattered himself with hopes of beating them, and of opening the career of victory to Lieutenant General-Melas, who was about to arrive to take the command, and who was

quickly to be followed by the Russian Field Marshal Suworow, the destined Commander in Chief of the united Russian and Austrian armies.

It was on the same day, the 5th of April, that the two Generals resolved to attack one another. The French army, already reduced to 36,000 men, moved from the camp of Magnan in three columns, exclusive of a fourth which formed the advanced guard. The column on the right, composed of the divisions of Generals Victor and Grenier, marched to the attack of St. Giacomo along the Adige.—That of the centre, formed of the divisions of Generals Montrichard and Hatry, and commanded by Moreau, was charged to dislodge the enemy posted between Villa-Franca and Verona.—The advanced guard, led by General Delmas, directed its march towards Dossobono, half way between the two last mentioned places, with a view to assist the operations of the centre.—General Serrurier, with the left, consisting of his own division, was ordered to get possession of Villa-Franca, and to push on to the Adige.

The respective situation of the two armies, and the nature of the country, had dictated

the plan of attack formed by Scherer. The same reasons had influenced General Kray, and therefore his plan was similar. His army, amounting to 45,000 men, he divided into three strong columns, and an advanced guard, commanded by General Hohenzollern, which was in front, for the protection of the right column, led by General Zoph.—General Kaim commanded the centre, and General Mercantin the left.—A reserve of thirteen battalions was under the orders of General Lusignan, who was charged to give assistance wherever it might be wanted.—The garrison of Legnago had instructions to make a show of attack on the left flank of the enemy, and General Klenau to try to turn them by advancing along the Po.—It is hardly necessary to mention, that the object of General Kray was to dislodge the French from their grand camp of Magnan, to drive them beyond the Tartaro, or if possible behind the Mincio.

The two armies were too near one another to be long in meeting, as they were both marching forward, and in fact the engagement was soon begun, and by ten o'clock was general along all the front of the line. For the first two

hours it was favourable to the French, and they gained ground on all sides; General Serrurier got possession of Villa-Franca, and maintained himself there. The centre and the right pushed on to near Verona. At this critical moment, nine battalions of the Austrian reserve, led by General Latterman, marched rapidly against the enemy, to the sound of Turkish music. Three of these battalions, forming the regiment of Reisky, with fixed bayonets, fell upon the rear of the right French column, while the regiments of Thurn and Nedasty, forming the six other battalions, attacked it boldly on the flank, with so much vigour, concert, and promptitude, that the French, till then victorious, were at once stopped, broken, and put to flight.

To prevent the Austrians from following up this success, and to restore the combat in favour of the French, Scherer and Moreau very judiciously resolved to do their utmost to pierce and overcome the centre of their enemy. To effect this, they united to their central column, some troops which had remained in reserve, and with this addition of force, they rushed so vigorously upon the centre of the Austrians,

that they made it give way, and General Kaim, notwithstanding his brave resistance, was repulsed till within half a league of Verona. General Lusignan having then come up to his assistance, with three battalions of grenadiers which he had still kept in reserve, the battle was renewed with redoubled fury, and was long maintained with equal success. The obstinacy of the Austrians at last prevailed, and the French upon this point likewise were broken, routed, and closely pursued, with the bayonet at their backs.

Defeated on the right and in the centre, the French could not think of drawing any advantage from the success they had had on their left, and Serrurier, in consequence, followed the retrograde movement of the rest of the army, which it executed with great confusion, leaving behind them cannon, ammunition-waggons, and wounded. The Austrians pursued them nine miles, and till night; they then established a line of observation, which extended from Lecco till near Valeggio.—The trophies of this victory were 17 pieces of cannon, and near 3000 prisoners. It cost the victors, in killed and wounded, 2500 men, and among the latter were Generals Mercantin, Kowasewich,

and Ross. The loss of the French, in killed and wounded, was at least 3500 men. Several of their Generals were grievously wounded, and one of them, named Pigeon, died afterwards at Isola della Scala. There were few actions during the war so warmly disputed, and on both sides there was no cessation from ten in the morning till six at night.

This engagement was one of the few, since 1792, which merited the name of a *battle*. The two armies were engaged upon their whole front, and in a narrow space. In that respect it resembled the battles of the former century, which decided commonly the fate of a campaign. This one, as will be seen, had the same effect: it otherwise furnishes no subject for reflection. The French seem to have committed no other essential fault, but that of having separated too much the columns of their right and their centre, which gave to their enemy the power of placing themselves between the two, and of putting the former to the rout. The Austrians evidently owed their victory to their reserve, for which their superiority of numbers had enabled them to allot 10,000 men.

CHAPTER III.

On the 6th, Scherer retires to the Mincio, and on the 7th, passes beyond that river—Operations of General Klenau upon the two banks of the Po—The inhabitants arm against the French—Important success obtained by General Wuckassowich at the other extremity of the line—He forces Scherer to quit the Mincio and to retire upon the Chiesa—General Melas, who had taken the command of the Austrian army, sends his vanguard over the first of these rivers, and causes Peschiera to be blockaded—He passes the Mincio in person, with all his army—The 23,000 Russian auxiliaries arrive, with Marshal Suworow, who takes the chief command of the troops of the two Emperors—General Kray invests Peschiera and Mantua—Scherer continues to retire, abandoning the Chiesa and a part of the course of the Oglio—The vanguard of the Allies follows the French, and very soon after the whole army marches forward—The town and citadel of Brescia are taken—The Allies march to the Oglio, which

the French abandon—Progress made by Colonel Strauch—View of the events already described—Divers causes of the rapid success of the Imperial armies—Moreau succeeds to Scherer, who was become the object of public animadversion—The French army is reinforced—The allied army passes the Oglio in two columns, and in three goes to encamp upon the Adda—Distribution of the Republican forces upon that river—Marshal Suworow resolves to dislodge them on the 27th—The day before, General Wuckassowich passes the river by surprise, and takes post at Brivio—The Marquis de Chasteller throws over a bridge at Trezzo during the night—Battle of Cassano—The French lose it, and are compelled to fly towards Milan—The Allies enter that town on the 28th—On the same day, General Serrurier is made prisoner, with the wrecks of his corps—Losses suffered by the opposed armies in the battle of the 27th and the combat of the 28th.

ON the day after the battle of Magnan, Scherer abandoned Villa-Franca and Isola della Scala, and removed his head-quarters to Marmirolo,

having concentrated his army between Mantua and Goito. Had it been less weakened, less discouraged and discontented, it may be supposed, that, being supported by that fortress, he would have sought to maintain himself in front of it, and to defend, for some time at least, the strong line of the Mincio. But such was the void occasioned in the Republican ranks by the battle of the 5th; such was, above all, the want of confidence amongst the Generals, and of discipline amongst the soldiery, that from the 7th Scherer continued his retreat, and passed the Mincio near to Goito; at the same time throwing a reinforcement of men and provisions into Peschiera. The Austrian vanguard occupied the extent of country abandoned by the French, and pushed on to Valeggio, where it seized the bridge over the Mincio, which was committed to the charge of the small corps that came out of the Tyrol with General St. Julien. While the main body of the army saw itself in possession of the extent of country enclosed by the Adige and the Mincio, the price of their victories, the detached corps upon its wings secured the progress it had made, and prepared new successes. General Klenau, whose flying corps had been

augmented by a part of the garrison of Legnago, either sunk or took the armed and provision boats of the French upon the Po, gained possession of the countries of Ostiglia and Governolo on the 7th, thus cutting off the communication between Mantua and the Lower Po; and carried off 18,000 muskets, intended for the use of the garrison of that fortress, besides making some hundreds of prisoners. The appearance of these troops, and the report of the victories which were crowning the Imperial armies on all sides, caused the long suppressed detestation of the Italians for the French to break forth. The inhabitants of the two banks of the Po took up arms of themselves, cut down the trees of liberty, abjured all revolutionary insignia, and compelled the French troops dispersed about the country to shut themselves up in Ferrara and Bologna. Affairs were equally prosperous at the other extremity of the line formed by the Imperial army. General Wuckassowich, with the different small columns, which, as it has been seen in the former volume, were detached at the beginning of April, from the army of the Tyrol, to act intermediately between it and the army of Italy, was driving

the enemy from the valley of the Chiesa, from the two shores of the Lake of Idro, and had taken possession, on the 8th, of the important defile of Bocca d'Anfo, which opened the entrance of the Brescian, and placed him in the rear of the French army. This threatening circumstance determined Scherer to quit the Mincio entirely, and to retire by Arola behind the Chiesa, thus leaving Peschiera and Mantua to their fate: with the latter, indeed, he continued to communicate during some days by the Lower Oglio and the Po.

General Melas, who had arrived on the 8th, to take the command of the Austrian army, sent his vanguard to over-run the country between the Adige and the Mincio, and caused it to advance on the 10th, beyond the latter of these rivers, to occupy the approaches to Peschiera. Upon the left, General Klenau, who had taken possession of the post of the Lagoscuro, pushed on to the vicinity of Mantua. It may be believed, that General Melas himself would not have delayed advancing beyond the Mincio, had there not been a fortress occupied by the enemy on each of his flanks. Though superior in number, yet he was not so much so

as to be able to leave a sufficient force behind him to form the blockade of both these places.

He was very soon in a situation to do so. On the 13th, the first columns of the Russian auxiliary army, which were immediately followed by the others, arrived at Verona, and the day after, General Melas, having no longer any thing to fear for his rear, passed the Mincio, with all his army, which on that day he encamped near to Campagnola, the head-quarters being at Valeggio. In this position, on the 16th, he was joined by the Russian army, and by Marshal Suworow, who took the chief command of the troops of the two Emperors.* Their union formed an army of 60,000 men, besides the corps detached upon the flanks.

Placed at the head of troops so numerous and so excellent, and coming with a strong desire to render the campaign as brilliant and profitable as possible, Marshal Suworow immediately employed himself in taking measures for pushing forwards, and made the necessary arrangements for the double blockade of Mantua and Pes-

* This Russian army was estimated at 23,000 men, but by the best accounts it appears that it did not exceed 20,000 fighting men.

chiera. Between 18,000 and 20,000 men were allotted to that service, and the command was given to the Conqueror of Legnago and of Magnan, who hastened to invest the two fortresses.

Scherer, seeing his army reduced to less than 20,000 men, as well by the losses it had sustained, as by the sacrifices it had been compelled to make for the completion of the garrisons of Mantua and Peschiera, far from profiting (as might have been expected) of the inaction of the Austrians upon the Mincio, when they awaited the arrival of the Russians, to entrench himself upon the Chiesa and the Oglio, had continued his retreat, and on the 14th had placed the Chiesa upon his left, and upon his right the Oglio, between him and the Imperialists. On the 15th, 16th, and 17th, he pursued his retrograde movements. On the last of these days, his right passed the Adda, leaving its rear guard, however, upon the left bank of that river: his left remained in front of the Oglio, behind Brescia. His head-quarters were at Lodi upon the Adda, a place which in vain recalled to the French army the brilliant triumph it had there obtained three years before. Two days after,

on the 19th, the head-quarters were transferred to Calcio, upon the Oglio, and the right of the army approached the left of that river and of Brescia, by an oblique movement.

The van guard of the allied army had followed the French step by step, and on the 17th, its patrols had already penetrated, on one side beyond the Chiesa, to the neighbourhood of Brescia, and on the other beyond the Oglio to Cremona, which the enemy had evacuated the day before. Marshal Suworow having made all the dispositions necessary for the blockade, which was soon to be turned into a siege, of the two fortresses he was about to leave behind him—having secured the proper supplies of provisions; established a communication with General Wuckassowich by Salo, which this General had possessed himself of, and having caused the country beyond the Po to be cleared by General Klenau, who pushed on to Bologna without meeting a single corps of the enemy capable of opposing him; the Russian Marshal, finding himself at liberty to go in search of the enemy, moved forward with his army, on the 18th, that day encamped at Capriano, and the following near to Montechiaro. On the 20th,

General Kaim severely beat the rear guard of the enemy's right at Cremona, and made 400 prisoners. In this action the Russians first coped with the French: Strange consequence of the Revolution! that the inhabitants of the countries of the Seine and of the Wolga should meet for purposes of mutual destruction on those of the Po!

On the 20th, Marshal Suworow marched by Castenedolo towards Brescia, intending to attack the enemy, who were encamped on the other side of that town. Scherer had reinforced this point with some battalions which Massena had sent him by the Valteline to keep up the communication between them, and the arrival of which had prevented General Wuckassowich from taking possession of Brescia. It is scarcely necessary to mention, that a contrary reason had determined the Russian General to march against the left, rather than against the right of the French, to the end that he might cut off, or at least throw off their line of communication with Switzerland, might draw nearer with his own to the Austrian army in that country, and establish an unison of operations, and a reaction of success with it.

In the night between the 20th and 21st, General Ott's division, supported by that of General Zoph, and by 2000 Russians, had marched to Brescia, and occupied the suburbs and the roads which lead towards that place. At his approach, the enemy, who were encamped behind the town, removed with precipitation, after having thrown 1000 men into it. As soon as it was invested, General Kray, who had the chief command of the troops employed in this expedition, summoned the French to surrender the town, which was no otherwise defended than by a wall and a rampart. On their refusal, some bombs were thrown into the place, which, about eight o'clock, determined the Republicans to retire into the citadel. The gates of the town were broke open, and the inhabitants themselves let down the drawbridges. — The citadel was immediately summoned; the Commander asked to be permitted to retire with arms and baggage, which proposition was not acceded to. The sight of the ladders prepared for the assault, and of the troops, half Austrians, half Russians, already drawn up to commence it, induced him to accept a capitulation, by which, himself and garrison were made prisoners of war. The capture of

the town and citadel, which gave 44 pieces of cannon to the Austrians, with a very large quantity of warlike stores and provisions, was attended with no other loss to them, but that of six hours and one artillery man.

On the 22d, the Allies marched towards the Oglio, which was occupied on the three bridges of Palazuolo, Pontoglio, and Orsinovi, by the rear guard of the Republicans; they directed their force principally upon the two first, as being the most important to future operations. The enemy, after a smart skirmish in front of Palazuolo, passed the bridge (which they had broken down the day before) upon planks. In the night, between the 22d and 23d, a bridge of boats was constructed below Palazuolo; but it became useless, the enemy having abandoned the Oglio in the same night, and having retired upon the Adda. The approach of the grand army was not the only motive which induced the French to abandon the Oglio so unresistingly: it was rather the progress made upon the upper part of that river, by Colonel Strauch, who has been spoken of in the preceding volume. Though not yet a General, he had deserved that seven battalions should be entrusted to him. This confi-

dence was completely justified.—He penetrated, in spite of the difficulties opposed by the season, the mountains, and the enemy, from Tonale to Edolo, in the valley Camonica; descended the valley of the Oglio, and pushed to the vicinity of Lovere, situated at the northern extremity of the Lake of Iseo, thus menacing the left flank of the French army.—This affords an opportunity of remarking how judicious was the employment, and how useful were the services of the corps entrusted to General Wuckassowich and Colonel Strauch; corps, which, as they acted continually in the midst of the mountains, took possession of the heads of the valleys on the two slopes of the Great Alps; at once secured the left flank of the Swiss army, and the right flank of the army of Italy; and turned those of the two armies of the enemy in the same countries. It may be remembered, that General Dessolles' division had been intended, by the French, to act the same part on their side. Obligated to give aid to Scherer's army, instead of receiving assistance from it, that division was unable to maintain the excellent position presented by the space which separates the valleys of the Upper Oglio and of the Upper Adda,

and was obliged to fall back upon the latter, which it also abandoned in a short time.

Whoever has read the history of the wars carried on in Italy, within a century and a half, will recollect, that whole campaigns have been employed by great armies, in disputing the space lying between the Great Alps and the Po: that each of the rivers, which take their source in the mountains, traverse this bason in almost a parallel direction, and lose themselves in that river, arrested, for months, such Generals as Prince Eugene, the Duke de Vendome, and Marshal Catinat; that, in their time, a battle lost or gained, was only followed by an advance or a retreat to the next river. Whoever recollects this, will wonder how, in less than four weeks, the French, from being aggressors during the first, should pass, on a sudden, to a defensive almost unavailing, and be driven beyond the Mincio, the Po, the Chiesa, the Oglio, and the Adda. If the battle of Magnan, and the great superiority of numbers on the side of the Allies, seem to account, in some measure, for this rapid loss of ground, a cause not less real must be perceived in a circumstance peculiar to this campaign—the facility which Switzerland, and

the countries depending upon it (become, for the first time, the common theatre of the war) gave to the Allies to rule the course of the waters from the tops of the mountains, and thus to force the French, by simple manœuvres, to abandon the defensive line of the rivers, which in all other wars, it was necessary to attack in front, and by main force.

These various considerations were not the only ones which concurred to strip the French so rapidly of a part of their conquests. Those conquests, they were not content to make, as they were formerly made—at the expense of the vanquished, and to the profit of the victorious Sovereign. They had exerted the right of the strongest, rather to destroy than to preserve: the epocha of conquest had been to the people of Italy, that of a thorough change, in every respect, of their political and civil existence.—Their property, religion, manners, and prejudices, had been the objects of the avidity, contempt, and insults of their new masters.—The wants and the rapacity of a triumphant soldiery had devoured the profits arising from industry and commerce.—The territorial properties had fallen

into different hands, and had, of course, been greatly diminished in value.—In this general confusion, those who had lost, exceeded the number of those who had gained, in the same proportion that the sums which had been lost, exceeded those which had been acquired. It was natural, therefore, that, although three years of a revolutionary regimen had, in some degree, bent the spirit of the Italians to it, the majority of them, and especially the inhabitants of the country, with whom ancient customs retain their force the longest, should be inclined to resume those customs, and to seize the first opportunity of emancipating themselves, with all the warmth inherent in their national character.—Indeed, as has been already said, the French had scarcely suffered a first defeat, when the hatred felt, and the revenge reserved for them, broke forth with Italian heat. In a moment, the insurrection spread itself upon the two banks of the Po; the inhabitants took up arms, assembled in a military manner, and demanded assistance from the Austrians, which was speedily afforded. The French, dispersed about the country, fell under the blows of those Italians, who were a few days before so obedient, or were obliged to

take refuge in the towns in which they had garrisons. Some towns even, and, among others, Mirandola, were taken from them by the armed peasants, supported by some light Imperial troops. The sparks of this fire passed, as it were, over the heads of the French, and lighted up the Brescian, the Bergamese, and Piedmont. The people assembled in several places, and where the storm did not burst, it threatened. The communications and provisionary supplies of the French suffered by it, and their security was endangered. —The fear of seeing a numerous population arm behind them, and the impossibility of making head at once against the Austrians and it, contributed to determine Scherer to retire, that he might concentrate his force, secure the fortified places of Piedmont, and receive those reinforcements sooner, which were coming from Switzerland and France. By this proceeding, it is true, he removed at a distance from, and even endangered his communication with the troops which occupied the States of the Church and the Kingdom of Naples; but in risking other defeats, he would have made his own situation worse, without bettering theirs.

The reverses experienced by this General had awakened in his army, as well as at Paris, a Republican sentiment—*Injustice*. Because he had been unfortunate, he was looked upon as blameable; because he had committed some faults, his conduct was thought to be made up of nothing else; no allowances were made him, either for the injudicious plan of the campaign, dictated by the Directory, or the superior force of the Austrians. He was made responsible, not only for his own defeats, but also for those of Jourdan. People did not scruple to say, that, during his administration, he had intentionally prepared the ruin of the French army. A court-martial was talked of; the cries of the army, and of the Jacobin councils, compelled the Directory to strip Scherer, to whom they were attached, of his command,* which was given to Moreau, who was not in their good graces: he was invested with the command on the banks of the Adda. Being at last made

* Scherer, upon his return to France, had much difficulty in saving his head from the fury of the Jacobins. The Directors stipulated for him, as well as for themselves, with the party which seized the administration on the 18th of June.

sensible of their presumption, by its consequences, orders, which ought to have been dispatched three months before, were sent to the army of Naples, directing it to evacuate that country, and rejoin Moreau's army. An account shall not yet be given of the execution of these orders, as it would interrupt the narration of the events which took place in the north of Italy. What was passing, and what did pass, in the south, will naturally appear in a short time.

Arrived upon the Adda, the French army was reinforced by some troops, come out of Piedmont, from the State of Genoa, and from the interior of France, which, in part, made up for the sacrifices of men it had been obliged to make, in forming the garrisons of Mantua, Peschiera, Brescia, and Pizzighitone, but did not raise its number to more than 30,000 men. Although the army opposed was almost double his number, yet Moreau could not bring himself to quit the Adda, so soon as Scherer had abandoned the Chiesa and the Oglio. He had not, indeed, the same reason to do so. The line of the Adda was not only stronger, and better concentrated by nature, but was also untouched. Neither of its flanks were turned, nor in danger

of being so. The left was perfectly well covered, as the army of Switzerland was still mistress of the Splugen: the right was protected by Pizzigh-tone and the Po. Moreau, however, did not hope to be able to maintain himself upon this defensive line, but expected that he might at least detain the Allies a few days, during which, the fortified places of Piedmont, and of the Apennines, would be put in a state of defence. The Cisalpine Republic was also too dear to the French Republic, not to induce the latter to defend the capital of the former to the last extremity.

It has been said, that the Allies had arrived upon the Oglio on the 22d, and that the enemy had quitted it the following night. In the afternoon of the 23d, they were pursued in two large columns: that of the right, commanded by the Russian General Rosenberg, passed the Oglio, at Palazuolo, directing itself towards Bergamo: that of the left, under General Melas, passed by Pontoglio, and Sora, and went to encamp upon the Serio. On the morrow, they continued their march without impediment, the enemy having left no troops in Bergamo, and encamped upon the banks of the Adda: the

column of the left opposite to Cassano, and that of the right opposite to Vaprio. Some troops, drawn from the latter column, and joined to General Wuckassowich's brigade, formed a third column, which encamped between Brivio and Lecco. The head-quarters were placed at Treviglio; at the same time, General Kaim's division held Pizzighetone in check, observed the Lower Adda, and advanced parties beyond the Po, towards Placentia and Parma. One of these parties was sent into the latter place, to carry off the Pope, whom the French were conducting into France, but the Austrians having got their information too late, did not arrive at Parma till twenty-four hours after the unfortunate Pius VI. had been torn from thence. On the 25th and 26th, the army, excessively fatigued by long marches, across a country almost flooded by continual rains, reposed in its positions. The latter day was not, however, passed in complete inaction: on the right, the enemy was driven back to Lecco; on the left, a regiment of infantry and 300 horse were sent to mask Lodi, from whence the enemy had detached some strong parties to Crema.

The positions taken by the allied army along

the Adda, faced those occupied by the French. Their left, consisting of two divisions, commanded by General Serrurier, defended the Upper Adda, and was subdivided into three corps, one posted at Lecco, upon the Lake of Como, where it possessed a bridge-head upon the left bank ; one at Imberzago, and the third near to Trezzo. Here it joined to the centre, composed of the divisions of Generals Victor and Grenier. Moreau was with it in person, and had established his head quarters at Inzago, behind the canal, which reaches from Milan to the Adda. All the space comprized between Trezzo and Cassano, was occupied by these two divisions. At their right, and behind the last mentioned place, was posted the main body of their cavalry ; the bridge-head of Cassano was strongly entrenched and protected by the artillery of the castle : it was covered, besides, by the canal, lined with riflemen, and defended by a great number of batteries, raised along the banks of the river. The right of the French army, composed, in great part, of the vanguard, and commanded by General Delmas, guarded the rest of the course of the Adda, and had its principal force at Lodi and Pizzighetone. Upon

all that line, which was more than 50 miles, the French had only 25,000 men.

Marshal Suworow, unable to turn this line, and unwilling to be impeded by it, resolved to force it on the 27th, and to make attacks at the same time upon its centre and left points, on which it was best defended. It is evident, that to conquer the Milanese was of greater importance to him than merely to possess himself of the course of the Po, and that therefore his first object was more and more to detach the enemy from the foot of the Great Alps.

In the night between the 26th and 27th, the able and active General Wuckassowich succeeded in making himself master of a flying bridge, which the enemy had been negligent enough to destroy but imperfectly: having quickly repaired it, he marched four battalions and two squadrons across the river, and took up a position at Brivio, an important point situated at the end of the road leading from Milan to the Lake of Como, and which it is surprising the French had not caused to be occupied at least by some weak piquets. The patrols which General Wuckassowich employed

in clearing the country, only met with the enemy at Ogiliate and Garlate.

On the centre of the allied army it was not so easy as on the right to reach the opposite bank of the Adda: in the first point it was strongly guarded; its course was rapid and sinuous; and its two banks were craggy and steep. The passage could only be effected by a concurrence of boldness, good fortune, and activity: this concurrence Marshal Suworow hoped to obtain. He had for Quarter-Master-General to his army the Marquis de Chasteller, a man as much disposed as himself to expect something from fortune, and equally capable of snatching her favours. This officer having sent an officer of pontoneers, in the night of the 26th, to reconnoitre the banks of the river opposite Trezzo, and having received a report that it was impossible to throw over a bridge at that place, repaired to the spot himself; and being convinced rather of the difficulty than of the impossibility of the undertaking, perhaps even spurred on by the desire of performing a thing which seemed impracticable, he caused some hundreds of men to quit their arms, and employed them almost all the night

in carrying the pontoons and planks necessary to the construction of a bridge, to the edge of the water. At half after five the next morning, in spite of every obstacle, the bridge was completed. The establishment of it on the opposite bank was protected by 80 volunteers, who were conveyed thither in a boat, and remained in silence at the foot of the mountain and castle of Trezzo. All this was done, which is very astonishing, without the French having the least knowledge of it. It was not long before they were punished for this want of vigilance. All the light troops belonging to the centre of the allied army, which had repaired during the night to St. Gervasso, opposite Trezzo, having made haste to pass the bridge, fell upon that part of Serrurier's division which occupied the last mentioned place, drove it from thence, and repulsed it to Pozzo.

At the noise of this attack, General Grenier, who had put himself in motion some time before with his division, and was passing by Vaprio, to go and oppose General Wuckassowich, halted, rallied the corps driven from Trezzo around him, and vigorously repelled the vanguard of the Allies: but the latter being immediately sup-

ported by the whole of General Ott's division, a battle ensued, which was fought with great obstinacy, between Brivio and Pozzo. Some reinforcements, which came from the division of Victor, inclined the balance in favour of the French, and they were about to capture or destroy the right of the Allies, when the Marquis de Chasteller came to its assistance with two battalions of grenadiers, which formed the head of the column of General Zoph's division. These two battalions could not restore the battle without considerable loss; but being quickly supported by some hundreds of hussars, they broke in upon the left flank of the enemy, put it to the rout, and dislodged it, sword in hand, from the village of Pozzo. In vain did they rally at Vaprio—in vain did General Moreau, who had arrived there with all he could draw from his right, endeavour to arrest the progress of the Allies. They drove him out of the village, made some hundreds of prisoners, and pursued him to Gorgonzello.

While these things were passing, the body of General Melas's army, which, as has been said, lay encamped between Treviglio and Cassano, advanced towards the Adda, and carried the

entrenchments thrown up in front of the Ritorto. But the bridge of that canal, as well as that of the river, being demolished, General Melas was obliged to confine himself, during great part of the day, to battering the works and batteries of the French upon the river and the canal, and could make no farther diversion in favour of that part of the army which had passed the Adda. He succeeded, in spite of the fire from the opposite bank, in throwing a bridge over the Ritorto, and then possessed himself with but little difficulty of the bridge-head at Cassano, which the French defended weakly, having moved almost all their force towards their left. General Melas threw a flying bridge, which he had in readiness, over the Adda, passed it with his two divisions, and rejoined, on the same night, Marshal Suworow, at Gorgonzello. The enemy, who retired towards Milan, were pursued ; but the obscurity of night and the fatigue of the troops favoured their retreat. Had it been otherwise, this day would have been far more fatal to them than it was.

On the morrow, General Melas's divisions, less fatigued than those of the Russian Marshal, marched towards Milan, where they arrived

without meeting any obstacle, and took 400 or 500 stragglers. The Imperial troops were received in that populous capital of Lombardy, which now changed masters for the twenty-fourth time since its foundation, with the same demonstrations of joy, they had lavished upon the French three years before. The tricoloured flag did not receive more homage than was paid this day to the Imperial Eagle. Such is the nature of men whenever their imaginations are struck by any important change—such especially is that of the people of Italy. On the same night, Marshal Suworow with all his staff arrived at Milan. His entry was nobly contrasted with that of Bonaparte.

The retaking of the ancient capital of the Austrian Monarchy in Italy, was not the only immediate fruit reaped by the Allies from the victory which they had just obtained: it produced on the same day (the 28th) an advantage of greater military importance. If attention has been paid to the detail of the positions occupied by the French army along the Adda on the 26th, and that of the dispositions for attacking made by Marshal Suworow, it will no doubt have been remarked that General Wuckassowich, by

surprising the passage of the Adda at Brivio, and posting himself at that place, had cut off the line of communication between the centre and left of the French. Their left, thus cut off, had General Wuckassowich upon its right flank, and upon its left, Prince Bagration, who, after having driven the French into Lecco (as has been before stated) carried the bridge-head of that place, on the following day passed the Adda, and forced the corps of the enemy which defended that part of its course to retreat. General Wuckassowich, not having been obliged to take part in the engagement of Trezzo, moved to the right; and, followed by the rest of General Rosenberg's column, went to meet General Serrurier. That General, who had now no other resource but in his own courage and ability, had taken a position near to Verderio, where he had entrenched himself so strongly as to form a kind of fortress. On the 28th, General Wuckassowich arrived before that position, and attacked it in front. But Serrurier made such excellent dispositions, and supported them with so much firmness, that, though inferior in number, he repulsed him after an obstinate engagement. The Austrian General then deter-

mined to surround this corps, to batter it in every 'direction with his artillery, to throw it into confusion, and then to charge it with his cavalry.—This latter movement was going to take place, when Serrurier, seeing no hope of succour, and being reduced to 3000 men, demanded to capitulate, which was granted him. The conditions were, that the whole troop should lay down their arms and be made prisoners of war. The Generals and officers, however, were permitted to return to France on their parole not to serve again until exchanged. This latter condition was a mark of respect shewn to the bravery of old General Serrurier, and to the probity of his conduct.*

The battle of the 27th, and the actions it produced upon the Upper Adda cost the Republicans 5000 men made prisoners, amongst whom was a General, besides 4000 wounded or killed. The loss of the Allies, under these different heads, amounted at least to 2500. They took

* It is known that, preserving under the Republican standard that sense of honour which had raised him to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel under the old government, he kept himself so pure in the midst of the extortions committed by the other Generals, that he was called the *Virgin of the Army*.

32 pieces of cannon upon the field of battle, and a much greater number at Milan.

No remark has yet been made upon the last, and important events which have just been described, neither shall any be made in this chapter, except this, *viz.* that the Imperialists fought for the safety of Verona under its walls on the 26th, and even on the 30th of March, and that, eight-and-twenty days after, they were established in Milan, having in the interval invested two fortresses, forced the passage of a river lined with entrenchments, obtained two brilliant victories, killed or wounded more than 15,000 men, made a like number of prisoners, and taken more than 100 pieces of cannon. A single month had produced to them a mass of trophies and advantages, which in other times would have alone constituted a happy result of a campaign, and even, as to territory, of a whole war.

CHAPTER IV.

*View of the battle of the 27th of April—
Examination of the conduct of the opposed
Generals—Biographical note upon the Mar-
quis of Chasteller—Account of two other
battles fought upon the Adda, that of Fla-
minius against the Insubrian Gauls, and
that of Prince Eugene against the Duke
de Vendome—Points of similitude or dissi-
militude between these battles and that of
the 27th of April.*

THE battle of Cassano,* has been too import-
ant, both with respect to itself and its conse-
quences, too particular in its details, and too
bloody, for one not to be tempted to pause a

* Though this battle naturally ought to have taken its name from Trezzo or Pozzo, villages near which it was fought, Cassano being the central point, and the strongest part of the position taken by Moreau, and what influenced it the most, this place being already famous for the battle which was fought there, in 1705, by Prince Eugene and the Duke de Vendome, it gave its name to that of the 27th of April.

few moments upon it. It is a species of action, the most interesting that war can furnish, since it presents at the same time, the passage of a river surprised against a whole army which guards it, and a battle maintained with obstinacy and vicissitude. The spot on which it was fought brings to recollection great military events: to its issue, was attached the possession of one of the finest provinces in Europe, the fate of the most considerable of the Republics created by the French Republic; and it may also be said, the political destiny of Italy. Nothing then is wanting to this battle, to ensure to it the remembrance of contemporaries, and the interest of posterity.

Every military man will perceive, that the plan of Marshal Suworow was in general well conceived, that the distribution of his forces was judicious, and that he acted much wiser in endeavouring to penetrate by the Upper, rather than the Lower Adda: they will agree, that the execution was courageous, and even perhaps more than that. It was without doubt a great preparatory means of success, to have caused General Wuckassowich to pass the Adda

in the evening of the 26th, and to have thus, by the possession of Brivio, broken the line of the French army. But what would have become of this little body of forlorn hope, if they had not been enabled, the same night, to throw a bridge at Trezzo? Was it not highly probable, that they should not succeed in establishing it? The rapidity of the current of the river, the abruptness of the windings, and the steepness of the banks, did they not present such a complication of obstacles, that they appeared insurmountable to the most competent judge in this respect, the chief of the pontoneers? To the active boldness which surmounted them, was it natural to join the confidence, that an army encamped on the other bank, and expecting to be attacked, should neglect the ordinary precaution of guarding all the points of that bank by piquets, to watch them by patrols, or to have at least sentinels from distance to distance? If any accident, if the vigilance of the enemy had hindered or retarded for some hours, the establishment of the bridge of Trezzo, General Grenier, who, at six o'clock in the morning, had already *debouched* from Vaprio, would have had time to arrive against Gene-

ral Wuckassowich. It is doubtful whether the latter would have given up, without an engagement, a post so precious to future operations ; and in that case, how, with 3000 men, could he have resisted the whole of Grenier's division, and the detachments which might have joined him there along the Adda ? If, on the contrary, the Austrian General had not thought it prudent to contend with superior forces, having a river behind him, was it not possible that all Grenier's corps, or a large detachment of cavalry at least, might fall upon him briskly before his whole force had passed the Adda over his flying bridge ?—In every case, the ground that they had gained on the right bank would have been lost, and it would have been necessary to put off the passage to another day, which the enemy, from that time on their guard, might have rendered more difficult. It must be said, that if the event justified the temerity of the Marquis de Chasteller, if success crowned him with considerable glory, that still, however, such examples cannot be recommended for the study and imitation of military men ; they must be rather told : “ May you, in admiring the activity “ which accomplished that enterprize, be con-

“vinced that that which has succeeded once,
 “may not always succeed, and do not trust to
 “fortune till you can no longer expect success
 “but from her.”*

* General the Marquis de Chasteller is a man of rank and fortune in the Low Countries. He has, from his youth, served in the engineers, and possesses all the knowledge necessary for that situation. He served with distinction in the war against the Turks, and in the two against France. It was he, who, in 1795, placed Mentz in that formidable state in which it now is, and with respect to which, it may be truly said, *Non nos quæsitum munus in usus*.—His example may encourage military men who are short-sighted, not to despair of being useful, and of advancing in their military career. Few people labour under this disadvantage to a greater degree than himself; but making use of glasses and spectacles, which he always wears in battle, he has ever found himself capable of seeing every thing, as well as of doing every thing; and during the campaign, he has filled the most active situation, the most important one, and to which the *coup-d’œil* seemed particularly necessary, that of Quarter-Master-General. It is to be presumed, that the singularity of wearing spectacles, a very uncommon thing in the German armies, might have contributed, but nevertheless, not so much as his extraordinary bravery, in drawing upon him some of the numerous wounds with which he is covered. He received glorious ones at the battle of Maubeuge, which recalls an incident that will not be misplaced in this biographical note.

The Marquis de Chasteller, then employed in the staff, put himself at the head of a body of horse, to

If it may be thought that those who gained the battle of Cassano, did not deserve it under all considerations, on the other hand it is clear, that those who lost it, deserved completely to lose it. The facility with which General Wuckassowich took possession of the bridge at Brivio, passed the Adda there, and maintained

charge the French infantry; after having given the order, he executed it himself, with all the ardour of his courage, and all the speed of his horse; but those of the troop who followed him, not being so swift as his own, he came alone on the bayonets of the enemy, had his horse killed, received himself several wounds, and was thrown on the ground. In a few minutes, his body of cavalry had charged, dispersed, and pursued the enemy, and had disappeared. The Marquis de Chasteller found himself on the field of battle, covered with his blood, and without the means of regaining the army. He was perceived, and recognised by an Austrian horseman, who came to him and said, "Sir, "I have a broken thigh, but my horse is sound: make use of it to get away from hence; your life is valuable; mine can no longer be of any service." The soldier at the same time got off his horse, and compelled, by his entreaties, the Marquis de Chasteller to mount it. The latter rejoined the body of the army, and before he thought of having his wounds dressed, he thought of sending for this heroic soldier, had the pleasure to see him, as well as himself, recover from his wounds, and the generosity, it may perhaps be said, the justice, to grant him a pension.

himself in this post—the inconceivable negligence of the troops who defended the environs and the castle of Trezzo—the concentration behind Cassano, the strongest point, and secured from a sudden *coup de main* of two entire divisions, and of almost all the cavalry—all demonstrate, that if the French were careful to fortify the line of the Adda, they did not guard it with the same care; and that, however inferior their forces were, they were far from having distributed them so advantageously as they might have done. Moreau has confessed it; but being anxious that no blame should attach to him, he has said, that the dispositions for defence had been made by Scherer, and that, having replaced him in the command only two days before the battle, he had not had time to alter them; which may be credited. At any rate, if the Republican troops had been as well, as in fact they were badly disposed, the most they could have done, would have been to retard the passage of the Adda for a few days, and to make it cost more to the Allies. The latter had too great a superiority not to force it, with more or less loss, in one part or other of the line. It does not appear that any blame is to be attached to

Moreau for his conduct during the engagement. He maintained it with bravery and ability : it is, nevertheless, very unjustly that the French have attributed their defeat to their inferiority ; it was then but trifling. It must be recollected, that only two divisions of the Imperial army took any part in the engagement.

After having examined the merits or the faults which may be attributed to the two Generals, who fought the battle of the Adda, it may not be thought improper to compare it, briefly, to two other great battles, which took place on the same river ; that, in which Flaminus defeated the Insubrian Gauls, or inhabitants of the Milanese, and that which the Duke de Vendome gained at Cassano, in 1705, over Prince Eugene.

Flaminus, resolving to attack the Insubrian Gauls, who again threatened Rome, and who had formed an alliance with several neighbouring states, passed the Adda, not far from the place where General Wuckassowich surprised the passage of it, and afterwards destroyed the bridge which he had thrown over the river. The Gauls marched against him with very superior force. Flaminus, apprehensive of being surrounded, took advantage of a curve of the

Adda, in which he placed his army, thus supporting his two wings by the river, which rendered their numbers useless to the Gauls, and prevented them from making the most of their cavalry. It was in this singular position, and which left no alternative but death or victory, that he waited for the Gauls. The latter attacked him with their accustomed, and, if one may say so, superior valour, and fell upon him with all the weight of their enormous phalanxes. Flaminius had drawn up his army in the order of battle that was common to the Romans, in three lines, the first composed of *Hastarii*, the second of *Princes*, and the third of *Triarii*; the *Velites*, or light infantry, being in the front of the whole. When the Gauls advanced upon him in a mass, Flaminius placed the *Triarii* in the intervals between the *Hastarii*. The long arms (*Pilum*) of the former, supported by the short swords of the latter, opposed an impenetrable and deadly bulwark to the impetuosity of the Gauls, whose bad swords, without points, were either broke or bent, at every stroke against the bucklers or the helmets of the Romans. The latter gained a complete victory, not by their superior bravery, but by their tactics, their dis-

cipline, and above all, by the quality of their arms.

Thus are Flaminius and Marshal Suworow both seen passing the Adda, to attack their enemies ; both fighting with a river behind them, but with this material difference, that the former had no bridge, and both gain the victory. The comparison of engagements, supported by armies so different in their formation, their arms, and their elements, cannot be pushed any farther.

If, under these circumstances, the battles at Cassano, of 1705, and of 1799, seem capable of affording a nearer parallel, it will soon be seen that they resemble each other in nothing but name.

Prince Eugene, earnestly desiring to penetrate into the Milanese, where he flattered himself with finding a powerful party in favour of the Archduke Charles, had made many marches and countermarches to surprise a passage over the Adda. He succeeded, at length, in throwing over a bridge, near Paradiso ; but an accident, which happened to the pontoons, having retarded the completion of it, the Duke de Vendome arrived, by a forced march, before him, and posted himself so well, that Prince Eugene did

not dare to attempt the passage in his presence. Disappointed again in his project, he formed that of gaining a march on Monsieur de Vendome, and making himself master of the entrenched bridge which the latter had at Cassano, where his brother, the *Grand Prieur*, had remained, with part of the army, but from whence the Duke, following the perfidious advice of a Spanish General, had given him orders to depart for Rivola. Prince Eugene, informed that this order had been given, flattered himself that he should arrive at Cassano after the *Grand Prieur* should be gone from thence, and before the Duke de Vendome had been able to arrive there. That would in effect have infallibly happened, had not the *Grand Prieur*, suspecting that his brother had been deceived, taken upon himself not to obey the first order, and even to execute very slowly, a second, which had been given him ; so that when the advanced guard of Prince Eugene arrived near Cassano, the rear guard of the *Grand Prieur* was quitting it. The latter, as well as some regiments of the rear of the army, returned, and threw itself into the *tête de pont*. The Duke de Vendome, who finally mistrusted the sincerity

of the advice, and the truth of the information which had been given him, learning that Prince Eugene had decamped from Paradiso, departed also hastily, descended rapidly along the Adda, and arrived at Cassano at the moment when Prince Eugene had begun his attack, for which he had lost some time, having been deceived by the report which was made to him, that the French had broken down one of the bridges of the canal of Ritorto, while they had done nothing but cover it with some abbatis. The Duke de Vendome had time to cause seventeen battalions, which he brought with him from Paradiso, to pass the bridge of Cassano, and to place them in the *tête de pont*, and along the canal of Ritorto. After many attacks, the Imperialists succeeded in forcing one of the bridges, and in extending themselves in the plain between the canal and the Adda. The Duke de Vendome then changed quickly his order of battle, supporting his left on his *tête de pont*, and his right on the part of the canal of which he was still master. There then began one of the most furious engagements of infantry, of which history makes mention. The Duke de Vendome finding himself on the point of

being forced, thought of placing some troops and some cannon upon the castle of Cassano. Their commanding fire, which was actively served, made such ravage in the Imperial army, which had already suffered much, that it determined to retreat. Never, perhaps, was a battle fought in so small a place, with so large a force, and kept up with so much obstinacy. The slaughter was terrible; the Imperialists had 5000 men killed, of the flower of their infantry: the French 3000. There was, on both sides, a much greater number of wounded; and all this in the space of three hours. There was scarcely an officer of rank that was not either killed or wounded. Monsieur de Linanges, who was the second in command in the Imperial army, was in the number of the first. The Duke de Vendome received a contusion; Prince Eugene was badly wounded. It was thus that this Prince, who shewed himself the most able of all the Generals of his time in the passing of rivers, failed in this, which he had flattered himself he should have effected without obstacles.

This exposition shews that there is no resemblance between this battle, and that which Mar-

shal Suworow gained ninety-four years afterwards, except that Prince Eugene made the same attack as Monsieur de Melas. But it has been seen, that the latter took a very slight part in the combat, and that the *tête de pont* of Cassano was neither vigorously attacked, nor more vigorously defended. Under every other consideration, the two battles of Cassano are entirely different. That of 1705, was fought on the left bank of the Adda; that of 1799, on the right. In the first, the forces of the two armies were respectively united, and found themselves opposed to each other on the same side of the river; in the second, they were distributed upon a long line, and supported upon the two banks. In the first, the French were conquerors; in the second, conquered. To conclude the contrast, it will be said, that if one is disposed to seize the weak points of comparison, which those who commanded in the two battles offer, Moreau most resembled Prince Eugene; and Marshal Suworow the Duke de Vendome.*

* This chapter, and also a part of the preceding one, having principally related to the passages of rivers, it may not, perhaps, be amiss to say a few words on this operation, considered in itself. No part of the art of

war has been brought to greater perfection by the moderns. It is known how difficult and how dangerous this species of enterprize was amongst the ancients, and we may judge of it by the importance which the historians of antiquity attached to it, and of the wonderful relations which they have left us of the passages of rivers, by great armies; such as that of the Indus by Alexander, and that of Rhône by Hannibal. They then considered rivers as almost insurmountable barriers; the famous bridge thrown over the Rhine by Cæsar, in his expedition against the Suevi, was considered as one of the most glorious of his military labours. These impressions were even perpetuated in some degree, into modern times. We know how historians and poets have extolled the passage of the Rhine at Tolhuis, by Louis XIV. At present, the difficulties, the dangers, and the glory of these enterprizes, have, it may be said, vanished; this is owing to the state of perfection to which boats are brought, to the simplification of the means by which they are joined together, and above all, to the regular and fixed establishment, in all armies, of a corps of pontoneers, who learn to throw a bridge as a soldier learns to handle his arms and to march. It is now sufficient, to pass a river, to deceive the vigilance of your enemy for a few hours, on one single point. A passage may even be effected in his sight, provided you have a superiority of fire. The pontoons are fitted to one another with admirable quickness; and it requires but a small number of volunteers to go and secure on the other side, the *tête de pont*. It is also admitted now, as a principle, that an army, however strong it may be, cannot prevent another, though inferior, from passing the largest river. It was the want of perfection in mechanical means, and that of a body of men

entirely devoted to this function, which made the ancients remain behind us in this part of warfare, they, who surpassed us in many others, and particularly in tactics. Bridges of boats are of the highest antiquity: the invention of them is by some attributed to the Persians, by others to Semiramis. The latter, according to Diodorus Siculus, had one constructed in a particular and ingenious manner, for the passage of the Indus. Many centuries afterwards, Alexander passed the same river on a bridge, the first boats of which were fixed in the river, by large cages of willow, filled with stones, which circumstance renders very ancient, the idea of *Cones*, which have been made use of in our days, and particularly at Cherbourg. The bridge which Xerxes caused to be thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus (the Strait of Constantinople) required more than 600 boats, or vessels, of those days, and prodigious patience and mechanical efforts. The Greeks and the Romans made greater progress in this object; they had, like us, bridge equipages carried after their armies; but they knew nothing of our pontoons, or copper boats.

CHAPTER V.

Embarrassing situation in which Moreau found himself—The point towards which he directed his retreat—Explanation of the two courses between which he had to choose—He adopts the best—Motives which determined him—Direction taken by the different columns of the Allies—Reduction of the fortresses of Peschiera and Pizzighitone—Plan of operations pursued by Marshal Suworow—Capture of the city of Tortona—Unsuccessful attacks made by the Russians on the Po—Manœuvres which are made on Moreau's flanks—That General passes the Bormida—Battle of Marengo—Moreau abandons his position, and retreats towards Coni—The allied army marches to Turin, and gets possession of that city on the 27th—Corps left in the Tortonese and the Alexandrino—Expedition and success of General Hohenzollern in the Italian bailiwicks—Rapidity of his marches—He reduces the castle of Milan—General Klenau possesses

himself of the citadal of Ferrara—The Republicans are driven from Ravenna—General state of affairs at the end of May.

AFTER the battle of the Adda, Moreau, compelled to yield the Milanese to the conquerors, found himself in a situation as embarrassing as possible. He had with him scarce 15,000 men; and what remained of his forces on his right and on his left, hardly amounted to 10,000 more. With this small number of men, he had at once to preserve his communications with Switzerland, to defend the approaches of Turin, to cover the fortified places of Eastern Piedmont, to secure the preservation of the passes of the Apennines, to leave to the army of Naples the means of effecting its retreat, and to suppress the insurrections which were breaking out against him on all sides. To endeavour to face so many duties, calls, and dangers, he caused his right to fall back from the Adda to the Po; his centre from Milan to Pavia; and his left towards Novara, not at all thinking of defending the course of the Ticino. He himself quitted this latter town, where he had had his head-quarters, and re-

paired to Turin, to put it in a state of defence, not the city, for his whole army would hardly have been sufficient to form a garrison for it, but the citadel, which required a much smaller one. After having made the arrangements necessary for this purpose, and stifled some little insurrections which disturbed his communications with France by the valleys of Piedmont, he rejoined his army.

Too weak to be enabled to protect equally well Turin, Tortona, and Alexandria, two courses then presented themselves to him : that of devoting his whole force to preserve the former of these places, in which case he must have abandoned to themselves the two others, as well as Genoa and the army of Naples ; or that of attending to the latter interests, by leaving Turin to its fate. This moment was the true touchstone of Moreau's abilities, and his reputation may be said to have depended on his decision. A General of moderate abilities would have adopted the first alternative, to save his whole army, and to secure support from France. The French General determined on the second, to endeavour to save the campaign, and to gain time. The first course would have

left him what was easy to be done: the second presented to him difficulties and dangers, but, at the same time, the means of being really useful, and of exercising his talents. Having then determined to dispute, inch by inch, the rest of Italy, he could not have chosen a better position than that which he took on the 7th of May, a position the most advantageous which Italy offers, in the opinion of Prince Eugene, who, of all Generals, was the best acquainted with this country. His right rested on Alexandria and on the Tanaro; his left on Valentia and the Po. By this position, on one side he supported Tortona, and on the other he also gave some protection to Turin, by the course of the Po, and by strong detachments placed at Casale and Verua. He preserved, at the same time, if not the shortest, at least his most important communications with France, as well as with the Genoese territory, and consequently with the army of Naples. He drew also another advantage from it, and which he principally had in view, that of fixing the Allies in the centre of Italy, to oblige them to waste the campaign in a war of posts and of sieges, and thus to retard, or even prevent the project of invasion,

which they might form against France, and to give the latter time to collect new armies.

After entering Milan, Marshal Suworow contented himself with causing the retreating enemy to be pursued by the light troops. As soon as the different directions they had taken were known, the Russian General, after leaving 4000 men under General Latterman, to blockade the castle of Milan, put his army in motion, on the 1st of May, in the same order in which it had arrived on the Adda. General Wuckassowich marched on the right, towards the Novarese, and the country of Vercelli; the centre towards the Pavisan and the Lumelline; the left towards the Plaisantin and the Tortonese. On the 4th, Marshal Suworow established his head quarters at Pavia. Two plans presented themselves to this General, as well as to Moreau, at this epocha, which, it may be said, was the opening of a new campaign: the one to carry the war against the frontiers of France, by traversing Piedmont, and going to besiege Turin; the other, to endeavour to carry the fortified places of Alexandria and Tortona. A third object existed, independent of the two others, and which it was necessary to attain in either case;

that of cutting off the retreat of the army of Naples, and with that view to seize the passes of the Apennines.

Whilst the first days in May passed on either side in making the movements which have just been mentioned, General Kray, who had remained on the Mincio with 20,000 men to besiege Peschiera and Mantua, made himself master of the former on the 5th. The opening of the trenches, which had been retarded by incessant rains that fell during the month of April, was to have taken place on that day. The garrison, consisting of only 1500 men, did not think^{ba} it ought to wait for this; and having been again summoned, made a capitulation, by which it was allowed to return to France, on the condition not to serve again for six months against the Allies. The desire of not being long detained before this fortress, and to be at liberty to proceed instantly to the siege of Mantua, determined General Kray to accede to these conditions. The Grand Duke Constantine, son of the Emperor of Russia, who was at that time on his way to join the army of Marshal Suworow, was present, in passing, at the taking possession of this fortress, which

though small, is advantageously situated. On the same day, the 5th, General Latterman invested in form the castle of Milan, and General Kaim that of Pizzighitone. The siege of this last place was pressed with so much vigour, and the bombardment was so brisk, that it surrendered on the 9th, after an explosion of a small magazine of powder. The garrison, consisting of 600 men, were made prisoners of war.

From the time that the double movement made by Moreau, first towards Turin and then towards Alexandria, had become known, Marshal Suworow had been aware of the defensive plan adopted by that General: He reduced his own to three principal points, to interrupt as much as possible Moreau's communications with Switzerland and France, to endeavour to cut off that which he had with Tuscany and with the army of Naples, and to oblige him, either by demonstrations, or by force, to quit the excellent position which he had taken. It will be seen, that the means to accomplish at once these three objects were, to extend himself on Moreau's right and left, and to gain as much as possible his flanks. In consequence, General Wuckassowich marched towards the Upper Po,

took possession of the whole of the left bank, which was abandoned by the French, and pushed his advanced posts as far as Chiavasso, only a few miles distant from Turin.—A strong detachment of his corps, under the command of Prince Charles de Rohan, entered the valley of Aosta, and possessed itself of Ivrea.—The centre, under General Rosenberg, occupied the Lumelline, presenting a front against the French army, from which it was only separated by the Po.—The left traversed the Duchy of Parma, and occupied Bobbio; the other pushed its advanced posts as far as Voghera.—General Klenau blocked up Ferrara and Bologna.—Towards the latter place General Ott was also marching with 5000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry.—General Kray had, since the 6th, enclosed Mantua (the garrison of which had, the evening before, made a pretty successful sortie against the troops which blockaded it at a distance), and prepared to besiege that place.—In the rear of the army, Colonel Strauch gained more and more ground in the Valteline, and took*

* A place famous for the victory gained there, in 1635, by the Duke de Rohan, over Serbelloni, the Spanish General.

the important post of Morbegno.—Prince Victor de Rohan, with 2000 men, aided by the inhabitants of the country, after having taken possession of Como, pursued the enemy, who had retreated towards Chiavenna, thus making war on the same ground on which one of his ancestors, in the preceding century, had acquired so much glory.*—Another corps, sent from Milan, proceeded as far as Arona, on the Lake Maggiore.

Such is the condensed picture of the multiplied operations which the allied army undertook at the beginning of May, operations which divided it into a great number of corps, and thus very much reducing the principal body of the army, afforded Moreau the hope of being able to maintain his ground. It is seen that the Allies were acting on a line almost circular, round the bason formed by the Alps and the Apennines, and intersected by the Po.

* The two French Princes de Rohan, who have been spoken of, are brothers; they have, in the course of this war, alternately, and with equal distinction, served the King of England and the Emperor, at the head of legions raised by them. A third brother, Prince Louis, has also raised several corps, either for the Emperor or the Empire.

It may be perceived that the great variety of objects which the campaign then embraced, and the multiplicity of corps which then acted in different directions, render it impossible to give an account of the daily transactions of each of them; and that the only means by which the historian of this campaign, no less singular than astonishing, can avoid confusion, is to lay hold of the situation in which the different branches of the army found themselves at certain fixed periods, making it an invariable rule to follow attentively the operations of the principal bodies of the army, to which those of all the others were more or less immediately subordinate. It is by this method alone, that in relating facts, the order, the combination, and the comparative importance of the events can be preserved.

Conformably to the plan just mentioned, Marshal Suworow determined to attack at the same time both Moreau's flanks. The left wing, which had been reinforced by General Kaim's division since the reduction of Pizzighetone, on the 11th of May passed the Po at Pavia, advanced by Voghera to Tortona, broke open

its gates, took possession of the city, and masked the citadel.

While they thus took post on Moreau's right flank, they also insulted his left. On the same day, the 11th, the centre of the allied army threw some hundred men across the Po, favoured by an island situated between Busignagna and Castel-Franco, from whence they might easily ford the river: this brought on an engagement, which cost the Allies a part of the troops which they had hazarded. The day following, they repassed the river, and in greater force, near Busignagna, drove in the French piquets which guarded the river, and advanced almost to Becetio, a post very near to the French army. Almost the whole of the latter marched against this corps, which was principally composed of Russians, and consisted of 5000 or 6000 men. These fought with great valour; but General Schubach, who commanded them, having been killed, they were unable to resist the numbers of their enemies, and were obliged to repass the Po. Many were drowned in crossing it, and some hundreds remained on the field of battle, or in the hands of the enemy. The number of French killed and wounded was

also, as they themselves acknowledged, very considerable. They much exaggerated their success in this affair, and represented themselves as having defeated the attempt of the enemy's army to pass the Po. It is evident, that if Marshal Suworow had determined at that time to establish himself beyond that river, he would have effected the passage elsewhere, and in stronger force. It is probable that he had no other object than to ascertain the value in which Moreau estimated his position, and the degree of vigour with which he would defend it; possibly he flattered himself, that this General, informed of the capture of Tortona, might think himself insecure, and finding himself attacked might abandon the Tanaro.

On the day on which the city of Tortona was carried, the advanced guard of the left of the army had, to cover that operation, passed the Scrivia, and pushed on between the last named city and Alexandria, having the Orba and the Tanaro between it and the French army. On the 14th, the army also passed the Scrivia, and encamped at St. Juliano, thus taking a position on the right flank of Moreau. Its head-quarters were at Castel-Nuovo della

Scrivia. Neither this movement, nor that made on the other side by General Wuckassowich, shaking the firmness of the French General, Marshal Suworow hoped to weary him out by a new movement, and gave orders to his army, in the night of the 16th, to fall back, and to go and pass the Po, near Casa Tisma, from thence to proceed towards the Sessia.

Whether Moreau was informed of this order, or that he had some other reason, which has remained a secret, in the night of the 15th, he threw a bridge of boats over the Bormida, and on the 16th, in the morning, passed that river with 10,000 men. He overthrew the advanced posts of the combined army, and drove them by Marengo, towards St. Julian. The divisions of Generals Kaim and Frolich were encamped at this place: the latter, seven battalions and six squadrons strong, was then commanded by General Lusignan, who, without waiting for orders from the head-quarters, which were full two leagues distant, marched to meet the French. Near St. Julian he fell in with Prince Bagration, who was marching from Novi, with five Russian battalions, towards the Po, to cross that river, in consequence of

the order which has been mentioned. This brave General did not hesitate to offer his services, and to place himself under the command of General Lusignan. The latter formed the combined corps in two lines, marched towards the enemy, who had already penetrated near to St. Juliano, and charged them vigorously with fixed bayonets and to the sound of music, in spite of a violent fire of grape-shot to which he was exposed. Moreau sustained this charge without moving, and the battle was continued for a long time with obstinacy. But the second line of the Imperialists having advanced and charged in its turn, the French gave way and began to retreat. This they did in good order, their cavalry, which was three times superior to that of the Imperialists, having prevented the latter from making the most of their success. They succeeded, however, in cutting off on the right of the enemy 300 men, who were either killed or drowned. The French infantry, arrived near their bridge, posted themselves behind some large ditches which were in the neighbourhood, and in their turn protected the retreat of the cavalry, which, as well as the artillery, passed the bridge on a gallop. Night being

come, Moreau took advantage of it to draw back all his troops across the Bormida, after having lost about 1200 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The loss of the Imperialists amounted to about half that number. Their flying artillery distinguished itself much in this affair, and made great ravages in the French ranks.

Moreau finding that he had in vain endeavoured to disengage his right flank, that his left flank was threatened, and the line of the Po, already broken by General Wuckassowich, who had taken possession of Verrua and Casale,* and by the Russian General Rosenberg, who had taken post on the right bank, near Valentia, seeing a strong and active insurrection carrying off, in his rear, his couriers, his provision, transports, and even the reinforcements which were coming to him, abandoned, on the 19th, his position ; satisfied that by having occupied it, he had kept for a fortnight the combined army in a

* Casale was formerly an important fortress, which, besides its own fortifications, had a castle and a citadel, which was of the best in Italy. It cut a considerable figure in all the preceding wars.—In 1705, the Duke de Vendome took Verrua after a long siege, and razed the fortifications.

state of indecision, and thus necessarily retarded the course of the campaign. He retreated by Asti, Cherasco, and Fossano, on Coni, where he established his head-quarters, thus abandoning to the Allies the whole plain of Piedmont, and confining himself to preserving the communications with France by the Col di Tende and by the valley of Argentiere, and with the Riviera di Genoa by the Maritime Alps. To accomplish this latter object, he was obliged to dispatch to his right a body of troops to engage the insurgents of Mondovi and Ceva. He succeeded in reducing the first by fire and sword ; but an Austrian Captain, conducted by guides, who had been sent by the Insurgents to the head-quarters of the Allies, having succeeded in traversing with 300 men the country of Montferrat, occupied by the French, and in throwing himself into Ceva, he maintained himself there by dint of courage and ability, and annoyed the French very much by the possession of this post, which cut off their communications. The march and conduct of this Captain, named Schmelzer, seem rather of a character with the wars which

were carried on two hundred years ago, than with the present.

The offensive irruption of Moreau had retarded the grand and decisive movement which Marshal Suworow meditated. This General, naturally enterprising, and who was resolved to press this campaign with all possible vivacity, having obtained his object in forcing Moreau to quit his position, and not choosing to be stopped in his career by only 15,000 men, determined to march straight to Turin. In consequence, the combined army, from 30,000 to 34,000 men strong, on the 19th, abandoned the Scrivia, fell back by Voghera, and on the next day went to pass the Po, part at Cambio, and part near the mouth of the Ticino. Three corps, which formed one almost as considerable as the French army, were left on the Scrivia and the Tanaro: the first, under the orders of General Alcaini, to blockade the castle of Tortona; the second, under the Russian General Schweikowsky, to mask Alexandria; the third, under General Seckendorf, to watch the Apennines, to scour the country of Montferrat, and to support the inhabitants of the provinces of Mondovi and

Ceva, who were in full insurrection, had taken a French battalion, had massacred some hundreds of men, had taken, after a blockade of nine days, the castle of Ceva as well as its garrison, 300 men strong, and had sent to demand succour from the Imperialists.

On the 21st, the columns of the combined army reunited at Candia, on the Sessia; they rested there on the 22d; and on the 23d continued their march by Trino, Crescentino, and Chiavasso, along the left bank of the Po. General Wuckassowich crossed that river at Casale, and proceeded by the right bank towards Turin, to second the movements which were made on the opposite side. On the 25th, in the afternoon, the combined army, composed of three Austrian and one Russian division, and including the advanced guard, consisting of rather more than 30,000 men, encamped within a league of Turin. The enemy had in this city 2500 men under the command of General Fiorella. The latter, having refused to surrender the city on the summons that had been sent him, on the same night 7000 or 8000 Austrians were ordered to cross the Stura, who pushed

forwards to the suburb of Balon, and took post there during the night. General Wuckassowich at the same time took possession of the heights, called the Heights of the Capuchins, which command the city on the side of the Po. General Fiorella, having persisted during the whole of the 26th in his refusal to give up the city, probably to gain time for the evacuation of it, and to be able to make the necessary arrangements for the defence of the citadel, General Wuckassowich ordered the batteries to play in the morning. The third shell having set fire to one quarter of the city, the garrison determined to abandon it, and shut itself up in the citadel. The inhabitants themselves opened their gates to the Imperialists towards noon, and in the course of the day, the whole army passed through the city, and went to take different positions between it and the circumjacent towns of Carmagnola, Pignerol, and Suza. It is not necessary to say, that in thus occupying the three principal roads by which the French might approach Turin, their object was to secure from insult the siege of the citadel, which they were about to begin. After having retired there, General Fiorella threw some balls and shells into

the city; but having been given to understand that if the firing was continued, no capitulation would be allowed him, he readily consented to a convention, by which he engaged to fire no more on the town, as the Allies did, not to fire on the citadel from that quarter.

Thus did Marshal Suworow, in less than a week, carry his army from the Scrivia to the Stura and the Doira, that is to say, almost to the frontiers of France, and make himself master of the capital of Piedmont, a place strong in itself, and which there is no doubt nothing but the want of troops prevented Moreau from defending. This movement of the Russian General was no less bold than successful; for although the day on which he began it was the same on which Moreau quitted his position at Alexandria, it is seen, by the anterior orders that had been given to the Allied army, that even had the French General remained there, the Field Marshal having the three corps which have been mentioned, on the Scrivia, the Bormida, and the Tanaro, and covering his march along the Po by the corps of Generals Wuckassowich and Rosemberg, would have nevertheless proceeded against Turin. This movement recalls

to one's recollection that by which, in 1706, Prince Eugene, after having gained some marches on the French army that was opposed to him in Lombardy, came to raise the siege of this place, and to break the lines of his enemy; lines, which the inactivity of the Marshals de la Feuillade and Marsin had neglected to make as strong on the side of Chiavasso as on the other points. Prince Eugene, whom these two Generals had obliged the Duke of Orleans to suffer to pass, first the Tanaro, and afterwards the Po, and lastly the Doira, began his attack, like Marshal Suworow, on the suburb of Balon, and pierced on this point the lines in which the two French Marshals had so foolishly waited for him.

The capture of Turin was not the only fruit which the Allies derived at this same time from their victory on the Adda, and from their superiority. The four battalions which had been left at Milan with General Latterman, not being sufficient to undertake the siege of the castle, Marshal Suworow, who was determined not to suffer the sieges which he had to undertake, and which divided his army, to be drawn out to any length, commissioned

General Count Hohenzollern to go and lay siege to the castle of Milan, and gave him six battalions more for that purpose.

At the same time, Prince Victor de Rohan, who, as has been mentioned, acted on the Lakes of Como and Lugano, and was there supporting the insurrection of the inhabitants of the country, finding himself too weak to make head against the French troops, who, after having departed from the Valteline, had retired to Bellinzona, to cover the right of the army of Switzerland, had sent to ask for assistance; and General Hohenzollern received orders to carry it to him. For this purpose, being obliged to interrupt the measures which he was taking for the siege of the castle of Milan, he left in that city General Latterman with five battalions, and marched with the five others, on the 15th, to Ponte Teresa, where the advanced posts of Prince Rohan were. He made such diligence, that he joined the latter there on the 17th. No less ready to fight than to march, this General, who had much distinguished himself at the battle of Legnago, on the 18th, attacked the French General Loison, who, it may be remembered, commanded in those parts, defeated him, forced

him to fall back more than twenty miles, and to abandon the southern part of the Italian bailiwicks. After having thus confirmed the Prince de Rohan in his positions of Lugano and Ponte Teresa, and having left a battalion to reinforce him, General Hohenzollern immediately returned towards Milan with the same expedition that he left it, and arrived there on the 20th, having thus in six days marched more than 100 miles and defeated the enemy. With the same activity, on the night following, he opened the trenches against the castle of Milan; and the siege was continued with such vigour, notwithstanding the fire of the besieged, that on the 23d the batteries were mounted and in condition to play. Being summoned a second time, the Commandant consented to capitulate. The principal conditions were that the garrison, consisting of 2200 men, should return to France, but should not serve for a year against the two Emperors. It was at this time much regretted, that this garrison, as well as that of Peschiera and some others, had not been made prisoners of war, instead of returning to France, where they were made use of to maintain the Directorial despotism, to act against the Royalists of

Brittany, in short, to enable the French rulers to send troops to the armies which they would otherwise have been obliged to keep in the interior of France. The fear of prolonging the defence of these places, and the desire of rendering disposable as soon as possible the corps employed in besieging them, were probably the motives that determined the allied Generals to accede to this sort of capitulation, which the French Commanders in besieged places had orders to endeavour to obtain. The capture of the castle of Milan did not cost the Austrians fifty men ; they found there a great quantity of provisions of all kinds. The losses which the French had suffered in this respect since the beginning of the campaign have not yet been stated. It will be sufficient to say that the magazines which were taken from them at Brescia, Bergamo, Crema, Cremona, Peschiera, Pizzighetone, and other places, were immense, and abundantly sufficient for the supply of the allied armies. The spoils of Italy, those at least of the soil, passed in part from the hands of the French to those of the Imperialists.

On the same day on which the latter took possession of the Castle of Milan, they also

took the citadel of Ferrara. The fortifications of this city, which had been originally constructed by Pope Clement VIII. had, as may be supposed, been much neglected since that time. The French thought of restoring them, to give themselves a point of support on the Lower Po; and they built a citadel perfectly regular, which they furnished with a great quantity of artillery. General Klenau had, after a long blockade, formed in a great degree by the armed peasants, easily got possession of the city, which was without defence; but he was obliged, if not to besiege the citadel in form, at least to construct some batteries to bombard it. These works having been finished on the evening of the 22d, on the following morning the fortress was summoned, and on its refusal, was bombarded. In a short time, some of the magazines having been set on fire, the Commandant beat a parley. The capitulation was signed on the 24th, and was similar to those on which some remarks have just been made. The garrison, consisting of 1525 men, were sent to France under the engagement not to serve for six months against the Allies.

Two days afterwards, the left wing of the

Allies extended itself still farther; for four companies of infantry having been embarked on the 24th at the mouth of the Po, they took possession, the day following, without obstacle, of Porto Digoro, and on the 26th of Porto Primaro, where they disembarked, and from whence, supported by 300 insurgents of the country, they marched against Ravenna, into the port of which city an Austrian flotilla had just entered at the same time. The French and the Italian patriots, who occupied it, shut its gates; but one of them was soon forced, and the garrison obliged to fly by another towards Lucca, not however without leaving a hundred prisoners in the hands of the assailants. The capture of Ferrara and Ravenna completed the establishment of the Austrians on the Lower Po, gave support to their left, and rendered their maritime communications, and the arrival of their transports more easy and more secure. The period at which they got possession of these two posts made the acquisition of them, as will soon be seen, very valuable, and particularly that of the first of them.

Thus the Imperialists, confined and threatened as they had been at the end of March,

on the line of the Adige, had in two months of the campaign gained three pitched battles, taken four fortresses, made themselves masters of the course of the Po, carried their right to the frontiers of France, and their left to the Adriatic Sea.—A Russian and Turkish squadron blocked up the port of Ancona, and bombarded that city.—General Klenau occupied the country of Ferrara, and a great part of that of Bologna, blockaded the fort of Urbino, and sent parties into Romagna, and as far as the frontiers of Tuscany.—General Ott, with a division, occupied the duchies of Parma and Modena, and had his advanced posts in the Apennines, and among other places at the important pass of Pentromoli.—General Kray, who had been joined by the whole corps which had besieged the castle of Milan, and by reinforcements brought from the Hereditary countries, left 15,000 men before Mantua, passed the Po with an equal number, to go and succour the divisions of Generals Ott and Klenau, and placed his head-quarters at Castelluccio.—The three corps already mentioned blocked up Tortona and Alexandria, watched the mountains of the State of Genoa, and

countenanced the insurgents of the maritime Alps.—The great army supported them still more at the other extremity of Piedmont, possessed itself of the passes which lead from this country to France, and kept in check the army of Moreau.—Such was the state of affairs, at the end of the month of May, in the upper parts of Italy. It has been necessary to present an abridged view of it, and to review the results which followed from the two first months of the campaign, the better to be prepared for the new military scene which is going to open itself.

CHAPTER VI.

State of the kingdom of Naples when General Macdonald received orders to evacuate it—His political and military measures—His arrival in Tuscany, where he unites 25,000 men—Task which he has still to perform, and the two ways of executing it—Part which he adopts, and projects which he forms in concert with Moreau—On the 26th of May, he begins to act with success on both sides of the Apennines—Movement made and position taken by Moreau, to facilitate a junction with the army of Naples—He goes to Genoa, and there receives some reinforcements—Occupations of the Allies after the taking of Turin—Distribution of their forces, and countries which are in their possession—Multiplicity of their enterprizes—Situation of Marshal Suworow—He makes himself be joined by General Bellegarde and 12,000 men—Macdonald and all his army cross the Apennines—Combats near Modena on the 10th, 11th, and 12th of June—He is repulsed in the two first, but victorious in the last—He makes

himself master of Modena, Reggio, Parma, and Placentia—Marshal Suworow quits Turin with his army, he marches first against Moreau, and then with great rapidity against Macdonald—He meets with him on the little river Tidone—Battles of the 17th, 18th, and 19th of June, on both sides of the Trebbia, all of which terminate to the advantage of the Allies—Macdonald, after having lost more than a third of his army, returns to the same spots from whence he had set out—Generals Hohenzollern and Klenau are left to oppose him—Marshal Suworow hastens back to engage Moreau, who had passed the Apennines, raised the blockade of Tortona, and forced General Bellegarde to retreat behind the Bormida—He retires to Genoa on the approach of the Russian Commander—Account of the siege of the citadel of Turin—Its reduction, and remark on two articles of the capitulation.

LITTLE attention has as yet been paid to the South of Italy, and it has only been mentioned in the first chapter, what was the force of the army of Naples, and what positions it occupied

in that kingdom, and in the territories of the Church. Neither has any thing been said about Tuscany, for as war was not declared against the Grand Duke, at Paris, till the 13th of March, it was not till the end of that month, that his states were invaded, revolutionized, and pillaged by 7000 or 8000 Republican troops, mostly Ligurians and Cisalpines. The Prince himself had been wise enough to foresee the coming storm, and had retired to Vienna before the declaration of war.

It has been mentioned that at the opening of the campaign, the French were only masters of some of the provinces, and of the capital of the kingdom of Naples. Since that time General Macdonald had been prevented from extending his conquests, by the gradual diminution of his army, which for some months had received no reinforcements, by the daily increasing number of faithful inhabitants, who took up arms in favour of their King under the command of Cardinal Ruffo and other inferior leaders, by the continual alarm occasioned by threats of descent from the English, Russians, and Turks, who cruized on the coasts of both seas, and had even seized upon the Proci-dean islands, and

lastly, by the disastrous news which he received from Upper Italy. He had been obliged to content himself with securing the submission of the capital, with putting the coasts in a state of defence, and with completing the reduction of the two provinces of Abbruzza, of Capitanata, and of the two principalities, which he had been able to effect by burning several towns and villages, and putting to the sword some thousands of peasants. Such was the situation of Macdonald, when he received from the Directory the tardy and difficult to be executed order, to evacuate the kingdom of Naples, and join Moreau.—According to the instructions sent him, he left all power in the hands of the patriots, not, however, as in other countries, of patriots of the lower classes, but of nobles and dignitaries of the church, who, at the time of the conquest, had thrown themselves into the arms of the French, and who having been long before engaged in conspiracies against their Sovereign, offered more certain assurances of Republican fidelity, than were found among those who commonly compose the forlorn hopes of democracy.—He left for their support Re-

publican corps raised in the country, and the garrisons of St. Elme, of Capua, and of Gaeta, which could easily communicate with, and assist one another. He set out with all the rest of his troops, traversed in close columns the Romish state, several parts of which were not entirely subdued, left there his heavy baggage, and having made himself be joined by all the troops in it, excepting some small garrisons which he left at Rome, Civita Vecchia, Viterbo, Perugia, Ronciglione, and Ancona, he hastened towards Tuscany, the capital of which he reached on the 24th of May. He found there the division of General Gauthier, and established a communication with that of General Montrichard, which was opposed to General Klenau in the country of Bologna and in Romagna. The union of all these troops, composed of French, Italians, and Poles, formed an army of about 25,000 men, which was a greater force than that with which Moreau still disputed the possession of Upper Italy, and therefore, the Allies were about to have to combat more than a double number of enemies. When attention is paid to the different and intermingled positions of the contending parties, and when it is remem-

bered that the French army occupied Tuscany, while one of Austrians and Russians was on the frontiers of France, that Mantua was in the hands of the Republicans, and Turin in that of the Imperialists, the singularity of this campaign, the variety of chances which it presented, and the multiplicity of combinations required on both sides, are strikingly felt.—Although that of 1706, during which (as has been observed in the account of the Campaign of 1796) Prince Eugene was at Turin, while the French army occupied Mantua and its duchy, offers a very remarkable resemblance, yet it must be acknowledged, that the comparison is of small things with great, and that affairs at the more distant period were much less complicated. The season, too, was more advanced, and left less time for operations.

It was a great deal for Macdonald to have traversed the territory of the Church, to have led his army in safety from Naples into Tuscany, to have found that country still in the hands of the Republicans, and to have there received reinforcements; it was probably even more than he had expected: but yet, the most difficult part

of his task remained still to be performed.—He had to join Moreau, who was at 150 miles distance, and to overcome the multiplied obstacles presented both by the nature of the country and by the enemy. To effect an union with his colleague, he had two roads on different sides of the Apennines. The one goes along the Riviera di Ponente, and is known under the name of the *Corniche*; but it could not admit of the passage of artillery, or even of baggage. His army would have been obliged to pass it in a manner one man after another, and that would have had more the appearance of a flight than of a march. Besides, the Austrians were masters of the defile of Pontremoli; they commanded that road, and might have suddenly stopped and destroyed those who ventured to pass it. The second road was that in the plain between the Apennines and the Po, across the duchies of Modena, Parma, and Placentia. From this country Macdonald had to drive away the Austrians, who were in possession of it; and, besides, he could not on this side effect a junction, unless Moreau, who had retreated among the Maritime Alps, should return into the Po, which he would find very difficult, from

the weakness of his army, and from the advantageous positions occupied by the Allies.

This, however, was the road chosen by the two Republican Generals, who already had a free and speedy intercourse with one another by the Riviera di Levante, and began to concert their plans and measures. They thought this way of forming a junction was at once more sure, more bold, and better calculated to embarrass the Allies, and to lengthen out the campaign. In fact, even supposing that they could not effect a junction, they would oblige the Allies to divide their forces, and to employ them in the heart of Italy, instead of directing them in Switzerland, or against France itself. But Macdonald and Moreau carried their ambition still farther.—Seeing the allied army scattered all around the vast basin of Lombardy, and employed in blocking up at the same time four strong places; knowing that the three-coloured flag still waved at Mantua, on the extremity of the line of the Po, and on the other end at Turin, while in the middle Tortona and Alexandria still held out, they flattered themselves with being able to support themselves on some one of these four fortresses, and hoped

to reestablish the affairs of the Republic, however desperate they might appear at the moment, and still to render doubtful the result of the campaign.—They aimed at nothing less than to reconquer all the right bank of the Po, to raise the blockades of Tortona, Alexandria, and Turin, and perhaps even of Mantua, and ultimately to drive back the Allies to the Alps of Switzerland and of the Tyrol.

Although Macdonald had resolved to advance between the Apennines and the Po, it was nevertheless necessary that he should be master of the road by the Corniche; for not only was it by it that he was to preserve his intercourse with Moreau, but it was also by roads which branched off from it, that he could penetrate into the plain across the mountains. His first object, therefore, was to open to himself the two *debouches*, and consequently having, on the 26th, assembled his troops upon the frontiers of Tuscany, he divided them into two principal bodies. That of the right, which was supported from Bologna, marched the same day against the advanced posts of General Klenau, forced them to raise the blockade of fort Urbano, and made them retreat to Modena. The second

column, composed of the division of Dombrowsky, directed its course to the left against General Ott, and having left Sassalba, on the 27th, it gained ground upon the enemy, and on that and the following day advancing by Sarzana, Ulla, and Villa-Franca, dislodged the Imperial troops from the important post of Pontremoli, a defile through which Charles VIII. King of France, entered into Tuscany, in 1493.* The head-quarters of Macdonald were, on the 30th, placed at Lucca.

While this General thus opened to himself the entry to the plain of the Po, and secured the principal passage, by the possession of which the Allies might have prevented a junction, Moreau advanced half-way to meet his colleague, and leaving only his left wing in the position of Coni, arrived with his right, across the Maritime Alps, at Savona, occupying with his centre the Upper Valley of the Tanaro—a position almost the same with that occupied by the army of Bonaparte, at the beginning of the campaign of 1796. Detaching the division of Victor still

* It was likewise at Pontremoli, that, in 1797, the treaty was concluded, by which Tuscany came into the possession of the House of Lorrain.

farther on in the State of Genoa, he occupied, with considerable force, the defile of the Bochetta, and the other passages of the Apennines, from which the Allies had not yet thought of driving the feeble detachments which defended them. In this manner did Moreau give himself the power of penetrating also into the plain, as soon as circumstances should render it adviseable. He went himself to Genoa, some days afterwards, where he concerted matters with General Pérignon, who commanded there, and received some small reinforcements and some provisions. These were brought to him by the French fleet, which, after having had the good luck to escape from Brest, where it had long been blocked up by the English fleets, had passed the Straits of Gibraltar, touched at Toulon, shewed itself for a moment on the coasts of Genoa and Tuscany, and had again the good fortune to return by the same road, and to enter safely into the port of Brest, taking with it the Spanish fleet, which had joined it off Cadiz.

While the two Republican Generals, by their movements and their operations, were preparing for very important events, the Allies gathered together all the spoils left by the French, at

Turin—instead of the government of the King of Sardinia, established there a provisional government, directed by delegates from Vienna—prepared to besiege the citadel—enrolled in their army some thousands of Piedmontese soldiers, who had abandoned the standards of the Republic—restored the ancient Sardinian regiments—raised in the country a corps of chasseurs—spread themselves into the neighbouring provinces, and there encouraged the different bands of insurgents, who carried on a very troublesome war against the French, whom they sought for in all the retreats of the mountains, and to whom they gave no quarter.

Of all the subjects of the King of Sardinia, the inhabitants of the valleys of Lucerne, of St. Martin, and of Perousa, known under the name of Vaudois, or Barbets, and so celebrated in the old wars of Italy, had alone joined the French, and had armed in their favour.* Ge-

* They had, on the contrary, been the enemies of France, in the war which preceded, and in that which followed the peace of Ryswick. They shewed themselves so active and so dangerous, that the French were obliged to send a whole army against them; at last, the famous Monsieur de Feuquieres, having been entrusted with their reduction, shut them up in their

neral Lusignan was sent against them with 3000 men. He marched by Pignerol, towards the valley of Fenestrelles, and, on the 3d, surprised and took prisoner, the Republican General Zimmerman, who commanded in these parts. On the 4th, he penetrated into the mountains, defeated the insurgents, and the French who supported them; and having arrived, on the 5th, before Fenestrelles, which he kept blockaded for three days, he sent past it strong patrols, by the valley of St. Martin, into Dauphiné, where they carried off some plunder, and spread an alarm.

While Marshal Suworow extended his forces towards France, he likewise gained ground opposite to Moreau. The division of General Frœlich, which occupied Pignerol, Montcalieri,

last and most impenetrable asylum, the great rock, called from its form, the *Four Teeth*, where he found means to force and to destroy them. It was this cavern, surrounded by inaccessible mountains, that, in the times of persecution, served as a refuge to the ministers of the Vaudois, called *Old Beards*, from which came the name of *Barbets*. The inhabitants of these three valleys did not amount to 20,000 souls. It is known, that before this war, their priests received an annual stipend from England.

and Carignan, pushed on afterwards to Fossano and Savigliano, where it established itself, and sent patrols even as far as Coni. General Wuckassowich, who continued to lead the vanguard with the same ability and success, took Carmagnola, Alba, and Cherasco, and forced the French to retire from Ceva and Mondovi, the former of which places they had blockaded and bombarded for some days. General Alcaïni began the siege and bombardment of the citadel of Tortona; and some light troops, invited and seconded by the inhabitants of the country, advanced by Suza, into the Maurienne. Thus it appears, that with the exception of the province of Coni, of the countries of Nice and Tende, and of small portions of the south of Piedmont, the Allies had already reconquered all the territories which had been in the possession of the King of Sardinia, when the French deprived him of his crown.

Although Marshal Suworow had not, perhaps, imagined that Macdonald would arrive so soon, and with so many forces, in Tuscany, and although it was at a moment when he increased the distance between them, by marching to Turin, yet he had not shut his eyes upon this augmen-

tation of enemies, which he would soon have to encounter: and it was to oppose them in the mean time, that he had ordered General Kray to suspend the siege of Mantua, and to advance beyond the Po, with fifteen battalions and twelve squadrons, of which movement, an account has already been given. It has been seen, that Generals Ott and Klenau, who, with very few troops, had a large extent of country to defend, had been obliged to retire before Macdonald, notwithstanding the support afforded them by General Kray. Although always victorious, the allied army had been weakened by the very consequences of their success. In order to secure their conquests, they were forced to spread and divide themselves into a multitude of parts: they had posts at the feet of the Apennines, the Maritime, the Upper, and the Pennine Alps,*

* The *Apennines* commence near Mount Appio, in the State of Genoa, and, as is well known, divide Lower Italy.—The *Maritime Alps* extend from Vado, in the State of Genoa, to the source of the Var, at which point begin the *Cotian Alps*, which reach as far as the town of Suza.—From that, the *Gratian Alps* occupy the space, as far as Mount St. Bernard, as do the *Pennine*, to St. Gothard. At that mountain begin the *Rhetian*, which end at Piava; and from thence

an immense circuit of more than 400 miles. The allied army, at the same time, carried on sieges on both sides of the Po, and sustained the war in the open country, to a great distance from the towns, which it either blockaded or besieged. Its right was upon the frontiers of France, and its left upon the Adriatic Gulf. Its two flanks were at 300 miles distance from one another, and it may be said, it was in a situation similar to that of the French at the commencement of the campaign, when, on account of the vast extent of country which they guarded, they felt a relative inferiority, though superior in number. As long as Marshal Suworow had no enemy but Moreau, he could, with the forces he had, continue this war, and, at the same time, act offensively against the army of the enemy; the small reinforcements which he received, being at least equal to those sent to Moreau. But he had foreseen, that when Macdonald should come to throw his weight into the scales, his situation would be much altered, and he had, therefore, beforehand,

on to Istria, where the chain finishes, the mountains take the name of the *Northern*, or *Carnic Alps*.

asked for reinforcements, both at Petersburg and at Vienna. The first of these courts detached to his assistance 11,000 men of the 45,000 which it had destined to act in Switzerland: the second, attaching less importance to the conquest of the latter country, than of Italy, ordered General Bellegarde, with a part of his corps, to reinforce Marshal Suworow, whenever he should be required to do so. This occasion was now come, and, consequently, as has been mentioned in the preceding volume, General Bellegarde, leaving General Haddick with a sufficient force in the Italian bailiwicks, quitted that country at the end of May, with about 14,000 men, arrived at Milan on the 5th of June, and afterwards marched by Pavia, to Alexandria, the blockade of which place was confided to him. This powerful reinforcement, and some free corps, which arrived at the same time from the Hereditary States, put it in the power of Marshal Suworow to unite about 40,000 fighting men, to oppose the two French Generals.

That it might not be necessary to interrupt the recital of subsequent events, the operations, the designs, and the situation of the Allies in Piedmont, in the beginning of June, have been

detailed in connection. Another theatre must now be returned to, and a new scene of activity laid open.

Macdonald, on his arrival in Tuscany, had so much hastened to push his advanced posts beyond that country, only because he feared that upon intelligence of his approach, the Allies would lose no time in seizing, with sufficient force, the roads of the Apennines, and thus shutting up the passage against him. But having secured it by the attacks, of which an account has been given, and having it in his power, from this time forward, to enter on the plan, on either side at his pleasure, his right being supported by Bologna, and his left by the division of Victor, in the valley of Taro, he for some days suspended every offensive operation, to give time to Moreau to make a movement towards Genoa. He had also in view, to procure for himself all the military assistance which could be had from Tuscany and Romania, and to secure the Island of Elba, of which the possession was become very precarious, from the insurrection of the inhabitants, supported by a body of Neapolitans, which had landed there.

All the preparatory measures having been

taken by him and his colleague, Macdonald put his army in motion, on the 8th of June. He set out himself with the centre, from Pistoya, and marched towards Modena. His right, composed of the divisions of Montrichard and of Rusca, was ordered to direct its course between that town and the Po, cutting off all communication between them, by passing the Panaro. These divisions set out from Bologna and its neighbourhood. Those of Victor and of Dombrowsky, which were on the left, moved, the former from Borgo di Taro, and the latter from Pontremoli, the one taking the road to Fornovio, and the other to Reggio.

Although, from what has been said elsewhere, the dispositions of the Allies in these parts, may be known, it is, perhaps, proper to repeat here, that the left of Macdonald was directed against General Ott, who, after having been driven from Pontremoli, in the end of May, had reassembled his corps at Fornovio, to which place General Melas had sent him some slight reinforcements: that Macdonald, in the centre, had opposed to him General Hohenzollern, who had been left by General Kray at Modena, with a part of the troops taken from the blockade of Mantua, and

brought to the other side of the Po: lastly, that the right of the Republican army was opposed to General Klenau, who had concentrated his force under the walls of Ferrara. After the reflections, in a preceding part of this chapter, on the distribution of the allied forces, it is hardly necessary to say, that the three last mentioned corps were collectively much inferior to the army of Macdonald, which, including the division of Victor, now amounted to about 35,000 men.

On the 10th, the advanced posts of the centre of each of the two armies met, on the road to Modena, which produced a skirmish among the cavalry. On the day after, Macdonald reconnoitred, at the head of his horse, which brought on a very smart action, in which the Austrian infantry gave another proof of that extraordinary bravery which it had shewn at the battle of Jemappes, in charging with the bayonet and repulsing the cavalry of the enemy. The regiment of light cavalry of Bussi, a free corps, composed of Emigrant French officers, and which had just arrived from the Hereditary States, distinguished itself much in this affair. Macdonald could

not break through the line of advanced posts of General Hohenzollern, nor cut off his communication with General Ott, and was repulsed with the loss of several hundred men.

This reconnoitring affair was only the forerunner of a much more serious attack, which the French General made, on the 12th, with all his forces, and with much more success. He had concerted it so as to surround the corps of General Hohenzollern; for, while he himself advanced in front upon Modena, the left wing, which, the night before, had proceeded to near Reggio, was to penetrate between these two towns, and the right wing, to pass the Panaro, and turn the left flank of the Imperialists. If these three attacks should succeed, every retreat for the latter would be cut off. Attacked on all points, by superior forces (General Hohenzollern having but five battalions and six squadrons) they defended themselves with a bravery equal to that of their assailants, and the combat was so obstinate, that the infantry several times joined with the bayonet, and that the cavalry reciprocally charged one another. Officers and Generals, all were personally engaged. The French General Forest was killed; Macdonald

himself was severely wounded, by several sabre cuts, in one of the charges of cavalry. All this, however, did not save the centre of the Imperialists from being driven from Modena, and its right from the road from that town to Reggio. Fortunately, the left maintained itself between the Panaro and the Secchia, and on that point, victoriously resisted all the efforts of the French. General Hohenzollern was therefore enabled to make his retreat towards Mirandole and the Po, which he hastened to pass, after having suffered a very considerable loss. The regiment of Preiss, which, with its brave Colonel Weidenfelt, had acquired great glory the evening before, suffered much on this day, as did also that of Klebeck, one of those in the Austrian army, whose bravery has been most fatal to it in the course of the two wars.* Macdonald wrote from his bed, that the Imperialists had had 1500 men killed and wounded, and his army 200.

* This regiment lost 605 men at the single battle of Maubeuge, of whom 22 were officers. It took, on that occasion, three different times, at the point of the bayonet, the village of Watignies, which disputes with Maubeuge the honour of giving a name to that battle.

The first computation was too much by one third, and the last too small by one half; in which proportion likewise the 2000 prisoners, which he said he had taken, must be reduced.

It was pretty generally believed at the time, that after this success, Macdonald would have immediately endeavoured to cross the Po, to raise the siege of Mantua, to destroy the works of the besiegers, and to revictual that place; and that he would confine himself to attempting to reconquer the Lower Po. But when it is remarked that General Kray was behind that river with 10,000 men of regular troops, and a still greater number of armed peasants, that General Hohenzollern had retired to join him, and that, while these two Generals would resist Macdonald in front, General Klenau, who on his left maintained his post at Ferrara and on the Panaro, and General Ott, who on his right had retired to Parma, where he might be reinforced with any number the Allies thought proper to send; when it is remarked that these two last mentioned Generals could join whenever Macdonald passed the Po, could deprive him of his bridge on that river, could follow him on the opposite bank, and could

form a strong force upon his rear; and that, in that case, he would have been left to himself, deprived of every means of communication with Moreau; it will appear very plain that it was much more his interest to remain between the Apennines and the Po, and to think of other projects; and so indeed he acted: for, on the 13th, he advanced towards Reggio, entered Parma on the 14th, from which the Duke and all his family fled beyond the Po on his approach, and on the 15th arrived at Placentia. General Ott, who had not above 10,000 men, did not choose to risk an unequal battle, and though by falling back he had the mortification to yield ground, yet he had the advantage of saving half the distance to those troops which were advancing to his assistance.

Marshal Suworow had not waited till Macdonald had begun his operations to prepare to oppose this new enemy. Knowing that he was assembling troops upon the frontiers of Tuscany, that he had there been joined by the divisions of Gauthier and Montrichard, and that, by the intermediate division of Victor, he was in full communication with Moreau: being likewise informed of the movements made by

the latter in the country of Genoa, he easily discovered that the two Republican Generals had concerted their projects, and that he had no time to lose in overturning them. In consequence, leaving General Wuckassowich with a corps of observation in the province of Mondovi, and General Kaim with the brigade of General Lusignan and with some small corps of light troops, to cover the siege on the side of France, he set out, on the 10th, from Turin, with the principal part of his army, amounting to from 25,000 to 30,000 men, and placed his head-quarters the same day at Asti, from which they were transferred, on the 12th, to Acqui. It is clear that this first movement was not directed against Macdonald, but against Moreau; and, indeed, when it is remembered that the Allies at that moment blocked up the two fortresses of Tortona and Alexandria, it will be perceived that it was from the latter General, that the Marshal had most immediately any thing to dread, and that it was against him that he ought first to secure himself. But when he saw that the army of Moreau continued shut up in the mountains, and that that General himself was still at Genoa; that the division of

Grenier, which had been sent forward, had not yet left the Apennines; when at the same time he learned the advantage which Macdonald had gained on the 12th, and his after progress, then Marshal Suworow determined to march against the latter in person, and to bring him to action. He therefore turned upon his left, and marched towards Alexandria, from which, having left there General Bellegarde, who had just arrived with a force sufficient to continue the blockade, and to keep in check the division of Grenier, he set out, on the 15th, with a little more than 20,000 men, of whom two-thirds were Russians, to go and meet Macdonald.

It has been stated that the latter arrived on the same day at Placentia; on the 16th, he united there all his forces, and invested the citadel, which he in vain attempted to carry by storm. On the 17th, he marched again against General Ott, who had continued to retire before him, keeping however his advanced posts always in view. Macdonald crossed the Trebia in two columns, the one marching along the Po, the other towards Castel St. Giovanni, and he repulsed, beyond that place and beyond the little river Tidone, the advanced posts of

the Imperialists. While these latter skirmished and disputed the ground, Marshal Suworow arrived with his vanguard; and General Ott being reinforced by him immediately with some battalions and squadrons, marched with all his division to the assistance of his vanguard, and repulsed that of the enemy; which having been in its turn reinforced, the combat was carried on pretty smartly till night. The French were forced, on one side by General Ott, and on the other by the vanguard of the Russians, to retire behind the Tidone, leaving a great number of dead upon the field, and some hundreds of prisoners in the hands of the Imperialists.

In the night the whole of the allied army arrived, and having given them but a few hours repose after their rapid march, Marshal Suworow, on the following morning, formed them in order of battle in three columns: those of the right and centre were entirely composed of Russians, and commanded, the first by General Rosemberg, and the last by General Forster; the left was under the orders of General Melas, and consisted of the Austrian divisions of Ott and Frœlich. Prince Lichtenstein, of the same nation, commanded a reserve of cavalry near

the Po, and the Russian Prince Bagration led the vanguard. All the army advanced beyond the Tidone, which it forded; but the time required for forming in order of battle, the fatigue of the troops, and the difficulties of the ground, prevented their arrival early in presence of the enemy, and it was found necessary to defer the general attack, which had been intended for that day, to the following one: partial engagements, however, before the Trebia, took place that afternoon, and they fought with obstinacy with divided success till night. The advantage, however, was gained by the Allies, and the Russian grenadiers surrounded at Cassaleggio, and took two battalions. The French, after a still greater loss than they had sustained the preceding evening, were driven back on all points behind the Trebia. This river, which is divided in several branches, at that time very low and easily fordable, separated the two armies.

Macdonald, who, though wounded, followed and directed the army, was not discouraged by the issue of these two successive combats, and formed the project of taking his revenge. He had at least 30,000 men, and the Allies

had no more ; besides, he supposed that their troops would be much fatigued with their extraordinary marches, which had made them arrive sooner than he expected them ; trusting probably likewise that Moreau, who had pushed on as far as Bobbio a division of Ligurian troops, under General Lapoype, would begin offensive operations, he determined to attack, himself, the Allies on the 19th. The Austro-Russians, who had the same intention, and who were in the same order of battle they had formed the night before, were preceded and almost surprised by the impetuosity with which the Republicans advanced beyond the Trebia, and pushed back the advanced posts which guarded the left bank of that river. While the whole line of the French army passed it, and opened a heavy fire, Macdonald, who had formed the bold project of turning at the same time the two wings of the Austro-Russian army, made two columns march on their flanks. That of the right, composed of 2000 horse, pushed so briskly along the Po, that the Austrian cavalry had hardly time to form ; but that being done, they fell vigorously on that of the enemy, defeated them after a very hot action, and forced

them back in disorder upon their infantry. The column which had marched against the right wing of the Russians, had at first more success. It forced it to fall back, and dislodged it from Cassaleggio, but Prince Bagration, who, according to the plan of Marshal Suworow, had received orders to make an opposite movement, that is to say, to turn the left of the French, having already commenced his manœuvre, outflanked in his turn the hostile column, fell upon it, beat it, and having taken one piece of cannon and several prisoners, drove it from Cassaleggio. That post became then the cause of a very obstinate engagement—the French endeavoured several times to carry it—each time they were repulsed by the Russian infantry, who forgetting their fatigues and their privations, performed prodigies of valour. Things went on in the same manner in the centre. The Republicans long disputed the victory, but there at last, as on the other two points, it was achieved by the Imperialists towards the end of the day: Macdonald was obliged to lead back all his army behind the Trebia, and thus to abandon the field of battle to the Allies.

The fortune of the day had been too decidedly in favour of the latter not to induce them to profit by it the day after, and for the same reason Macdonald could not resolve to await their approach. On the morning of the 20th, having advanced to attack him, they discovered that he had decamped during the night. The pursuit commenced in two columns, the same order in which he was making his retreat. Upon the right, the Russians marched by Settima, Montanura, and Zena ; at the latter place they came up with the rear guard, attacked briskly, almost surrounded it, and compelled it, after a courageous defence, to lay down its arms. The Austrians, who had advanced on the left by the bridge of Placentia, also overtook the rear of the retiring army near that town. They drove it precipitately through the place, and took several thousand sick and wounded, amongst whom were four Generals named Rusca, Salm, Olivier, and Chambrai. On that day the Imperialists did not pursue farther than Pontenura. The head-quarters were established at Placentia.

These four days cost to Macdonald's army at least 4000 men killed, and more than 10,000 prisoners, of whom a great number were

wounded, overturning at the same time all the newly conceived hopes of the French. The triumphs of the Allies cost them dear, and their loss in killed and wounded was little inferior to that of their enemies. Though their victory was complete, only seven pieces of cannon fell into their hands, Macdonald having been but badly provided with artillery. Nothing more shall be said at present upon these great events; others of almost equal importance, and which cannot be separated from the first, must speedily find a place in this narrative. This short campaign, made by Marshal Suworow and Macdonald, one against the other, cannot, however, be yet abandoned.—The latter continued his retreat on the 21st, upon one side towards Parma, and upon the other towards Fornovio. That same day, the allied army advanced to Fiorenzolo, where head-quarters were placed; and General Ott, with his division reinforced by some thousands of men, was alone sent in pursuit of the enemy, from whom he took a few hundred prisoners. Arrived at Fornovio, Macdonald's left retook the road of the valley of Taro, by which it had come, and his right, conducted by himself, retreated over the same

road upon which, but a few days before, it had triumphantly advanced. He had no time to lose if he intended to move with safety, for already had Generals Klenau and Hohenzollern put themselves in motion upon the right bank of the Po, and were advancing upon his rear. Their light troops, indeed, occupied the town of Modena on the 23d, and Macdonald was compelled to drive them from thence, that he might himself pass through the place. From that time more at liberty to continue his retreat, he only left his rear guard to keep the Allies in check, threw some troops into Bologna and Fort Urbin, and went to reassume the position of Pistoia, where he arrived on the 28th. General Hohenzollern entered Parma on the 23d, whither he was followed by General Ott. On the next day, they occupied Reggio and Modena, again co-operating with General Klenau. These three Generals were entrusted, as they had been fifteen days before, with the care of guarding the *debouchés* of the Apennines, as well those of Tuscany as those of Pontremoli and the Taro upon the frontiers of the Genoese. General Kray resumed the twice interrupted labours of the siege

of Mantua, and brought back before that place the heavy artillery, sent to Verona for safety, upon occasion of Macdonald's irruption.

It cannot be doubted that Marshal Suworow would have followed the General with all his forces, and would have endeavoured to complete his ruin, if other events had not arrested his steps, and even compelled him, victorious, to do the same that the vanquished Macdonald did, namely, to retake the very road by which he had come. On the 23d, this was done by transferring his head-quarters from Fiorenzolo to Placentia, from whence, the day after, he marched his army towards Alexandria, to go to meet his old antagonist Moreau.

This General, after employing himself at Genoa for some days, in the execution of the projects concerted with his colleague, after drawing from that town every thing that could be of service in the equipment and provisioning of his troops, after receiving a reinforcement of some thousand men by sea, and by the roads of Nice and Oneglia, and after taking leave of the Ligurian Republic, with many thanks, on the 16th, departed, on the 17th, from the capital of that Republic, and went to join

the centre of his army, which had already entered the defile of the Bochetta. His left, posted amongst the Apennines, and in the rear of Coni, protected that place, and covered the Col di Tende and the Riviera di Ponente. His right had been pushed as far as Bobbio, to support Macdonald as soon as possible. His army was then about 20,000 strong. Moreau's first object in advancing by the Bochetta, and by the valley of the Scrivia, was to raise the blockade, and to revictual Tortona, which had been severely bombarded for several days. The attainment of this object, by making him master of the plain, was to lead to the accomplishment of a second, still more important, *viz.* to enable him to reach Voghera, a point where the roads by which Macdonald was advancing joined, and at which place the two Generals had determined to effect their union.

Moreau having pushed General Grenier's division towards Tortona with rapidity, it entered the town without meeting any resistance, pillaged it, and caused the siege of the citadel to be raised with equal facility. The Austrians had prepared to abandon it at his approach, and the two corps of Generals Seckendorf and

Alcaini, had joined General Bellegarde, who had taken the place of the Russian General Schweikowsky, before Alexandria, and to effect the blockade of that citadel, had assumed a position between the Bormida and the Scrivia. It will be seen, that he thus flanked Moreau, and could act upon his rear, in case he should advance against Voghera. Whether Moreau intended to do this, or wished first to remove an enemy, who was too near him; or whether, on the contrary, he had been informed of the reverses already experienced by his colleague upon the Trebia, and wished to take vengeance for them, and to hinder Marshal Suworow from profiting by them, he attacked, on the 20th, General Bellegarde, with all his forces, upon the roads of Acqui and Novi. The hottest of the battle was chiefly upon the latter road, and upon the very same ground, where, on the 16th of the preceding month, he had fought, in an inverse situation, with General Lusignan. The result, considered not as to persons, but as to places, was also exactly the same. General Bellegarde, after an obstinate resistance of fourteen hours, was (as Moreau had been before)

driven from Bosco, St. Julian, and Marengo, and was obliged to repass the Bormida. He was also, on the other side of that river, dislodged from Cassina Grande and Spinetta. General Dessolles, Chief of the Staff of the Republican army, stated General Bellegarde's loss at 4000 men, of which one half were killed and wounded, and the other were made prisoners. This account was exaggerated exactly by one half. The Imperialists were not more than 8000 in front of the Bormida, the rest of the army having remained before Alexandria. What proves this estimate to be more correct than that of General Desolles, is, that Moreau durst not pass the Bormida, to cause the siege of the last-mentioned place to be raised, a great temptation to him, and which he would probably have attempted, had he injured his enemy so much as was asserted.

After this contest, in which Moreau had a horse killed under him, and which was a revenge to him for the defeat he had sustained on the same spot five weeks before, that General, who was no doubt informed of the disasters experienced by Macdonald, did nothing more at all remarkable in his favour, and abandoned

the offensive, which he had maintained for so short a time. He contented himself with reinforcing the corps of troops, mostly Ligurian, which he had posted at Bobbio, to protect on the flank the retreat of the army of Naples, and at all events to cover the Riviera di Ponente.

Being master, however, of all the *gorges* of the Apennines, and having it in his power to secure himself amongst them when he might judge proper, he was in no haste to retire, and maintained himself at Tortona, where indeed he did not long remain. Marshal Suworow had learnt the raising of the siege of that place, which was already far advanced, with too much regret, not to exert his usual activity to repair an accident unfortunate from the delay which it occasioned to the victorious course of the campaign. That General, who was left on the 23d at Placentia, repeating the forced marches which he had made a few days before, brought his army, on the 24th to Stradella, on the 25th to Voghera, and on the 26th to Tortona. Moreau did not wait for him there, but drew off towards Genoa by Novi, Gavi, and the Bochetta, the very same places through which he

had advanced.—He would probably have made this retrograde motion, even if the Russian General had not compelled him to it; for on hearing of the raising of the siege of Tortona, and of the battle of the 20th, General Wuckasowich had approached General Bellegarde to support him; and with the same view, 3000 infantry and cavalry, under General Kaim, had set out on the 21st from Turin, and arrived on the 25th upon the Scrivia. This gives an occasion (which the necessary recital of the operations of the three corps of the army has not afforded) to give some account of an event, highly advantageous to the Allies, which happening at the same time with the victories of the Trebia, completed their triumph, and justified the hazardous and singular plan of campaign adopted by the General in Chief.

It may be remembered that he had left Generals Kaim and Lusignan to besiege the citadel of Turin. The necessary preparations hindered the opening of the trenches before that place till the 12th, but on that day they were boldly opened at 300 paces distance from the covered way. In spite of every effort, it was not till the morning of the 18th, that matters were arranged

TUNIS

The Tunisian coast is a long, straight line of low, sandy dunes, with a few small, rocky islands in the sea. The interior is a vast, flat, sandy plain, with a few small, rocky hills in the distance. The climate is hot and dry, with a long, hot summer and a short, cool winter. The population is small, and the country is mostly uninhabited.

THE TUNISIAN COAST

1. The Tunisian coast is a long, straight line of low, sandy dunes, with a few small, rocky islands in the sea.
2. The interior is a vast, flat, sandy plain, with a few small, rocky hills in the distance.
3. The climate is hot and dry, with a long, hot summer and a short, cool winter.
4. The population is small, and the country is mostly uninhabited.
5. The Tunisian coast is a long, straight line of low, sandy dunes, with a few small, rocky islands in the sea.
6. The interior is a vast, flat, sandy plain, with a few small, rocky hills in the distance.
7. The climate is hot and dry, with a long, hot summer and a short, cool winter.
8. The population is small, and the country is mostly uninhabited.
9. The Tunisian coast is a long, straight line of low, sandy dunes, with a few small, rocky islands in the sea.
10. The interior is a vast, flat, sandy plain, with a few small, rocky hills in the distance.
11. The climate is hot and dry, with a long, hot summer and a short, cool winter.
12. The population is small, and the country is mostly uninhabited.
13. The Tunisian coast is a long, straight line of low, sandy dunes, with a few small, rocky islands in the sea.
14. The interior is a vast, flat, sandy plain, with a few small, rocky hills in the distance.
15. The climate is hot and dry, with a long, hot summer and a short, cool winter.
16. The population is small, and the country is mostly uninhabited.
17. The Tunisian coast is a long, straight line of low, sandy dunes, with a few small, rocky islands in the sea.
18. The interior is a vast, flat, sandy plain, with a few small, rocky hills in the distance.
19. The climate is hot and dry, with a long, hot summer and a short, cool winter.
20. The population is small, and the country is mostly uninhabited.

TURIN.


REFERENCES to the APPROACHES.

A. First parallel. B. Communication. C. Last parallel. D. Communication from the first to the second. N.B. The punctuated part of this parallel was to have been executed in the night of the day on which the garrison capitulated. E. Sap pushed on the last night to *attach* the miner. F. *Epaulement* of mattresses to communicate from the town to the parallel. G. Passage for the cavalry and light artillery against the *sorties*. H. False attack.

N. I. Principal depot without the Palace gate. N. II. Depot near the *Brusacore*. N. III. Depot near the *Saccarella*. N. IV. Depot near the new gate.

REFERENCES to the BATTERIES.

1. Battery of 12 mortars
2. Ditto *à ricochet* of 4 twelve-pounders
3. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 twelve-pounders
4. Ditto of 4 mortars
5. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 4 eighteen-pounders
6. Ditto of 4 mortars
7. Ditto *à ricochet* of 4 twelve pounders
8. Ditto of 4 mortars
9. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 4 twenty-four pounders
10. Ditto *à ricochet* of 4 twelve-pounders
11. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 twelve-pounders
12. Ditto *à ricochet* of 4 twelve-pounders
13. Ditto *à ricochet* of 4 howitzers
14. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 4 twenty-four pounders
14. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 4 twenty-four pounders
15. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 twelve pounders
16. Ditto of 4 mortars
17. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 twelve-pounders
18. Ditto *à ricochet* of 4 eighteen-pounders
19. Ditto *à ricochet* of 10 six-pounders
20. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 twelve pounders
21. Ditto of 4 mortars
22. Ditto *à ricochet* of 4 howitzers





for commencing the bombardment; 81 pieces of ordinance then began so heavy a fire, that at the end of six hours the principal batteries were dismounted, the works damaged, and a cartridge manufactory blown up.—The place was then summoned to surrender. Upon a refusal being given, the fire recommenced, and was not discontinued till the evening of the 19th, when another powder magazine blew up. The barracks, the magazines, a great number of buildings, and General Fiorella's own house, were on fire. More than a hundred artillerymen had already been killed or wounded; the batteries and parapets were destroyed. The second parallel had moreover been commenced the preceding night, at pistol-shot from the covered way, and was carried on in broad day by sap. All these circumstances, joined to the bad state of the casemates, into which the water had penetrated from neglect, and to the anti-republican disposition manifested by a part of the garrison, composed of Piedmontese and Swiss, determined the Commandant to send out an officer to capitulate, in the afternoon of the 19th. The parties did not agree upon the conditions, and consequently the fire re-

commenced that very night, and lasted till the morning of the 20th, when an officer again came out at eight o'clock, with more acceptable propositions; and after a discussion, which lasted the whole day, the capitulation was signed at eleven o'clock at night, and the Imperialists were put in possession of the gates. Conformably to the capitulation, the garrison, consisting of 2700 men, was conducted, on the 22d, to the frontiers of France, after having laid down its arms upon the glacis, and given its parole not to serve till exchanged, against the Emperor of Germany and his Allies. The Commandant Fiorella, General Lalance, with all the officers of artillery, of engineers, and of the staff, to the number of 25 Generals and officers, remained prisoners of war, and were sent into Germany on the 25th.* The Imperialists found in the citadel 562 of the finest pieces of ordnance, 40,000 muskets, 400,000lb. weight of powder, and considerable

* General Fiorella, who had been indulgently left upon his parole in the environs of Verona, being imprudent enough to endeavour to propagate his violent democracy, was sent to Kufstein in the Tyrol, and there shut up in the castle.

magazines. This rich military booty would have more than indemnified the Emperor for the expenses of the siege, if that expense had been made by him—but it was in every respect upon the account of the Piedmontese government, and cost not a farthing to the House of Austria.—The men lost before the place, were to the number of 24 killed and 72 wounded.

Thus fell, after eight days' siege, and only 48 hours' fire, that fine pentagon, that famous citadel, one of the best existing, and which, in 1706, had victoriously sustained a siege of four months, a siege, it is true, as ill conducted as it was badly protected. It would be needless to insist upon the importance of this capture to the Allies. By it the best possible point of support was obtained for their right, and it afforded also a formidable advanced post on the side of France; the possession of Piedmont was secured to them, and they were enabled to prosecute with new strength and additional motives for confidence, the operations of a campaign already so brilliant, and so profitable. Before the narration is continued, it may be

proper to breathe a little, and to dwell a moment upon the past.*

* It may have been perceived, that, till now, in all the capitulations made during this campaign, the author has confined himself to pointing out the most important condition, *viz.* That which determines the fate of the garrison. By giving at full length the articles of each capitulation, and also by copying the different proclamations issued by the Generals, he might, without any trouble to himself, have augmented the size of this volume; but he has thought proper to omit both the one and the other, that his narration might not be interrupted, and that the interest it may excite might not be damped. The events of this campaign have been so multifarious, have succeeded each other so rapidly, and have even been so frequently simultaneous, that they could not, without destroying their concatenation and analogy, and without removing their consequences from sight, have been separated by any digression or episode. It is on this consideration that all the political acts, as well of the two Emperors as of the Empire and the French government, which could not be separated from the history of this war, since they point out its causes and its nature, and throw a light upon its direction and vicissitudes, have been placed in the account of the Campaign of Germany and of Switzerland—a campaign that presents fewer facts and longer intervals of repose.

Returning to the capitulation of Turin, which has occasioned this explanation, it is thought proper, leaving out fourteen of its articles, which belong to the ordinary kind of stipulations in all such transactions, to copy the 9th, and 14th, which are somewhat remarkable.

ARTICLE 9. The hostages detained in the citadel for the security of the patriots shall be set at liberty; and those who may be detained in the city, on account of their opinions, shall be released by the General, and shall not be prosecuted in any tribunal, civil or military.

Answer. The hostages detained in the citadel shall be set at liberty immediately after the signing of the capitulation. No answer can be given to the other part of the article, *as the Austrian Commander has caused no person to be arrested.*

ARTICLE 14. All the military chests belonging to the French and Cisalpine Republics, and the Piedmontese Government, shall be faithfully given up.

Answer. *There is no such thing to be found.*

The first of these articles shews the contrast between the conduct of the Allies and that of the French; the latter, without reason, without right, or utility of any kind, took hostages out of the town into the citadel, thus exposing a few innocent citizens to all the dangers and horrors of a bombardment. The former who exercised the rights of the King of Sardinia, and might have found more than one Jacobin to punish or watch over, had not, after possessing the town for four weeks, arrested any one. By the second article it is seen, that the triple chests of the French Republic, of the Cisalpine Republic, and of the Piedmontese Administration, did not contain a single louis-d'or, or else that the Republican Commissaries and Generals had taken the wise precaution to divide the contests amongst themselves. Justice compels us to remark, that in the latter case, they had *perhaps* only taken the money to save it for, and afterwards to restore it to, the French government.

CHAPTER VII.

Short view of the events described in the preceding chapter—Examination of the conduct of Marshal Suworow at two periods of the campaign—Difference of opinion that may be entertained about it—Judicious operations of Moreau—Subsequent faults committed by that General—Blame that may also be imputed to Macdonald—Comparison between the battle of the Trebia with that which Hannibal gained on the banks of the same river over Sempronius, and with that also in which Marshal Maillebois was defeated on the same ground, by Prince Lichtenstein.

FEW campaigns have ever presented, in an equal space of time, so many events calculated for the study and meditation of a military man, called to the command of an army, as that comprehended in the last chapter; and never, it may be truly said, did any present, at any period, a military spectacle so new, so singular, so various, and so interesting, under

every point of view. In the course of a month, six engagements and one great battle, a siege raised, rapid movements, and skilful manœuvres, have been witnessed.—By a whimsical opposition, Russians have been seen masters of Turin, and French of Naples.—The former have been seen depart from the foot of the Alps which bound France, and the latter from that of Vesuvius, to come and dispute on the Trebia, the command of Italy.—The French Generals have been seen, at a moment when their affairs seemed desperate, to effect a junction which was considered almost impossible, unexpectedly resume the offensive, and again make that doubtful, which appeared to have been absolutely decided.—Marshal Suworow has been seen, at the beginning of May, commanding on one side the frontiers of France, on the other the Adriatic Sea, occupying the foot of all the great passes of the Alps and the Apennines, principal possessor of the plain which divides the Po, a vast field of battle, moistened for the last twenty centuries with so much blood, fall all at once from this height of superiority to a war of equality and almost defensive.—He has been seen arrive like lightning, strike

like a thunderbolt, and secure in three days, what had suddenly become uncertain, the result of three months of labour, victories, and good fortune.—Such a complication of facts, such a series of vicissitudes, might be a source of abundant reflections. They will not be rejected, but they shall be confined within as narrow limits as they will admit of.

The first thing that presents itself to consideration is the conduct of Marshal Suworow. Till after the battle of the Adda, that which he had to observe, and which he did observe, was simple, commanded by circumstances, and directed towards a manifest object. To dislodge the French successively from the highest summits of the Upper Alps, and from all the rivers which water Lombardy, and fall into the Po; to force them to abandon that river, and thus to uncover the avenues of Piedmont; this was what the General in Chief of the Allies evidently had to do, and which he did with promptitude, boldness, and ability. The details of the execution might well be the subject of some examination; but the end and the aggregate of the operations cannot furnish matter for much discussion.

The case is very different with respect to his subsequent conduct: as it became more difficult, more involved, and less distinctly marked, by the state of affairs, it may be subject to a diversity of opinion, and may occasion either admiration or criticism. As at that time many courses were open to him, that which he took may to some appear the best, to others the worst. After the victory of the Adda, Marshal Suworow, master of the Milanese and of the foot of the Upper Alps, and being considerably stronger than Moreau, had the choice either to endeavour to destroy the vanquished army by battles, or to endeavour to gain as much ground as possible. He adopted the latter course, and was no doubt determined to it by the desire to render more and more impracticable the co-operation of Moreau and Massena, and still more by a wish to support and make general the insurrections which had broken out in all quarters against the French. He was anxious to give a great impulse to people's spirits, and perhaps flattered himself that the French, reduced to a small number, and surrounded by enemies, might hasten to place themselves in safety on

the other side of the Alps. These motives were powerful ones, and these hopes sufficiently reasonable; but it has not prevented the part which was taken by the Russian Marshal from being disapproved of by competent judges. They reasoned thus:—If that General, instead of extending his flanks, and of undertaking at once the siege or the blockade of Mantua, Peschiera, Pizzigtone, the castle of Milan, of Ferrara, and afterwards of the citadels of Tortona and Turin, had contented himself with leaving in some chosen positions some strong detachments, which could have given him a security that the garrisons of these places should not unite and undertake any thing serious in his rear, and had keenly pressed Moreau with the greater part of his force, one of these two things must have happened: either the French would have waited for him, or have retreated before him. In the latter case, the object of the Field Marshal would have been accomplished; in the former, the immense superiority of the allied army, triumphant as it was, and at that time full of enthusiasm, would almost to a certainty have given him the victory over an army broken and discouraged by four great

battles lost in the space of a month. Every action would have diminished its strength, both physical and moral, in the same proportion. It probably would not have required more than two actions to reduce it to a few thousand men, and to oblige it to repass the Alps, or, at least, to bury itself among their defiles. In that case, the Marshal would more readily and with more certainty have attained the object which he had in view, that of gaining ground, than he did by adopting the other plan. He would, besides, have accomplished another point which the conduct that he pursued prevented him from attaining, that of barring the passage of Macdonald, and of preventing his junction with Moreau. It has, in fact, be seen what danger the cause of the Allies incurred from the junction of these two Generals: one march more on the part of Macdonald, and one less on that of the Russian General, would have restored Italy to the French, or would at least have greatly limited the advantages of the campaign. Great credit is due to the latter General for the incredible rapidity with which he transported his army from the banks of the Bormida to those of the Tidone, and for the

determined vigour with which he defeated the hopes of Macdonald, on the same spot where Hannibal chastized the foolish confidence of Sempronius. In three days, he frustrated the plans which the French Generals had been a month in forming, compelled both the one and the other to shut themselves up in the Apennines; re-established the course of the campaign, and secured its glorious result. He it was who might truly have said—*Veni, vidi, vici*. If he did commit an error, which is doubtful, he knew how to repair it with resolution and ability; and this is a merit which distinguishes the Generals of the first order. Monsieur de Turenne committed one; but that has not prevented his being considered as the first of modern commanders.

With respect to the blame thrown upon Marshal Suworow, for not having prevented the junction of Moreau and Macdonald, there are particular reasons for believing that, strange as it may appear, the Allies never had that object seriously in view; whether it was that they thought they had enough on their hands without concerning themselves about it; whether they judged it impossible to occupy with secu-

city, the passes of the Apennines, and of the Riviera di Levante ; or whether (which is, not the least probable) they were afraid of fixing the theatre of war in Tuscany, and of thus ruining the country, in the safety of which the court of Vienna took a particular and a natural interest.

If in the eyes of all military men, the conduct of Moreau, from the battle of the Adda till his movements towards Genoa, that is to say, from the end of April, to the beginning of June, was that of an able, and it may be even said, of a consummate General, it does not appear that his subsequent conduct deserves the praise. He may be first reproached for having begun too late his march from Genoa to Tortona. It is not unknown that he delayed it so long only to induce Marshal Suworow to set out from Alexandria ; but if the departure of the Russian General was favourable to the operations of Moreau, it was the reverse to those of his colleague ; and since, according to the plan fixed upon, it was the latter who was required to take the most active part, and who had the farthest to go, it seems that the

best means of facilitating his progress would have been to have kept the allied army as long as possible on the Bormida and Tanaro. This is what Moreau would certainly have succeeded in, if he had made some offensive demonstrations before the 15th of June, in front of the Apennines. However, as particular circumstances, which it is difficult to pronounce decidedly upon, perhaps influenced Moreau at this period, this point shall not be insisted on; but there is another on which it may be ventured to speak more firmly. On the 17th, Moreau had raised the blockade of Tortona, and was master of the course of the Scrivia and of the road of Voghera. On the same day, Macdonald was on the Tidone, and Marshal Suworow had also arrived there. These two Generals could not fail soon to come to blows; and Moreau could not be ignorant of it. Why then, instead of endeavouring to form a junction by his right with his colleague, or, what perhaps would have been better, of pushing forward towards Voghera, leaving a division to keep General Bellegarde in check, did he remain three days stationary at Tortona?—Why, instead of making a diversion against the Rus-

sian General, did he go and engage in a tardy and almost useless action with General Bellegarde on the 20th?—Why, above all, did his right, which was at Bobbio, in the valley of Trebia, itself, remain, as one may say, tranquil spectators of the two first battles fought by Macdonald, and only make a late movement on the 19th, to join and reinforce the left of the army of Naples? It may be said, without hesitation, that if it had advanced one or two days sooner, the result of the 19th might have been very different. Marshal Suworow felt it so strongly, and was so much struck at seeing his right threatened by the corps stationed at Bobbio, which might at any moment take him in flank, that scarcely had he beat the enemy's army on the Trebia, than he made haste to send two regiments of Cossacks and some infantry to keep in awe this Ligurian division, which suffered itself to be attacked, to be defeated, and to be driven back to the Apennines. It is not known whether General Lapoype, who commanded it, remained voluntarily or by order in this astonishing state of inaction; but to whomever the fault belonged, it was perfectly

unjustifiable, and the blame must naturally attach to the Commander in Chief Moreau. In short, the latter General, after having prepared with great science the junction of his army with that of Naples, seems, in the critical period from the 12th to the 20th of June, to have paid much more attention to preserving the former, and to secure his positions, than to give powerful assistance to the latter. Some have attempted to explain this conduct, by saying that Macdonald did not wish that Moreau should join him, because in this case the chief command would have devolved on the latter, and because the former was ambitious to execute alone the great plan agreed upon. It will not be wondered at, that the grounds on which this is founded cannot be ascertained.

The operations of the Commander of the army of Naples must also be submitted, to the test of criticism. It will be admitted, that his march from that city to Florence was rapid and well directed. It will also be admitted, that he shewed much promptitude and activity in securing, in the first instance, the *debouchés* of the Plain of the Po. But in advertising the Allies of his presence from the 26th of May, and

afterwards not commencing his operations till the 1st of June, he at once gave them time to prepare themselves against him, and himself lost some valuable days. If he could have begun his movement sooner than he did, it is evident that Marshal Suworow could not have arrived time enough to stop him on the Tidone, and that he might have joined Moreau without obstacle. It does not appear that there is any other cause to blame Macdonald. His attacks were vigorous and well-concerted; and he bravely exposed his person on all occasions. It has been seen that, although beaten on the 17th and the 18th, he nevertheless dared himself to attack the day following, which he did with talent and resolution. It has been seen that, though abandoned by fortune, and having lost one-third of his army, he did not nevertheless go to take refuge in the Riviera di Levante, but returned still to dispute Tuscany.*

* This General is of Irish extraction, and after having first served in Holland, he entered the Irish brigade in the service of France, before the Revolution. While his comrades were emigrating, he seemed disposed to imitate their example; but having married the daughter of a violent democrat, he was threatened by him with being disinherited if he quitted France. This consi-

One remark only shall be added to what has just been said, which is, that if in the eyes of some persons, the two French Generals shewed greater abilities than the Field Marshal did till the middle of June, from the 12th of that month to the 20th, the latter surpassed them both in that respect, and displayed to a high degree two great military qualities, the determined pursuit of a single object, and the rapidity of execution.

Too much importance, both military and political, has been attached to the battle of the Trebia, not to induce us to pause a little upon it. Like that of the Adda, it recals to recollection, from the place where it was fought, two

deration kept him there; but he did more—he continued in the service of the Republic. He was Aide-de-Camp to Dumourier, and afterwards to Pichegru, who promoted him rapidly. He did not follow the fortunes of the latter General in 1797; and was the next year sent to the army of Naples. To him has been attributed the success of the battle of Civita Castellana, which decided the fate of the war undertaken by the King of the Two Sicilies. It is said, that on this occasion he treated Championnet very roughly on the field of battle, although the latter was Commander in Chief. It has been seen that he succeeded him in this rank a short time afterwards. He is at present one of the Lieutenants of the First Consul.

other famous battles, one ancient and the other modern. The first, which has been already pointed out, took place in the second Punic war, between the Carthaginians and the Romans. Publius Scipio, after having been beaten in an action of cavalry on the Ticino, where he had been wounded, retreated with his army behind the Trebia. He was soon afterwards joined there by Tiberius Sempronius, who brought him a fresh Roman army. The latter, notwithstanding the advice of his colleague, elated by some slight success which he had had the day before against the light-armed Carthaginian troops, passed the Trebia with his whole army, and attacked Hannibal, who having placed an ambuscade for him in the plain, and having defeated the two wings of the Roman cavalry, so inferior in quality to his own, gained a complete victory. The legions which composed the centre, seeing the battle lost, and finding themselves surrounded, forced their way, sword in hand, through the Carthaginians and the Gauls their Allies, and retired to Placentia. If these legions, which constituted the strength of the army, had had another commander, they might have re-esta-

blished the battle. As Montagne has remarked:
 "They purchased a disgraceful flight at the
 "same price that a glorious victory would have
 "cost them."

This battle has many points of similitude with that in which Macdonald was defeated. Like him Sempronius arrived from the bottom of Italy—like him he passed the Trebia, and made his attack on the very same ground, it is believed, which the left wing of the Allies occupied.—Like him, having been defeated, he retreated to Placentia. Points of comparison opposite to these also present themselves. The army of Sempronius had just made a successive march of forty days; it was extremely fatigued, and its General did not give it time to recover from its labours. He then led it into action before it had taken any repast. The army of Marshal Suworow arrived also on the Trebia by forced marches, and had not taken any food when Macdonald attacked it. It however gained the victory, because Macdonald was not Hannibal, and because Suworow was not Sempronius.

The analogy between the battle fought on the Trebia in 1799 and that in 1746 is less

striking, although a writer (that of the *Précis des Evenemens Militaires*) has represented it as perfect; for the latter battle was fought on the right of the Trebia, much nearer to Placentia, and in a totally different disposition of ground. It was not indeed less fatal to the French: Placentia was equally their point of retreat: Italy was in the same manner the price of the victory. It was a Prince of Lichtenstein who gained it, and it has been seen that it was a Prince of the same name, who, at the head of the reserve of the Austrian cavalry, defeated the left wing of the French army. This occasion may be taken to observe that he performed prodigies of valour there, and had several horses killed under him.

CHAPTER VIII.

Change which took place in the nature of the war at the end of June—State and distribution of the respective forces at this period—Twofold aim of the Allies—Insurrection of the inhabitants of Tuscany—Defection of the Cisalpine General Lahooz—Situation of Macdonald—He is forced to evacuate Tuscany—Rising in the city of Florence—The French withdraw to Lucca and Leghorn—Embarkation which takes place in the port of the latter city—The French evacuate it by capitulation—Macdonald accomplishes his retreat and his junction with Moreau—The line of conduct to which the latter is reduced—Respective situations during the month of July—The Allies besiege at the same time Alexandria and Mantua—Account of these two sieges—These places surrender by capitulation; the first on the 21st, and the second on the 30th of July—Events which take place in the Kingdom of Naples—Cardinal Ruffo makes himself master of the capital, the 20th of June—The English fleet disem-

bark there English, Portuguese, Italian, and Sicilian troops—They get possession of the castle of Nuovo, and of Ovo, and besiege that of St. Elm—The English Captain Trowbridge takes possession of it, by capitulation, on the 12th of July—He completes the deliverance of the Kingdom of Naples, by making himself master of Capua on the 29th, and of Gaeta on the 31st of the same month—A view of the glorious and fortunate character which England sustained at this time in the world.

THE retreat of Macdonald into Tuscany—that of Moreau into the defiles of the Apennines—and the reunion of Generals Suworow, Bellegarde, and Kaim, upon the banks of the Borinida, the consequence of the battle of St. Giovanni—put an end to the war of movements, of manœuvres, and engagements, which had lasted for three months back, and had continued with such activity during the half of that of May, and the whole of June. At the end of the latter, began a war, which might be called, to the Allies, that of sieges, and in respect to the French merely a defensive one. All the forces which the latter

had in Tuscany, in the state of Genoa, and in the southern Piedmont, did not amount to 45,000 men. Rather more than 15,000 defended the different passes of the Valais, and of the chain of Alps which separates France from Italy. The junction of General Bellegarde's corps, the co-operation of General Haddick in the valley of Aoust and the Novarese, the arrival of a fresh body of 11,000 Russians upon the Brenta, put Marshal Suworow, about the end of June, in a state to oppose near 90,000 men to the 60,000 of the French, who were exclusive, it is true, of the garrisons left in the three fortresses of Mantua, Tortona, and Alexandria, garrisons which amounted scarcely to 15,000 men. If the superiority which the Allies possessed in point of the number of effective regular soldiers, at the period referred to, far from being so considerable as was believed at the time, and as the French pretended, was at most but 15,000 men, it must be allowed that it was strengthened by the insurrection of a great part of the inhabitants of Piedmont and of the Valais, by a number of armed peasants in the territory of Mantua, and by a powerful body of auxiliaries of the same kind, which began to form itself

in another part of Italy. What was perhaps still more, the army of the Allies had in their favour the moral effect of three months of triumphs, and enjoyed a plenty, which was the fruit of them. The French army was in both these respects in a very different situation.

The advantage which Marshal Suworow thought to derive from his successes, was reduced to two principal objects, that of reconquering Tuscany, and that of taking the three strong places of Alexandria, Tortona, and Mantua. The first of these objects was become much more easy to be accomplished than the other. It had been with extreme reluctance, that the subjects of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, attached to their Sovereign, under whose administration they had in great measure escaped the evils which had afflicted for the last two years the rest of Italy, had seen themselves subject to the French yoke. Being inclined to shake it off, the example of the inhabitants of the kingdom of Naples and of the State of the Church, and still more the grand victories which had brought the Allies upon the frontiers of the Grand Duchy, inspired them with the confidence of succeeding in the attempt. As soon

therefore as Macdonald had removed himself from the Apennines, many thousands of the inhabitants of the province of Arezzo, encouraged and directed by Mr. Wyndham, the Envoy from England, took up arms in favour of their Sovereign, and formed themselves into a national army. The news of the disasters which had befallen the French General rapidly increased their number, which soon amounted to more than 25,000 men. At the same time, and owing to the same causes, a Cisalpine General, named Lahooz, who commanded for France a body of Italian troops in the March of Ancona, deserted the Republican cause, embraced that of the Allies, and had the address to make his soldiers follow his example. Having collected the different bands of the insurgents, of this part of the State of the Church, he united them under his own command, formed a considerable body of them, reduced to the power of the Allies the March of Ancona, which he had till then defended against them, and proceeded to invest the Capital, blockaded on the side towards the sea, as has been seen, by a Turco-Russian fleet. Such was the state of things in which Macdonald found this country, and those which bordered on

it, upon his return; and it is unnecessary to state, that having on his right and on his rear 30,000 or 40,000 insurgents, who deprived him of all his communication with the lower part of Italy, that threatened also with the loss of that which he kept up with the upper part of Italy, by 20,000 Austrians, who advanced under the command of Generals Ott and Klenau, the General of the army of Naples, who had no more than 20,000 men with him, could no longer flatter himself with being able to maintain his ground in the Grand Duchy.

If he still continued to indulge any hopes of doing this, they must have vanished as soon as he learned that Bologna, which protected him against General Klenau, had fallen into the hands of this General, who had followed thither, on the 30th, the rear-guard of the Republican army, which, after having sustained a fire of two or three hours, demanded a capitulation, and obtained leave to go and rejoin the body of the army in Tuscany. Macdonald, having his front exposed, and having to expect the speedy arrival of the two Austrian Generals against him, who were already reinforced by the first columns of the new Russian corps, lost no time in contriving

his retreat from Tuscany. This was not so easy to be effected as that from the kingdom of Naples; for there remained to him no other way than the sea, and the road of the Corniche, impassable, as has been said, for every kind of carriage. The troops alone therefore could retreat by the Riviera di Levante, and there was no other means of saving the artillery, the baggage, and the numerous chests filled with the spoil of Italy, than to send them by sea; a resource, which the continual cruizing of some English men of war upon the coasts of Tuscany, rendered very hazardous. But this was the only one which remained, and Macdonald resolved to attempt it. He caused, therefore, all the artillery, baggage, and Republican property, which he could collect, to be transported to Leghorn. Only a small part of that could be embarked on board an American vessel, in which many officers of the staff took their passage, as well as the civil agents of the Republic, amongst whom was the Envoy Reinhard, who was appointed at the same time, at Paris, Minister of foreign affairs. This vessel set sail on the 9th, and fell, almost on going out of the port, into the hands of the English; but the French Minister was not con-

sidered as a prisoner at war, and was disembarked upon the coast of Genoa. The same day, the 9th of July, the Allies made a more important acquisition, which was that of fort Urbino, the garrison of which, after having sustained a fire of some hours, capitulated, and obtained permission to return into France, under condition of not serving for six months against the Allies.

The preparations for retreat, which the French made in all parts of Tuscany, encouraged more and more the insurrection of its inhabitants. Those of Florence broke out on the 5th of July, cut down the trees of liberty, and destroyed all the other marks of their subjection. The Republican garrison, too weak to repress this movement, withdrew into the forts which it quitted the next morning, in order to retreat towards Leghorn. The government of the Grand Duke was re-established in his Capital, and its members hastened to demand the support of General Klenau, who also hastened to afford it to them. Colonel D'Aspre set out immediately from Bologna with some light troops, drove before him the rear guard of

the enemy, which still kept the rout to Florence, and entered this capital on the 8th, where, the evening before, had arrived the Chiefs of the Aretin insurgents, who had already got possession of Sienna, as well as all the eastern and southern part of the Grand Duchy. On the same day that the French quitted Florence, the bulk of their army decamped also from Pistoia, and marched towards Lucca, from whence they began to march towards Sarzana, and the road of the Corniche. They defiled successively, by small bodies, along this road, in the course of July, and did it with safety, the passes of Pontremoli and the valley of Taro being still in their power; but they were obliged to throw into the sea, or to destroy the greatest part of the artillery and heavy baggage, which they had not been able to embark at Leghorn. This city, together with Pisa, Lucca, Porto-Ferraio, in the island of the Elbe, and the fortress of Antignano, were the only points which the Republicans had turned their attention to preserve, in order to assure their retreat. It was not possible for them to maintain themselves there for any long time,

and it is probable that they neither had formed the hope nor the design of doing so. After the evacuation of Florence, the insurgents of Arrezzo, supported by the Imperialists, and joined on the road by almost all the inhabitants of the country, marched towards the coast, approached in large bodies the places which the French still occupied, and prepared to drive them thence by main force. This was unnecessary; for Macdonald, whose retreat by the Corniche was by this time rendered safe, and in great measure already effected, sent, on the 17th, orders to General Argubet, whom he had left at Leghorn, to quit this city and the rest of Tuscany, if he could effect it, by capitulation. This was agreed upon immediately, between the Tuscan General Lavillete the old governor of Leghorn, and some members of the ancient and new government. This capitulation being in some respects rather singular, and not of any great length, the whole of it shall be here inserted.

“Argubet, General of Brigade and Commandant of Leghorn, Pisa, and Lucca, proposes to the Governor and General Lavillete, and

the Chamber of Commerce, to evacuate the city of Leghorn on the subsequent conditions:

“ARTICLE I. General Lavillete and the Chamber of Commerce promise all the French remaining in the hospitals at Leghorn, protection and assistance.—On their recovery, they shall be sent back to the French army.—*Granted.*”

“ART. II. General Lavillete and the Chamber of Commerce farther pledge themselves to receive the garrison of Porto-Ferraio, and to send it, the day after its arrival, under escort and in safety, to the French army.—*Granted.*”

“ART. III. The Chamber of Commerce likewise promises to let such commercial houses as have *been ruined by requisitions for lead and saltpetre, for the French army*, partake of the indemnities and compensations that shall be hereafter granted; all the *goods and effects* of the said army, by *right of conquest*, shall be left behind for that purpose.—*Granted.*”

It is seen that the persons contracting for the Grand Duke made a bridge of gold for the retreat of the French; that the latter, perhaps for the first time, confessed their having *ruined* individuals by their requisitions, and

that they offered them a singular compensation—the fruit of their pillages : they paid for what they had stolen, with what they had stolen. The same day, General Argubet evacuated Leghorn, and all the rest of Tuscany, pursuant to the capitulation. The Austrians hastened to extend themselves over the country to which they had been ordered, and had endeavoured to mitigate, as much as possible, the evils of the war. This consideration was the true reason why the French so easily obtained a capitulation so advantageous to them, and it had also a powerful influence on the direction of the campaign.

While the Allies were liberating Tuscany, and by that means placing between them and the royal army of Naples the French division which still possessed, in the territory of the Church, Rome, Civita Vecchia, Perugia, Ancona, and Fano, precluded it from all possibility of retreat, Macdonald accomplished that of his army, and joined Moreau's, in which it was lost. Their reunion put at the disposition of the latter General from 40,000 to 50,000 men, who were spread from the eastern extremity of the state of Genoa, as far as Coni, and occu-

ped in that line all the defiles of the Apennines. It was to preserve the possession of them, that Moreau at that time was obliged to confine all his efforts. He was reduced to the necessity of witnessing, so to speak, from the summit of the mountains, the sieges which the Allies carried on at the entrance of the plain.

It has been mentioned, that after the gaining the battle of Trebia, and the retreat of Moreau into the mountains, Marshal Suworow employed himself merely in besieging the three strong places of Mantua, Tortona, and Alexandria; the first, possessed too powerful means of defence, for any hopes being indulged of reducing it soon. But General Kray, having nothing else to occupy his attention, and having no longer any fear of being interrupted in his measures, spared no pains to render them decisive, and to hasten the surrender of the place. Although Tortona appeared to present the least obstacles of the three, this excellent fortress, having been victualled by Moreau, and the works which had been raised against it having been destroyed, all was necessary to begin over again for a siege, and this must

necessarily cost some time. Of the three blockades begun at the end of May, that of the fortresses of Alexandria was the only one which had not been interrupted ; the preparatory labours were almost finished ; the provisions of the garrison must have been nearly consumed : it was this place, therefore, which Marshal Suworow resolved to reduce first. While the labours of the siege were pushing on, he caused his army, whose office it was to cover it, to take camp for sake of refreshment upon the banks of the Tanaro, the Bormida, and the Orba, to enable it to enjoy the repose which it richly merited. It is known to be a common practice, in the wars of Italy or of Spain, to make troops, during the months of July or August, take what they call summer quarters, for the sake of avoiding the diseases and loss of men, which the excessive heat of these two months might produce.

While the bulk of the army was thus advanced in front of Tortona and Alexandria to the foot of the Apennines, General Wuckassowich occupied with his advanced guard the provinces of Coni and Mondovi ; General Kaim was with a body of troops at Turin and its environs ;

Prince Rohan was in the valley of Aoust, at the double *debouché* of the great and little St. Bernard; General Haddick threatened the Valais; General Kray was besieging Mantua; General Hohenzollern was with some thousands of men in the duchy of Placentia; Generals Ott and Klenau succeeded Macdonald in Tuscany; the head-quarters of Marshal Suworow were at Bosco near Alexandria.—The disposition of the forces opposed by the French was as follows: the army of Naples was passing by way of the Corniche into the Riviera of Genoa; its advanced guard occupied Sarzanna and Pontremol; the division of General Victor was in the valley of Taro; that of the Piedmontese General Colli, the same who commanded, in 1796, the Piedmontese troops, and who had abandoned the service of his Sovereign to embrace that of the Republic, held an entrenched position in front of the Bochetta, near Gavi and Serravalle; the main body of Moreau's army, which, after having quitted Tortona, had made a movement to the left of that place, was stationed along the Riviera di Ponente, from Genoa as far as Loano; head-quarters were at Conegliano, near Loano. The left

wing of the army united itself, by some posts placed in the Apennines, to Coni, where was a strong garrison, which from time to time repulsed the light troops of the Allies, and made, for the sake of pillage, excursions into the neighbouring country. From thence, as far as the Valais, some thousands of men were to be found in the different passes of the Alps, who alone constituted, at that time, the new army, termed that of the Alps, which the Directory had just been creating, and the command of which had been given to General Championnet.

Such was, at the beginning of July, and such remained, with some slight alterations, during the whole of the month, the distribution of the respective forces, which it is hoped will not be thought to be too frequently detailed. In a campaign including so vast a theatre, presenting so great a variety of aspects, and so fruitful in military episodes, cannot be too often laid down; the whole of the positions, and the moments when the operations are least divergent, and when their object is most simplified, must be seized. It is in this point that narrations of military transactions very often err. Those who give them, too frequently lose

sight, sometimes of the general outline, and sometimes of important details; and thus incapacitate the reader from knowing at each epocha of the campaign, the aim, the connection, and the system of operations.

The large circumference which the fortress of Alexandria rendered it necessary to enclose, and the extent of the front of attack, had rendered the works of the lines and trenches long and laborious; and it was not till the 14th of July, that the first parallel, with the ordinary offensive and defensive works, was finished, and that the artillery was placed on the batteries. That day, the Commandant of the place, Gardanne, was summoned to surrender; but this officer, who had from the beginning of the siege shewn his determination to protract the length of it, and had made many sorties, some of which were successful, having returned for answer that the laws of his country and of honour did not permit him to surrender; the bombardment was begun on the morning of the 15th, and continued with vigour and almost without interruption. The besieged answered it by a fire equally brisk. On the 16th, a small magazine of powder

717511

THE FUTURE OF THE FIRM

$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{4}$

$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{4}$


ALEXANDRIA.

REFERENCES to the CITADEL.

- | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| a Bastion St. Christine | d Bastion St. Charles |
| b Bastion St. Michael | e Bastion St. Amadeus |
| c Bastion St. Thomas | f Bastion St. Anthony |

REFERENCES to the SIEGE,

- A First parallel
- B Second parallel
- C Communications
- D Redoubts against sorties
- 1. Battery of 6 mortars
- 2. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 4 twenty-four pounders
- 3. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 3 twelve pounders
- 4. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 twelve pounders
- 5. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 howitzers
- 6. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 4 twenty-four pounders
- 7. Ditto of 2 six pounders and 2 howitzers
- 8. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 twelve pounders
- 9. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 twelve pounders
- 10. Ditto *à ricochet* of 2 howitzers
- 11. Ditto of 4 mortars
- 12. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 4 eighteen pounders
- 13. Ditto of 4 mortars
- 14. Ditto of 4 mortars
- 15. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 4 twenty-four pounders
- 16. Ditto of 4 mortars
- 17. Ditto *à ricochet* of 2 howitzers
- 18. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 twelve pounders
- 19. Ditto *à ricochet* of 3 twelve pounders
- 20. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 4 twenty-four pounders
- 21. Ditto *de plein fouet* of 4 twenty-four pounders
- 22. Ditto *à ricochet* of 4 howitzers
- 23. Ditto *à ricochet* of 6 six-pounders
- 24. Ditto of 2 *pierriers*
- 25. Ditto of 2 howitzers
- 26. Ditto of 6 mortars *à la Cohorn*
- 27. Ditto of 4 large mortars
- 28. Ditto of 6 mortars *à la Cohorn*
- 29. Ditto of 6 mortars *à la Cohorn*
- 30. Ditto of 2 *pierriers*
- 31. Ditto of 6 mortars *à la Cohorn*
- 32. Ditto of 2 howitzers



Published by T. Gardner Prince Street Cavendish Square Jan^y 7 1812



blew up, and some buildings were set on fire. The same day, the first parallel was advanced 260 toises, notwithstanding a well-sustained fire of small arms, which came from the covered way. On the 17th, the branches of communication from the trenches, were pushed as far as the foot of the glacis, and the second parallel was advanced. It was continued on the 18th and 19th, and in the night which followed the latter day, the besiegers were not above 30 toises from the covered way. The batteries of the second parallel were also finished the same night, and furnished with artillery. The redoubled fire which issued from thence forced the enemy to abandon the covered way, which it had been resolved to storm the same day, and to withdraw within the works. On the 20th, the besiegers made a lodgment on the covered way, crowned the salient angles of it, completed the communications of the sap, and prepared to batter in breach. On the 21st, General Gardanne, who, as has been seen, had regularly defended the approaches of the body of the place, and had not ceased to keep up a most vigorous fire, seeing the moment arrive, in which he had to fear the assault

which was to be made the following night by twelve battalions, having exhausted his ammunition, and having no more than four pieces of cannon fit for use, thought he had fulfilled his duty, and dispatched an officer to propose a capitulation. It was signed the same evening, and purported that the garrison, which, including the sick and wounded, still amounted to 2400 men, should be made prisoners of war and sent into Germany; General Gardanne, in consideration of his honourable defence, was granted his liberty on his parole. There is reason to believe he was speedily exchanged, for he will be found serving again before the close of the campaign.* The next morning, the 22d, the Imperial troops took possession of this important citadel, which is larger than that of Turin, has excellent casemates, and almost all its buildings bomb proof.

* This General is not more than 31 years old, of a rich and respectable family in Provence, and served, before the Revolution, in a regiment of horse chasseurs. He is one of the Generals on whose courage and activity the Republicans pride themselves.—This General is the only one, of all the French Commanders, who sustained a siege during this campaign, who defended the fortress entrusted to him till after the crowning of the covered way.

The defence of it cost the French 900 men killed or wounded, and the Allies scarce less. The latter feared they should have to regret a very sensible loss in that of the Marquis de Chasteller, who on every occasion exposing himself as a private soldier, received, on the 18th, in going out of the trench, a musquet-ball in the reins. His life was for a long time despaired of, but it was happily preserved, and he was, some months after, restored to the service of his Sovereign. He was replaced in his office of Quarter-Master-General, by Major-General Zach, who had served in that capacity before his arrival.

While Marshal Suworow gained, by the capture of Alexandria, the fruit of the victory of St. Giovanni, General Kray was endeavouring to reap that of the victory of Magnan. It has already been said, that immediately after the defeat of the army of Naples, this General had actively recommenced the labours of the siege of Mantua, and had brought again before this place the heavy artillery which had for precaution been sent upon the Adige. It was of too much importance to the Allies to get prompt possession of this key of Italy, and

the enterprize presented too great difficulties, for them to attempt to effect it by ordinary means: 25,000 men, therefore, were destined solely to this service; many thousands of peasants were employed in the labours attending it; the two reserves of the heavy Austrian and Russian artillery were united. Five or six hundred pieces of cannon, some of which were of a caliber, which for a long time back had been unusual, were brought into the lines. In the history of the campaign of 1796, some details having been given respecting the situation and strength of Mantua; this subject shall not here be returned to; besides, the very correct annexed plan of the place will give a juster idea of it, than all that has been or can be said.

The inspection of the plan will at once shew that if General Kray was obliged to invest all the circle of this city, he could not think of attacking it with the same force on all points, or even on many different ones; and that the most expeditious means of reducing it would be to destroy the defence on a single side of the fortress, and to bring matters to such a point as to be enabled to make, or give room

100-100000

1. UTHMAN

100-100000

100-100000
100-100000
100-100000
100-100000
100-100000

100-100000

100-100000
100-100000
100-100000
100-100000
100-100000
100-100000
100-100000
100-100000
100-100000
100-100000


MANTUA.

REFERENCES to the CITADEL.

- a. Bastion of St. Anselmo
 - b. Bastion of the Holy Trinity
 - c. Bastion of St. Leopoldo
 - d. Bastion of Santa Maria
 - e. Bastion of Filippo
-

REFERENCES to the CITY of MANTUA.

- a. Castle of St. George
- b. Gate of St. George
- c. Bastion of the Garden
- d. Gate Fossetta
- e. Gate of Sortie
- f. Gate and post of St. Nicolo
- g. Bastion of St. Paul
- h. Bastion of St. Alessio
- i. New Bastion
- k. Gate of St. John
- l. Gate of Sapetto
- m. The twelve mills
- n. Rocca del Rio



to fear an assault. The principal point of attack which he fixed upon was the south side, the least strong of all on the exterior, and that where the waters which surrounded the place were of the least breadth. In order to prevent sorties, which the strength of the garrison, amounting to 10,000 men, might render dangerous, and that he might be enabled to throw up the trenches with more ease and safety, the Austrian General resolved immediately to carry by storm the tower of Ceresa, which, well furnished with artillery, covered the bridge over the arm of the Mincio, called Bajolo. On the 10th, at break of day, two battalions and some companies of chasseurs, preceded by 24 pieces of artillery, and supported by two divisions, marched to the attack, under the command of General St. Julien. The artillery battered violently for some time the tower, the batteries of which it dismounted. The troops, preceded by 50 volunteers, marched then to the assault, and carried the tower, the bridge, and the sluice; and drove back the French into their works of the suburb of *Thé*. The bridge was then repaired, under the enemy's fire, which was soon reduced to silence by that

of the besiegers. They lost no time in raising batteries upon the ground they had gained, and the next and two following days they joined them by trenches of communication to the batteries previously established at the time of the formation of the lines: their junction forming a kind of parallel. The capture of the sluice of the Bajolo, a marshy part of the lake which surrounds Mantua, enabled the besiegers to let the waters run off, to render the ground dry, and thus to make direct approaches towards the body of the place.

On the 14th, General Foissac Latour, who commanded in Mantua, having under him General Dombrowsky charged with the defence of the citadel, sent a flag of truce to inform General Kray, that, wishing to celebrate the feast of the 14th of July, the anniversary of the first day of the French Revolution, the firing which he should make on that day would be merely that of rejoicing; and proposed to him, in consequence of this, to cease firing during that time against the fortress. General Kray consented to this sort of truce; but without any violation of the literal tenor of it, he, in the evening, caused the trench of the

first parallel to be opened opposite the suburb of Thé; and it was forwarded with such activity, that, the next morning, the besieged, to their great astonishment, saw the first parallel entirely finished in front of them. They then commenced a violent fire, which had but little effect, the workmen being already sheltered. The days of the 15th, 16th, and 17th, were spent in giving the necessary breadth to the parallel and its branches of communication, in forming the *banquettes* and embrasures of the batteries. The fire of the enemy was pretty well supported during the two first of these days; it slackened on the latter, and recommenced with greater force on the 18th. This did not hinder the besiegers from opening, on the following night, the second parallel, which they extended from Osteria Alta to the ravine of Belliore, nor from employing themselves on the morrow in enlarging and providing it with *banquettes* and batteries. The fire of the enemy then became more firm and well supported, and nevertheless did but little execution. During the two following days, they completed the works, the communications, and defences of the second

parallel; and on the 22d already twelve batteries were erected and in a state to receive their ordnance. They were armed the 23d; and the next day more than 110 cannons or mortars opened a terrible fire upon that place.

General Kray resolved to derive advantage immediately from the effect which it must have produced, both upon the outward defence, and on the minds of the besieged; and on the night of the 24th or 25th, he caused to be carried by assault the two redoubts which were upon the dyke between Ceresa and the suburb of the Thé. On the 25th, the besieged were desirous of retaking them, and made a sortie in force, which at first proved rather successful; but they could not retake the principal redoubt of Ceresa, and in the end they were repulsed as far as the glacis, where the besiegers could not make a lodgment, but where they took a battery, the cannons of which they spiked.

The enemy's fire, the unhealthiness of Mantua, and still more the continuance of a forced service, had already considerably weakened the garrison, and it was not sufficient for guarding all its posts. This determined General

Foissac Latour to concentrate his defence; and in consequence of this, he, on the night of the 25th or 26th, abandoned the suburb, and the fort of St. George, which had acted so considerable a part in 1796 and 1797. The Imperialists immediately occupied them, found there many pieces of cannon, and prepared to make what advantage they could of this post, in order to hasten the surrender of the place. On the same night, the left of the trench, to the left of the attack, was advanced as far as the hornwork of Pradella. The enemy in the interval repaired some of the batteries which had been thrown down; but they were destroyed again some hours after. The third parallel had been continued with vigour, and it already approached the foot of the glacis of the hornwork of Pradella, and the batteries were ready to be armed. The besieged, fearing an assault on this point, abandoned this work on the night of the 26th or 27th, after having destroyed their batteries, and spiked their cannons. The Imperial chasseurs lodged themselves there immediately; and the trenches were pushed as far as the beginning of the glacis.

It is seen that at this period the besiegers were already masters of the outworks upon the three points of attack, of Ceresa, Pradella, and St. George; and that they were now able to attack the body of the place itself, the continual bombardment of which, for six days, must have almost destroyed all the defences. This state of affairs inducing General Kray to suspect that the Commandant might be tempted to capitulate, he sent to him, under a flag of truce, a Lieutenant-Colonel of Engineers, named Orlandini, a man possessed of as much address as courage, who found General Foissac Latour disposed to enter into terms. The firing on both sides ceased in consequence of this. The articles of the capitulation were prepared, and carried in the evening of the 27th, for General Kray's ratification, at his head-quarters of Castelluccio. He was not at first willing to consent to the free return of the garrison into France: he agreed, however, the next day, to this condition, modified by that of their not serving again till exchanged. This principal article being settled, the others were quickly determined, and the capitulation was signed on the 30th. The same day the

garrison, still amounting to 8700 men, of whom 6600 only were French, quitted the place, and laid down their arms upon the glacis.—Thus fell, only fourteen days after the opening of the trenches, and six of the commencement of the firing, the proud Mantua, which it had been thought almost impossible to reduce by open force.—Thus returned into the hands of Austria, at the expense only of a few hundreds of men, this place, for the preservation of which, the latter had, three years before, successively formed and seen destroyed four powerful armies: and thus did General Kray receive the most flattering reward of the victories, by which he had opened to the Allies a career of triumph.

So much space having been dedicated to the history of the siege just described, but a few observations shall be added to the same subject. The reflections which it is calculated to excite, will present themselves rationally to the mind, when it is remarked that the citadel of Alexandria had held out during a greater number of days of open trenches, and an equal duration of firing; that the case was the same, in the following month, with Tortona; that in

1796, Bonaparte opened, with as great military means, the trenches before Mantua, on the 18th of July; and that on the 31st, that is to say, fourteen days after, he was still 100 paces from the covered way; and that, besides, the outworks of this place were then far from possessing the same strength which they had in 1799; that when General Foissac Latour surrendered it, the fortress had provisions and ammunition for many months; that the body of the place was unhurt, that it had, besides, a citadel, which might have served as an asylum to the garrison; and in short, that Moreau received orders from the Minister at War, to try General Foissac by a court-martial. The perusal of some of the eighteen articles which the capitulation contained, will finally fix a judgment upon this event.

“ART. I. The garrison of Mantua shall march out, the 30th of July, 1799, at twelve o'clock, with the honours of war, having six pieces of cannon in front. The garrison shall be prisoners of war, and in order to prevent the disgrace and misery of confinement, the General commanding in chief, the other Generals under his orders, the Officers of the Staff,

and all the officers of the garrison, *consent* to remain prisoners, in the nearest part of the Hereditary States in Germany, in order to serve as *hostages* for the non-commissioned officers and soldiers, who shall be sent back into France by the shortest road, and shall not serve against the troops of the Emperor, or his Allies, till after their exchange.

“ *Answer.*—Granted in its fullest extent, and in consideration of the *open, brave, and honourable* conduct of the garrison of Mantua, the Commandant, the Officers of the Staff, and the other military officers of the garrison, after having remained three months in the Hereditary States, shall be at liberty to return to their respective countries, upon their word of honour, not to serve against His Imperial Majesty or his Allies, until they are reciprocally exchanged; the period of three months shall begin from the day on which the capitulation is signed.

“ A pair of colours shall be granted to the General of division Foissac Latour, *in consideration of the energy of his defence.*

“ ART. III. Three covered waggons shall be allowed the Commandant for the carriage of his papers, baggage, and *personal property.*

Those waggons shall not be examined, and shall be subject to his orders only.—*Granted.*

“ART. IV. The Chief of the Staff, and the other chiefs of departments shall have the power of taking with them all papers relating to their own concerns, and shall have the sole charge of the waggons destined for that purpose, and for the carriage of their *personal property*.—*Granted.*

“ART. X. All doubts that may arise out of the present capitulation, shall be explained in favour of the garrison, consistent with the laws of equity.—*Granted.*

(Signed)

“ Foissac Latour, General of division.

“ Baron Kray, General of artillery.

“ Maubert, Chief of brigade, Commander in Chief of artillery.

“ The Chief of brigade Boittou, Commander of the artillery, has not signed, from motives personal to him.”*

* General Maubert, who directed the defence of Mantua, has lately published a memoir in justification of his own conduct and that of General Foissac Latour, in which he says, that out of the 10,000 men who composed the garrison, only 3661 were able to do duty,

While the Allies were acquiring, by the capture of Alexandria and of Mantua, certain pledges of the reconquest of all Italy, one of its most valuable parts was snatched from the yoke of the French and Italian Revolutionists. After the evacuation of Naples by Macdonald, Cardinal Ruffo, at the head of the Royalist army, consisting of more than 20,000 men, and supported by, or rather supporting some hundreds of Russians, attacked the Republican levies of men, which were opposed to him, beat them, and marched towards the capital, in whose port the English fleet, on board of which the Hereditary Prince and some Sicilian regiments had embarked, was expected to arrive at the same time. Admiral Nelson had already

when the place surrendered, the remainder having either been killed, or being in the hospitals, wounded or sick. He labours to invalidate the general opinion as to the strength of Mantua, and pretends that if vigorously attacked on the side of Pradella, it cannot hold out for fifteen days of open trenches, unless the garrison be very numerous; and supports his opinion by asserting, that it is that of General Zach, who directed the siege on the side of the Austrians. There may be some truth in some of these assertions, but an examination of the whole would lead into a detail which would probably be thought tedious.

set sail, when the unexpected appearance of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, compelled him to take another direction. Cardinal Ruffo seeing himself deprived of this diversion in his favour, and fearing the resistance, which the Republicans, who were in great numbers in Naples, and still masters of the fort of St. Elme, and the castles of Castel Nuovo and Castel Ovo, might oppose to him, entered into a treaty with their chiefs, and granted them conditions more favourable than they had reason to expect. Being put in possession of Naples, at this price, on the 20th of June, he saw, a few days afterwards, the English fleet come into port, which, owing to the return of that of the French towards Toulon, had reverted as quick as possible to its former destination. Admiral Nelson refused to accede to the treaty, which the Cardinal, abusing his power, had entered into on equal terms with the Prince of Caraccioli and some other leaders of the revolution. Protecting the rights of the King of the Two Sicilies with the same zeal and activity which he had exerted in so heroical a manner for the honour and interests of his own country, he made the English and Portuguese marines dis-

embark and invest the castles of Ovo and Nuovo, got possession of them on the 26th, and caused the fort of St. Elme, where the few French troops who had been left in Naples and a greater number of their affiliated Neapolitans had taken refuge, to be invested on the 29th, by the English, Russian, and Portuguese troops. The English Captain Trowbridge was charged with the direction of the siege, which was pushed on with considerable spirit. Seven batteries, armed with cannon of the largest bore, were successively erected, and on the 11th of July, 30 pieces of ordnance were ready to play on the fort: the approaches had been at that time pushed to within 180 toises from the fort. The batteries of the place being almost all dismounted, and the works very much shattered, the garrison demanded to capitulate on the same day, and the terms were agreed upon and signed on the 12th. The purport of them was, that the garrison, after having laid down their arms, should be embarked for France, under condition of not serving again till an exchange should take place: that the would-be Patriots of Naples, who composed a part of the garrison, should be given up to the Allies; and that the booty

found in the fort should at the same time be put into their hands, in order to be restored to the lawful owners.

The King of the Two Sicilies, who had arrived in the bay of Naples, and who had hoisted his flag on board the *Foudroyant*, the English Admiral's ship, had the pleasure to see it once more wave over his capital, and the forts which defend it: Gaeta and Capua were the only towns which were not yet reduced under his authority; but his active Allies lost not a moment in endeavouring to subject them again to it.

On the 20th of July, Captain Trowbridge began his march at the head of his little army, composed of English, Russian, Neapolitan, Piedmontese, Swiss, and Ottoman troops, and arrived the next day at Caserta, from whence he on the same day repaired to Capua, which he invested. On the 22d, he had a bridge of boats thrown over the river Vulturno, which washes the walls of this place; and erected batteries mounted with some large pieces of cannon, as well as some howitzers and mortars. All of these began to play on the 25th, and during this day the fire of the besieged and

besiegers was equally spirited and well sustained. On the 26th, the trenches were opened, only a few toises from the glacis, and the new batteries began to be erected. The daring approaches of the besiegers alarmed the Commandant, and determined him to offer to capitulate; but the conditions he prepared were rejected by Captain Trowbridge, who proposed another capitulation, to which the Commandant agreed, and which was signed on the 28th. In conformity to its contents, the French garrison laid down their arms on the glacis on the 29th, and marched towards Naples, where they were to be embarked in order to return into France, under promise however of not serving against the Allies till exchanged. The surrender of this place was, two days after, followed by that of Gaeta, which had only been blockaded, and whose garrison consequently obtained the honours of war, and a free return into France.—General Girardon, who commanded at the same time the troops shut up in both the places, to the number of more than 2400 French, signed both capitulations, and consented in both to surrender to the besiegers the revolted Neapolitans, who had taken refuge in Gaeta and

Capona, or composed part of their garrisons. It was thus that the French, after having plundered and ravaged the kingdom of Naples, and induced some thousands of its inhabitants to turn rebels, abandoned them to the sword of justice, and the vengeance of the Royalist party.

While the regular troops of the Allies were reducing the different fortresses which have just been seen fall into their hands, and while the English Captain Hood maintained tranquillity in the capital with a detachment of sailors, the Royalist militia accomplished the subjection of the remainder of the kingdom of Naples, and met with no serious resistance except from the fortress of Pescara, upon the shore of the Adriatic, of which, however, they succeeded in making themselves masters, after a long blockade. All the continental possessions of the King of the Two Sicilies, being at length freed from the double yoke, as well as double rapacity of the French and their worthy Italian partizans, the confederated troops turned their attention to support, in their turn, the operations of the grand Imperial army, whose victories had rendered the kingdom of Naples an easy conquest. They proposed to

effect that of the State of the Church, of which the complete deliverance will ere long be announced.

This article will be terminated by remarking how glorious the æra which has now been engaging our attention was for England, and how extensive were the military means of every kind which she at that time displayed. Situated at one extremity of Europe, she was re-establishing, at the other extremity, the King of Naples on his throne—was preserving at the same time the Ottoman Empire, and accomplished more with some ships and some hundreds of men, than that immense colossus could effect for its own sake.—She was sustaining, by her councils, her fleets, and her treasures, the energy, the confidence, and the efforts of her continental Allies.—She was preparing to effect in Holland a powerful diversion in their favour.—She was shewing herself on the seas superior to the united maritime powers of France and Spain.—In a remote part of the globe, she was successful in rendering the whole of India one of her colonies. In the midst of this prodigious and incomparable exhibition of her power, and of this divergence of her force, she

was successfully employed in encreasing and concentrating it by the union of Ireland with Great Britain. Such was to this fortunate Island, flourishing at home, and powerful abroad, the happy result of the wisdom of the constitution, the virtues of the Sovereign, the genius of the Minister, and the public spirit of the nation.

CHAPTER IX.

Objects which Marshal Suworow had to accomplish after the surrender of Alexandria, and account of his conduct—What remained for Moreau to do, and what he did—He is superseded in the command of the army of Italy by General Joubert—Macdonald returns into France—Military measures taken by the new French Directory, and general plan of attack formed by them—Joubert arrives in Italy, and prevails on Moreau to remain there—Preparations made, and positions taken by the Republican army—Counter operations and positions of the Allies—Success of General Klenau in the Riviera di Levante, and taking of the fort of Serravalle—Order in which Joubert assembles his army—It is put in motion on the 11th of August, and, two days afterwards, arrives on the Orba and the Scrivia, in the presence of the enemy—Dispositions made by Marshal Suworow, and the order in which he arranges his army—Instead of waiting for Joubert, he determines to attack him—Battle of Novi—The victory

long doubtful, at last is decided in favour of the Allies—Enormous loss on both sides—Reflections upon this event.

MARSHAL Suworow and the grand army were left before Alexandria. The surrender of that place made no change in the plan which the Marshal had followed since the battle of the Trebia: it only demonstrated its excellence and hastened its execution. Of the three places which had remained to be taken, one was reduced, another (Mantua) could not resist much longer, and Tortona only was left, the blockade of which, having lasted above a month, he lost not a moment in converting into a vigorous siege. To cover it, he had only a slight movement to make on his left, and to pass from the banks of the Bormida to those of the Scrivia, which he did on the 26th, making his army establish its camp near to Rivalta, between Tortona and Novi. The head-quarters were placed at Tregaloro. From that moment the views of the Commander in Chief were restricted to the following objects:—to confine the French within the passages of the Alps; from the Valais all the way to Coni—to approach that place nearer

and nearer, in order to be able to invest it easily when the proper time should come to besiege Tortona—to force the united armies of Moreau and Macdonald to remain stationary in the maritime Alps and the Apennines—and to gain ground on their right flank in the Riviera di Levante. General Haddick, and Prince Rohan, were fulfilling the first object; General Kaim the second; General Wuckassowich the third; and General Bellegarde on the Bormida, the grand army on the Scrivia, and General Hohenzollern on the Trebia, were accomplishing the fourth; Generals Ott and Klenau the fifth. Behind the whole, General Kray was besieging Mantua; but, as has been seen, this last and important part of the plan was executed before the end of July, but made no change in the position of the grand army.

After having been driven from Tortona on the 26th of June, Moreau had nothing to do but to complete his junction with Macdonald, to secure himself in the possession of the passages of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, to keep open his communication with Coni, to cover the Col de Tende, and thus to wait in that position till he

received the reinforcements which were coming from France by the way of Nice, and till Championnet should get together a sufficient number of men to be able to connect himself with the left of the former General, and to act beyond the Alps, which was sufficiently proved to be his object, by the denomination given to his army. The remains of the army of Macdonald formed the right of the whole, in the Riviera di Levante; and Moreau, making a motion in a contrary direction to that which he had made, in order to approach his colleague, went and re-occupied upon the left, between Genoa and Savona, the same position which he had held in the latter end of May. It was in this situation, as has been partly pointed out before, that the Republican army passed the month of July, at the end of which the command of both Moreau and Macdonald was to cease in Italy. The latter of these Generals had obtained permission to return to France, to get cured of his wounds, and to regret his defeats. It was not, however, to his colleague that he was to leave the inheritance of his army; for he, being destined to command on the Rhine, was to be succeeded in Italy by General Joubert, to whom the Direc-

tory, which had been revolutionized on the 17th of June, thus restored the situation of which he had been deprived, a few months before, by their predecessors.

The misfortunes experienced on all sides by the Republican armies, under the old Directory, had furnished to the Jacobins of Paris, both the pretext and the force to overturn it. The mixed party which succeeded it, having attained the supreme power from the defeats of their predecessors, hoped to maintain it by victories. The disastrous battle of the Trebia, contemporary with their elevation, thwarted their hopes, but did not destroy them. They regarded it, and made it be regarded by others, as the consequence of the imprudent measures of the preceding Directory. Relying on the popularity which commonly attends newly acquired power, they decreed, with more rigour than ever, requisitions of men, of money, of horses, of provisions, and of military stores. They created a new army of the Alps, and soon after another, called that of the Rhine. They assembled all the troops which were scattered about in the interior of France, and made them march, with all the conscripts they could gather, towards Italy, Swit-

zerland, and Germany, flattering themselves that they would doubly regain the confidence of the Republican armies, by sending them both reinforcements and new Generals.

Such were the measures and hopes of the French government, and their views and projects were as follow: Victory had hitherto constantly attended the Allies in Switzerland and in Italy, but to make sure of it in the latter country, they had been obliged to send to it a part of the forces which they had in the former. The departure of Generals Bellegarde and Haddick had reduced the Archduke Charles to an equality of force with Massena. That Prince was to be reinforced by the Russian auxiliary army, which was at that time traversing Germany; but it could not arrive in Switzerland before the middle of August. Upon the other theatre of the war, the three strong places of Alexandria, Tortona, and Mantua, were likely to occupy the attention of the Allies till the same period, or perhaps longer. The Directory had therefore, till that time, a certainty that the Allies could undertake nothing against France itself; and during the interval of two months, it hoped that it might itself resume the offensive, and prevent the execution of

the projects which the coalition had formed for the end of the campaign. From these circumstances resulted a plan of general attack upon the line of the Apennines, the Piedmontese, and Swiss Alps, the Linmat, and the Rhine. The issue upon the three last points of attack is already known from the former volume, and what it was on the two first is now to be related. Joubert, on arriving in Italy, in the end of July, to take the command from Moreau, had the wisdom to entreat, and the good fortune to prevail upon him, to remain some time longer with the army. Aided by his advice, Joubert, by reconnoitring, by alterations of positions, and by changes among the commanders, prepared the plan of attack which he meditated: with his right, he occupied, on one side, the Riviera di Levante, and on the other, the road of the Bochetta; with his centre, the entry of the valleys of the Orba, and of the Erro; and with his left, the roads to Acqui and Ceva. Some detachments, placed at the Col de Tende, and in the other defiles of the Maritime Alps, established a communication with the troops of General Championnet, which began to shew themselves in force, in the passages of

Argentieres, of Fenestrelles, of Exiles, of Mont Cenis, and of St. Bernard.

While General Kaim and Prince Rohan kept in check this French army, General Klenau acted against the right flank of that of Joubert. Having driven the advanced posts from the frontiers of Tuscany, and rendered himself master of Sarzana, and of the defile of Pontremoli, on the 4th of August, he took the forts of Sarzanella and of Lerici; and the following days, those of Santa Teresa and St. Lorenzo; in a word, all the circumference of the Gulf of Spezia, with the exception of the fort of St. Marie, where the enemy had a garrison of 300 men. At the same time, Prince Bagration, at the head of the vanguard of the principal army, gained ground in the Apennines, on the road to Genoa; and having pushed forward his advanced posts till near to Gavi,* which was still in the possession of the French, invested the fort of Serravalle, and by the hotness of his fire forced the garrison, consisting

* Gavi has a castle built upon an elevated rock, which commands the pass of the Bochetta.

of 150 men, to surrender at discretion, on the 7th.*

The acquisition of this post in the mountains, and the desire to watch the enemy more narrowly, induced Marshal Suworow to transfer his head-quarters, for the moment, to Novi. The works of the siege of Tortona were carried on with activity, notwithstanding the difficulties arising from the stony nature of the soil; and on the 8th, the first parallel was at no greater distance than 170 toises from the counterscarp, and three strong batteries were ready to be armed. General Kray was crossing Lombardy with a body of troops, and directing his course towards Alexandria. In front of that place, General Bellegarde, in consequence of reinforcements received, and movements made, on the 8th, by the enemy in the valley, had taken post at Acqui and Terzo. General Wuckasowich still kept possession of Ceva and Mondovi, and masked Coni.

Such were the measures taken, and the ope-

* This castle is advantageously situated upon the banks of the Scrivia. The valley formed by that river is very narrow in this place, and the castle shuts it up, as may be known by its name.

rations executed, on both sides, from the 1st to the 11th of August. Joubert had employed the preceding days in assembling his army, and in dividing it into four columns, ready for marching; that of the right, which was the strongest, was on the road from the Bochetta to Novi, under the command of General St. Cyr; the second, composed of the centre of the army, and led by Joubert himself, was to follow the road which leads from Genoa to Alexandria, by Ovada, and the valley of Orba; the third was on the road to Acqui, by Sassello and Ponzzone; the fourth and last marched towards the same town, by Dego and Spigno. These two last-mentioned columns, which formed the left of the army, and were entrusted to General Perignon, having more space to traverse, in order to arrive at the points of attack, and to get into the line, were the first put in motion. On the 11th, they marched, and on the 12th they took post, the one at Spigno, and the other near Ponzzone, while the second column made itself master of Ovada, and forced the Imperial advanced posts to retreat towards Acqui. On the 13th, these three columns completed their movements, and in passing, without much difficulty, dislodged

the corps of General Bellegarde from Bistagno, Terzo, Acqui, and from all the posts which it occupied in the upper valleys of the Bormida, the Erro, and the Orba: the day after, the 14th, these three columns united, under the immediate orders of Joubert, at Capriata, on the Orba, where the head-quarters were established, and the advanced posts were pushed as far as Bazzaluzzo. On the same day, the right of the army, which had only one day's march to perform to arrive at its destined position, advanced by Voltagio and Gavi, to Novi, from which it expelled the Austrians, and joined the three other columns. The French army, to the number of between 36,000 and 40,000 men, was thus formed, on the 13th, in order of battle, in the space bounded by the Scrivia and the Bormida, having its right on the first of these rivers and at Serravalle, which it invested, its centre at Novi, and its left on the Bormida, and at Bazzaluzzo. From this strong position, on the summit of the last chain of the Apennines to the north, it commanded all the roads which traversed them, and all the plain below.

The movements made by the French, since the 6th, left no doubt with Marshal Suworow,

of their intending to make another effort to save Tortona, and he foresaw that he must gain another victory before he could carry that place. Being able, without interrupting the siege, to march 40,000 men against the enemy, and having a decided superiority in cavalry, he resolved to wait for them, and to fight them in the plain between the Scrivia and the Bormida. In consequence of this resolution, orders had been given to General Bellegarde, not to persist in defending, with his 8000 men, the posts which he occupied; but to draw nearer to the main army, by retiring towards the Orba, by the road of Ritorta. It was owing to this order, that the left of Joubert got possession so easily of the valley of the Bormida, which advantage was much boasted of by the French Generals, and by the Directory. General Kray, who, as has been already mentioned, arrived on the 12th, with a part of his army at Alexandria, from whence he was to proceed by Asti to Coni, with the siege of which he was to be entrusted, received first an order to suspend his march, and afterwards was directed to incline his course towards Fressonara, and to join the corps of General Bellegarde. This junction took place

on the 14th, and formed a body of 20,000 men, of which General Kray took the command. It composed the right of the line of battle, determined on by Marshal Suworow. — That General, with his Russians, to the number of about 13,000 men, was at Pozolo, on the road to Novi, and formed the centre. — The left, consisting entirely of Austrians, encamped at Rivalta, and under the orders of General Melas, covered the siege of Tortona. This division was particularly charged with the latter object, but was likewise to engage, if circumstances required. The number which could march against the enemy, without abandoning the siege, amounted to about 10,000 men, of which more than the half were grenadiers. It was with this total of force, and in this order of battle, that the allied army, on the 14th, at night, found itself opposite to that of the French.

If private accounts may be believed, Joubert had at first resolved to descend into the plain, and there to offer battle; but either that calling to mind the great number of Generals who have been beaten from having quitted a good position, he hesitated to give up the advantage of his own, or that the presence of the Allies kept him in

awe, or that he hoped to see them make some false movement, or, what is indeed more probable than any other supposition, that he was stopped by the unexpected arrival of General Kray, which gave to the Allies a degree of superiority, which the French General relied on his having over them, he remained immoveable all the evening of the 14th, and the night following. Marshal Suworow, little accustomed to temporize, and encouraged by the battles of the Adda and the Trebia, resolved, notwithstanding the local disadvantages he must labour under, to attack, himself, the next day.

At five o'clock in the morning, Generals Kray and Bellegarde marched against the left of the French army, where was the General in Chief in person, and attacked with a degree of vigour, which was imitated in the defence. On both sides the contest was obstinate and bloody.—Joubert, animating his troops, by his voice and his example, and leading on his infantry, received, about six o'clock, a musquet-ball through the body, which laid him dead on the field. This event did not disconcert his soldiers. Generals Kray and Bellegarde could not succeed in gaining the flank of the heights, on which the French

were entrenched, and after several hours of continued efforts, were obliged to abandon the enterprize. At nine o'clock, General Suworow, with his Russians, attacked, in front, the position of Novi: the extreme steepness of the mountains, and the plunging fire of the French, rendered fruitless the intrepid and obstinate valour of his infantry, and they were repulsed with a very heavy loss. At eleven o'clock, that is, after an engagement of six hours, the French line was still untouched, and the attempt to break it had cost the Allies already very dear. Any other General than Marshal Suworow would have been perhaps discouraged, but he did not despair of victory. He sent orders to General Melas, to advance, in his turn, against the enemy, and supported this movement by a Russian column, which marched forwards on the road to Novi, under General Derfelden, but which could not gain an inch of ground. About two o'clock, the Field-Marshal ordered a new and general attack upon the right and centre, but it had no better success than the former ones. The Austrian Generals Kray and Bellegarde on the first point, and on the second, the Russian Generals Rosenberg, Bagration, Millarodowich, and Derfelden,

after prodigies of valour and a great loss of men, were obliged to lead back their troops: of so difficult access were the heights occupied by the French, and so constant was the courage with which they defended them. So great also was the firmness of the Russian Field-Marshal, and the unshaken intrepidity of his infantry, that he sent them again to the charge, at three o'clock, in front, and on the two flanks of Novi, but their success was no greater than what it had been in the preceding attacks.—While the greater part of the day passed in this way, and while the French thought themselves certain of at least a negative victory, General Melas marched up the left bank of the Scrivia, and having relieved Serravalle, occupied Acquata; and sent to Vignola, on the other side of the river, General Nobilis, with a strong detachment, to keep in check a small French column, which sought to penetrate in that direction, and to get on as far as Tortona. When arrived near to the enemy, between Serravalle and Novi, General Melas formed his troops into three columns. The first, commanded by General Frœlich, and composed of the brigade of grenadiers of General Lusignan, and of a battalion of fusileers, was des-

tined to attack the extremity of the enemy's right wing.—The second column, composed of the brigade of General Loudon, and led by him, was to manœuvre on the left of the first, and to outflank the enemy.—The third, commanded by Prince Lichtenstein, and which had some cavalry, was ordered to turn still farther to the left, the right of the enemy. It was in this order, *en echelon*, supported by the artillery of reserve placed in the intervals, that the corps of General Melas marched against the enemy. General Lusignan, with his grenadiers, made a most vigorous attack upon the angle of the right of the French, and forced them to fall back. General Moreau, who had resumed the command of the army, and who happened to be on the spot, seeing his line broken by this attack, marched a half brigade of reinforcement against that of General Lusignan. In the charge of the bayonet, made by the two corps on one another, the last-mentioned General had his horse killed under him, and having received two balls, and a cut of a sabre on the head, the French rushed forward upon him, before his grenadiers could come to his assistance, and

carried him off prisoner ;* but his corps having been supported by that of General Loudon, the combat was maintained to the advantage of the Imperialists. They forced the French to fall back more and more, and at last succeeded in driving them, about five o'clock, from their central position at Novi. In the mean time, Prince Lichtenstein had so far got on the rear of their line, that he cut off their retreat towards Gavi and the Bocchetta, that they were obliged to make it to the left, towards Ovada. It was at first conducted in good order, but it did not continue long to be so.—All the army defiling by the same road, could not do it but slowly; and soon the road was embarrassed. By some accident, the artillery, having been stopped in the village of Pasturana, shut up all passage that way, and the rear-guard neither having it in its power to retreat, nor being able to oppose any orderly resistance to the Austrian General Karacksay, who pursued with the light troops, after a courageous defence, was put to flight and broken, and a great part

* He was exchanged, the day after, for General Partonneaux, and had the unexpected good fortune to recover of his wounds.

was destroyed or taken by the victors. Generals Grouchi, Perignon, and Colli, were all three grievously wounded and taken, on this occasion. General Partonneaux had likewise before fallen into the hands of the Austrians, and another General had been killed. This day cost the French 8000 men killed and wounded, 4000 made prisoners, and 32 pieces of cannon taken on the field of battle. The Imperialists paid dear for this victory by the loss of 7000 men killed, wounded, or missing. These last did not exceed 600.

Such was the termination of this terrible battle, so long, so disputed, and so bloody; and which in these three respects was without parallel in this campaign, or indeed in the whole war. It has been shewn that 15,000 men, about a fifth of the combatants, were disabled this day, and fortunately there are scarcely two or three similar examples to be found in the wars which have afflicted Europe for 200 years past. However remarkable this battle may be in future military annals, all reflections upon it might perhaps be dispensed with. The causes which brought on, the cir-

cumstances which accompanied it, and determined its issue, offer nothing but what is simple and easy to be understood. It is easy to perceive that Joubert had two motives for approaching and engaging the Allies, the general one of promoting the determined plan of a general attack in Italy, in Switzerland, and in Germany, and the particular one of saving Tortona. The junction of the armies of MacDonald and Moreau, with the reinforcements received from France, had given him a force superior to that of Marshal Suworow before the arrival of General Kray; and it appears that Joubert having hoped to make his attack before General Kray could come from Mantua, upon knowing, on the 14th, that his junction was effected, had abandoned his plan, or at least deferred it.—Perhaps he would have done better, had he from that moment fallen back, and shut himself up again in the Apennines. He would thus have preserved his army, while he kept in suspense that of the enemy; he would have embarrassed their future operations, and perhaps in the end would have found some more favourable opportunity for coming to battle. He would, it is true, have abandoned

Tortona, but the battle which he fought rather hastened than retarded the fall of that place.—Moreau has written, that if Joubert had not been attacked on the 15th, he would probably have led back his army into their former positions, and there is reason to believe it.

How brilliant and fortunate was the fate of General Kray in this campaign! A career of triumphs was opened by him, by the victories of Legnago and of Magnan.—By the taking of Mantua, he gathered the fruit of them, which was the most precious and the most difficult to be obtained; and at last he arrived in time to decide a victory which crowned, confirmed, and completed all the former successes. It was indeed not so much on the 30th of July as on the 15th of August, that the Allies had reason to felicitate themselves on the taking of Mantua; and when it is remembered, that if that place had resisted some days longer, Joubert would have had 12,000 men fewer to contend with, and would have thus been superior in force to Marshal Suworow, it must be acknowledged that General Kray was much in the right to grant such favourable terms to General Foissac Latour, and it is easily

understood why the French have never pardoned that officer for not having made a longer resistance.

Boldness accompanied by talent and followed by success, commands the mind, and so much overpowers the judgment, that, without inquiring whether Marshal Suworow, superior in numbers, and particularly in cavalry, would not have done better to wait for his enemy in the plain, as it appears he at first intended, one is forced to admire him when he is seen attacking in front an army entrenched upon a line of almost inaccessible heights, crowned with a numerous artillery, and so difficult to climb, that each column was in a manner obliged to make a road for itself, and that each attack was an assault. Never perhaps did any troops fight with more fury and make so great a slaughter without flinching, as did the centre and right of the Imperialists, and the centre and left of the French on that memorable day—Valour, the desire to conquer, the shame of yielding, were equal on both sides; numbers were likewise nearly equal on these two points. If the French were constantly victorious through the greatest part of the action,

the honour which they derived from it must be balanced by the difficulties which the Allies had to surmount, and by their being deprived of their principal advantage, a superiority of cavalry, that kind of troops having been of no use the whole day.

What bravery had left in suspense for so long, was decided by skill, that almost sovereign arbiter of the fortune of war; and the victory for which several thousands of men had been already sacrificed in vain, was obtained at the expense of a few hundreds—one single manœuvre decided it; and the fine movement of General Melas, something similar to that by which Alexander gained the battle of Arbela, is the only thing which that of Novi presents to the study and imitation of military men. It was such as the circumstances demanded. It was planned with skill, and executed with determined vigour by the Austrian grenadiers. It must be acknowledged, that the resistance was not so great on this point, the French being less in force there than in their centre and on their left. Moreau did every thing in his power to remedy this insufficiency of strength, and brought up reinforcements;

but it was no longer time: the columns of Generals Loudon and Lichtenstein had already advanced too far on the rear of the French: their line could no longer be maintained; and, cut off as they were from the road to Gavi, their retreat could be nothing else but a defeat, for they were obliged to go off obliquely, and consequently to expose their flank.

Combining all the circumstances of this battle, it may be said, that it was of the first order, as in it two great armies were engaged, and for more than twelve hours, on the whole extent of their front; that it was one of the most remarkable combats of infantry, which have taken place since the invention of fire-arms; that more bravery and obstinacy were shewn in it, than art and military skill; that the advantage of position was more in favour of the French, than that of number was in favour of the Allies; and that if it was a hurt to the former to lose their General in the beginning of the action, it was very fortunate that Moreau was there to take his place. — Without wishing to anticipate what

remains to be related, it may be remarked, that of all the victories obtained by the Allies, it was this one which cost them the most, and by which they gained the least. The proof of this will soon appear.

CHAPTER X.

After the battle of Novi, Moreau continues his retreat towards the state of Genoa, and goes to resume the position which he occupied before the offensive movement made by Joubert. The line of conduct which remained for him to observe—Movements of the army of Championnet in the French Alps—They induce Marshal Suworow to march to Asti—Conditional capitulation of Tortona—Operations of General Klenau—New progress made by Championnet—Objects which he had in view—Schemes of the Allies—They prepare to carry them into execution—Moreau endeavours to prevent them, and again makes a movement in advance—He is forced to make a retrograde movement—Tortona falls—Marshal Suworow sets off for Switzerland—Summary of the history of this General's life—View of his long and surprising career—Caprice of his destiny—Different opinions which have been formed concerning him—Judgment which appears best founded respecting his character as a military man.

MOREAU continued his retreat the night of the 15th, and brought back the wreck of his army into the defiles of the Apennines, the possession of which it was very doubtful whether he should henceforth be able to retain. His right wing was employed in covering the Bochetta; his centre and his left wing went to resume the positions which they held before the movement made by Joubert. This retreat was effected without any obstacle, the Imperialists not having pursued him very hotly, and having contented themselves with retaking, in the valleys of the Scrivia, of the Orba, and the Bormida, the posts which they occupied before the movement of the French Generals, on the 13th. As notwithstanding the general expectation, they did not make on the following days any attempt to penetrate farther into the Apennines, Moreau flattered himself he should still be able to maintain himself there, and after having taken measures to that effect, he returned to Genoa. His plan of conduct was confined to three things: To defend upon his front the passage of the mountains, upon his right the Riviera di Levante; upon his left to favour the operations of Cham-

pionnet, and to establish a free communication between himself and this General, whom he requested to come and take the command of the army of Italy, which had in fact, as well as in name, absorbed that of Naples.

The latter General had, in the beginning of August, begun, as has been seen, to shew the heads of different small columns of his army on the other side of several defiles of the French Alps, from Mount Cenis as far as the valley of Barcelonetta; he had effected the revictualling of Fenestrelles, which the light Imperial troops blockaded at a distance. These first movements, which had for their object to draw to this point the forces of the enemy, in order to diminish as much as possible the resistance which they might make to Joubert and to Massena in the grand attack which they were employed to make, became of a more important nature at the period at which it took place at once in Switzerland and Italy. On the 17th of August, Championnet caused an attack to be made on the post of La Thuill, at the *debouché* of the Little St. Bernard; at the same time another column penetrated by that of Mount Cenis, as far as La Ferriere

and La Novalese ; another advanced also by Mont Genevre towards Exilles, with the intent of joining the preceding column at Suza. A fourth column succeeded in carrying the famous post of *The Barricades*. In order to counter-balance in some measure the bad news of the battle of Novi : these little operations were represented at Paris as great advantages ; but they produced no other effect than that of enabling the Republicans to gain some leagues of territory, and of costing the lives of some hundreds of men. The commanding situation of Turin secured the Allies from every unfortunate event in this quarter.

These movements shewed nevertheless Championnet's intention to penetrate into Piedmont, or to effect a junction with Moreau. Marshal Suworow wishing to put himself in a situation to frustrate one or both of these projects, and to execute those which he had planned himself, marched with the greatest part of his army towards Asti, where, on the 20th, he placed his head-quarters ; upon his right, he extended his force towards Turin ; on his left there was upon the Scrivia and the Bormida, a sufficiently large body of troops to hold in check the right

wing of the French in the Apennines, and to cover and forward the siege of Tortona. General Kray set off at the same time with about 10,000 men for the Upper Novarese, for the purpose of supporting the troops stationed upon the frontiers of the Valais, which had experienced, on the 12th, a check, not of any great importance, but considerable enough to make the Allies sensible of the necessity of protecting more strongly this upper part of Italy. A reinforcement of one brigade having been considered as sufficient to accomplish this object, General Kray, who had arrived, on the 21st, at Novara, fell back from thence, and came to join the centre of the army near Asti. All these different movements took place between the 16th and 23d of August.

It is seen, that since the battle of Novi, the distribution of the allied forces had taken another direction, that it was no longer to the Apennines, but to the French Alps, that the greatest number of their troops were opposed; and that however weak Championnet's army might be, it had nevertheless made an advantageous diversion. It was the desire of paralyzing it, and still more the resolution already

taken by Marshal Suworow of advancing against Coni and the Col de Tende, and not the degree of weakness produced by the battle of Novi, which prevented the Austro-Russians from pursuing, after that event had taken place, the army of Moreau into the state of Genoa. In order to dislodge it entirely from thence, more time and labour would have been necessary than Marshal Suworow could spare for this enterprize. He confined his offensive projects in this quarter to the reduction of Tortona.

General Alcaini, who had recommenced the siege of this place, at the end of July, had pushed it with as much vigour as the difficulty of the soil would permit; and on the 21st the third parallel had been already advanced as far as the glacis. General Gast, who commanded in this fortress, being informed of the result of the battle of Novi, and seeing that he must renounce the hope of being quickly relieved, but still hoping that he should be so in the course of time, was induced by these motives to make an agreement with the besiegers, to surrender himself on the 11th of September, if he was not succoured before that time. He thus gave himself the chance of

preserving untouched to the Republic, a place which at the period fixed upon, would probably have been carried by force of arms. The Allies, on their side, saved themselves the trouble and fatigues of a siege, which the strength of the fortress and the rocky soil upon which they must have worked in the sap, would have rendered slow, difficult, and expensive: the officers of engineers, who conducted the siege, had declared, in a council of war, that they could not hope to blow up the counterscarp in less than three weeks. By means of these arrangements, there remained nothing more for the Allies than to prevent the French army from penetrating as far as Tortona, and that was a business which they would equally have had to perform, if they had continued the siege of this place. This sort of capitulation was concluded on the 23d of August. The Imperial commissaries were the same day introduced into the place, to make there the inventory of the military effects which it contained.

From this day till the end of the month, the opposite armies undertook nothing on their centres against each other, worthy of remark.

Their active operations were confined to their wings. General Klenau, after having got possession of the fort of St. Mary and all the Gulf of Spezia, made successive advances upon the Riviera di Levante, taking possession of Sestri, of Chiavari, and Bisagno, which made him master of the rout of the valley of Taro. He pushed afterwards as far as Rappallo, and even to near Recco, only four leagues from Genoa. This alarming approach determined Moreau to reinforce General Miollis, who was employed in the defence of the Riviera di Levante, and who having, on the 27th, attacked the advanced posts of the Imperialists, worsted them, and forced them to retreat as far as Rappallo. This was the extent of the progress of General Klenau, who though he appeared destined to take Genoa, not only did not get possession of it, but found himself, even eight months afterwards, that is to say, at the opening of the following campaign, very nearly in the position which has just been mentioned. The war which he and the French carried on in this part after the month of September, was purely one of observation and chicane;

many posts were taken and retaken, but nothing important was produced on either side, both sides being extremely weak in this direction.

Since, by means of the victory of Novi, and the conditional capitulation made by the citadel of Tortona, Marshal Suworow had gained a considerable disposeable force, which he could convey either into the Maritime Alps against Moreau, or to the other side of the Great Alps against Massena; it became more and more important to the general concerns of the Republic, that General Championnet should begin to act with effect, and to throw some weight into the balance. The Directory strove to put him in a capacity to do this, and sent him, in the course of the month of August, all the troops and conscripts which they could collect. These reinforcements made his army amount, at the end of this month, to about 25,000 men, enabled him to threaten Piedmont more seriously than he had hitherto done, and to draw nearer to Moreau. In consequence of this he transferred head-quarters to Embrun, which had hitherto been at Briançon.

On the 26th of August, he made an attack by the three valleys of Argentiere, of Pragelas,

and Suza, and gained ground in each. In the first, his advanced posts pushed as far as Demont.* In the second, he carried the post of Villaret, took possession of that of Perousa, and sent patrols very near as far as Pignerol. In the third, he made himself master of the posts of Exilles and Lassiette.† Championnet made the loss experienced by the Imperialists, in these different actions, amount to 1000 men. It did not amount to 500, and that of the French was not much less. Although the Imperialists did not attach any great importance to the preservation of the whole extent of these valleys, and although they guarded them with a very small number of men, the posts which they occupied were advantageously chosen; some of them were even somewhat entrenched; and the French must necessarily have suffered some loss in the forcing of them.

* There was, in this place, an excellent fortress, which the French razed in 1796.

† The reader will, no doubt, recollect the defeat which the French experienced in this spot, under the Chevalier de Belleisle, who, unable to survive it, threw away his life, after having performed prodigies of valour.

This petty warfare lasted some time between the French and the Imperialists, in the valleys of Piedmont; and many actions of posts took place, too trifling, both in respect to the mutual loss of ground, and of men, to deserve description. On the 30th of August, the French were repulsed, and worsted, near Suza, but they took their revenge the next morning, and on the 2d of September, gained possession of this town. The same day, they made also some progress on their right, and pushed from Perousa as far as Pignerol, which they entered, and approached Coni, both by the valley of Argentièrre, and by the Col de Tende. On the 6th, they drove the Allies from the post of La Thuill and the town of Aoust, and made them fall back as far as the Fort de Bard. It may be observed, that by these advances into the duchy of Aoust, and the provinces of Suza and Pignerol, Championnet effected an advantageous diversion in favour of Massena and Moreau; and that by the movements made in the marquisate of Saluzzo, and the province of Coni, he placed himself in communication and immediate co-operation with the latter General.

The Allies were too firmly established, and too superior in force in Italy, for the French Generals to hope that they could derive any important advantages from the trifling successes which they had just obtained. Their aim and expectations were confined, without doubt, to employ the Allies in Italy, to make them waste their time in a war of chicanery, and by that means to destroy the projects which had become ripe for execution.

It has been mentioned, in the preceding volume, of what they consisted, and it has been seen, that after some variations in its views, the cabinet of Vienna had resolved, that as soon as Marshal Suworow should be able to leave Italy in safety, he should return into Switzerland; that after uniting himself there to the Austrian troops which the Archduke Charles was to leave in that quarter, and to the new Russian army which arrived towards the middle of August, he should strive to finish the conquest of this country; that while he was playing the principal part in the centre, the Archduke Charles, on the right, should make also some important enterprize on the Lower Rhine; and that on the left, the corps stationed in the duchy

of Aoust, and on the frontier of the Valais, should make in this part an active diversion, while the army of General Melas should keep in check those of Championnet and Moreau in the Maritime and French Alps.

The moment for carrying this plan into execution was arrived, and Marshal Suworow, who had received orders to this effect towards the end of August, prepared to obey them as soon as he should have opened the gates of Tortona to the Austrians. The two French Generals could not be entirely ignorant of these projects, whatever might have been the information which they received from their military spies, or that which the Directory received from its political ones. It was in consequence of this that, in spite of the disaster experienced at Novi, the first of these Generals took the offensive, though he was not in a capacity to make it dangerous to the Allies: and that the second persisted in occupying the state of Genoa, from whence the latter could have driven him, if they had been inclined. It was the weakest party who acted on the offensive, because they knew the strongest were not willing to do so. It was not of themselves, or

even of Italy, that the former thought, but of Massena and of Switzerland, because they knew that the latter did the same. If the comparison be not too much beneath the subject, it may be said that Championnet and Moreau acted like a fencer, who does not look at the sword, but the eye of his antagonist.

Influenced by the state of affairs which have just been described, the General of the French army of Italy, after having a little recovered it from the great losses which it had experienced on the 15th of August, from that time, assured of the co-operation of his colleague, began again, on the 2d of September, to make movements in the defiles of the Apennines, towards the valleys of the Bormida, the Scrivia, and the Orba. These dispositions indicating a fresh attack, General Kray, who had come to take the command of the left wing, prepared himself to receive the French, and obtained some reinforcements from Asti. On the 2d, some pretty brisk actions of posts took place in the valley of the Bormida, and, on the 5th, on the road of the Bochetta, which did not turn to the advantage of the Republicans. In consequence of the latter, the Imperialists pushed

to the other side of Gavi, and as far as Voltaggio ; but they came back on the 7th, and concentrated themselves at Serravalle.

The demonstrations of Moreau, who had already formed his army in marching columns, had produced a part of the effect which he had promised himself from them. Marshal Suworow seeing the moment approach when Tortona would fall, had, since the 8th, caused his advanced guard to leave Asti, under the orders of General Rosenberg, who arrived the same day at Cazale ; but the Field-Marshal having learned, in the course of the day, the movements made by Moreau, sent orders to his advanced guard to turn back and march to Rivolta, before Tortona, where it arrived on the evening of the 9th. In the morning of the same day, Moreau, whether it was that he had been informed of the departure of the Russians for Cazale, or whether simply determined by the general motives which have been explained, or whether he conceived some hope of piercing the enemy's line, and getting as far as Tortona, made a general movement in advance, pushing one division upon Acqui and the Bormida, another upon the Orba and Bazza-

luzzo, and a third upon Novi, Serravalle, and the Scrivia. General Kray had expected him upon these three points; and the French found them so well covered, that, after having made some efforts to force them, and suffered for these attempts by the loss of some hundreds of men, they thought it most prudent to return, and took their old positions upon the three roads by which they had advanced.

This unsuccessful attack was the last attempt which Moreau could make in favour of Tortona. Two days after, its garrison, agreeably to the capitulation made on the 23d of the former month, surrendered to the Austrians, and set forward on its road to France. The capture of this important citadel,* which might

* There are few so good and so capable of making a long defence. It is built upon a rock, and the approaches of the body of the place are of course very difficult. This fortress indeed may be said to be quite a new one, its works having been, under the predecessor of the present King of Sardinia, almost entirely rebuilt and constructed with the highest degree of perfection. This place had however at all times been considered as the key of the plain of the Po, on the side of the state of Genoa. It was gallantly defended, in 1706, by a Spanish General, who sustained an assault on the breach, and was killed.

give much trouble to the Allies, was to them the fruit of the battle of Novi, as Alexandria and Mantua had been that of the victory of the Trebia. It placed on a lasting foundation their power in Italy, freed them henceforward from the necessity of gaining victories in order to secure the possession of it, and left no other pledge of it to be desired but Coni. This event was also in another respect a remarkable æra in this campaign: for, by accomplishing the object, not the last proposed by Marshal Suworow, but the last which he was left at liberty to undertake by superior authority, it put an end to his glorious labours in this part of the theatre of war. He set out from Asti on the 11th, with all the Russians whom he had left, consisting of about 16,000 men, and directed his course towards Novarra and the Italian bailiwicks. It has been already mentioned, in the preceding volume, that he had resolved to begin his march three days before, but that he was kept back by the feint which Moreau made of wishing to attempt the rescue of Tortona. It has been seen, also, that he regained by forced marches the three days which he had been obliged to lose. His army arrived on the

11th at Valentia, on the 12th at Mortara, on the 13th at Turbigo, on the 14th at Varese, and on the 15th at Taverne; marches, which for their length and continuance are almost without example. It will be recollected that all the fruit of the energy of this respectable warrior was lost by the delays which he was forced to experience in the Italian bailiwicks, delays which proved so fatal to the cause of the Allies and the interests of Europe.

The celebrity which Marshal Suworow already enjoyed before he came to acquire so much more in Italy, the memorable campaign which he made in this country, all that he did in Switzerland for his own glory, although he could do but little for the cause which he served, and the grand political and military interests in which he had been concerned in the course of the year 1799, render it almost a duty to stop some moments in order to contemplate this old warrior, as a private man, the subject of so many singular reports, and as a General, of so many different opinions. This might have been done at the close of the former volume, when an account was given of his departure from Switzerland, but the moment

has been preferred when all that he had done, both in Switzerland and Italy, should have already been described. Perhaps a short summary of the history of his life, which has been already published, and which has all the marks of authenticity, may here be acceptable.

Suworow was born in 1730, of noble parents ; in 1742, he entered the service as a common soldier, and it was not till the year 1759, that he was made a Lieutenant. In 1754, he made his first campaign in Pomerania : in that of 1761, he is found already a Lieutenant-Colonel in the light troops ; and it was then that, in serving at the out-posts against the Prussians, he became completely master of his profession, and obtained, at the head of the Cossacks, a reputation similar to that which the famous Loudon had, in the same rank, and the same war, acquired at the head of the Croats. Suworow during this campaign was in a number of actions, and was wounded by a shot at that of Golnaw. At the end of the year, which was the æra of peace, he was sent by Count Panin to the Empress, who gave him a Colonel's commission in her own hand-writing. In 1768, he was made Brigadier, and was sent into Poland

against the Confederates, whom he defeated in many rencontres. In 1770, he was raised to the rank of Major-General. He escaped death in a miraculous manner, having fallen into the Vistula, and being almost at his last gasp, when he was drawn out. He made rapid advances in the career of honour, received the same year the order of St. Anne, a little after that of St. George, and afterwards that of St. Alexander. In 1771, he was opposed to Dumouriez, who commanded a body of Confederates. The same year he gained the battle of Stalowitz, and besieged the castle of Cracow, and took it. The partition of Poland taking place in 1772, Suworow, having passed four years in that country, returned to Petersburg, and was employed in Finland. He was in 1773, in Moldavia, where he made war against the Turks under Marshal Romanzow. He covered himself with glory the following year, by defeating, with 12,000 men, the grand Turkish army, consisting of 50,000 men, of whom 3000 were slain; 40 pieces of cannon were taken. Peace having been made the same year, he was dispatched into Muscovy, to pursue and take the rebel Pugatschew: he was, as a

reward for this service, appointed Commander of all the troops of this vast country. In 1778, he was employed in the same capacity in the Crimea, where he had been sent two years before, and where he established Schaim Gheray as Khan. He then returned to Petersburg, where he was loaded with new favours by the Empress. Destined to serve in all the parts of the immense empire of this Sovereign, he was sent into Persia, in 1780, the following year into the Province of Casan, and in 1782, into the Cuban. In the next year, he made Schaim Gheray abdicate his throne, disarmed the Nogais Tartars, and obliged them to take an oath of fidelity to the Empress. Upon their breaking it, and making an insurrection, Suworow chastised them, by killing 4000 men upon the borders of the Cuban. He received the order of St. Wolodimir, returned to Moscow in 1784, and in 1785 to Petersburg. In 1786, he accompanied the Empress in her journey into the Crimea, and commanded the troops assembled on this occasion near Cherson. The following year, war breaking out between the Russians and the Turks, he was entrusted in the same country with the command of 30,000

men. He was wounded in the attack of Kinburn by the Turks, and again afterwards before Ocksakow. He was adorned with a new order, that of St. Andrew, the first in the Empire. He went in 1789, with 7000 men, to the relief of Prince Cobourg, in Wallachia, in 36 hours marched 70 miles, and assisted in defeating the Turks at Forhani. Having come back upon the Pruth with as much rapidity, he afterwards, with no less celerity, returned to rejoin Prince Cobourg. They together gained the battle of Rymnik: in consequence of this, the Empress conferred on him the title of Count Rymnisky, and the Emperor of Germany made him Count of the Empire. In 1790, he was commissioned to attack, with 23,000 men, Ismailow, defended by 43,000. He took this place by assault; 4300 Russians perished there; but 33,000 Turks were killed or wounded. After this terrible exploit, he returned to Petersburg in 1791, from whence he was sent into Finland, to command the fleet and the army. The following year he went into the Crimea, to reunite in his own person the three commandments of this country. Two years after, he was sent into Red Russia, with

13,000 men. He marched into Poland, went in three weeks about 500 miles, and beat the Poles in two great actions. After the defeat of Kosciusko at Matschewitz, he joined Generals Fersen and Derfelden, under the walls of Prague, (the suburb of Warsaw, on the other side of the Vistula); with 20,000 men, he carried by assault that suburb, where 30,000 Poles were entrenched, and where a great part of them were put to the sword. He entered Warsaw, was made Field-Marshal, received from his Sovereign an estate of 7000 peasants, and from the King of Prussia the order of the Black Eagle. He remained one year in Warsaw, went to Petersburg at the end of the year 1795, from thence to Finland, and afterwards upon the Niester to command 80,000 men. Here the historian leaves his hero. It is known that from the close of 1798, he was destined to the command, which in the course of this narration he has been seen to exercise with such success. By this succinct account, into which) the details of the private life of Marshal Suworow being omitted) his public life, so long, so active, and so varied, has been compressed, it has been seen, that at the moment in which,

by the peculiarity of his destiny, and by one of the singular effects of the French Revolution, he came to make war in the plains of Italy and on the summits of the Alps, he was 69 years of age, 57 of which had been spent in service—that he had made near 20 more or less active campaigns—fought the Prussians, the Poles, the Turks, and the Tartars—that he had made war on the shores of the Baltic, of the Black Sea, and of the Caspian Sea—that he had from the lowest, arrived at the highest rank in the army—and that he wore badges of the gratitude of three powerful Sovereigns.—Nothing was wanting to complete this great military career (for which, in respect to the variety of the theatre upon which it was transacted, no terms of comparison can be found but in ancient history), but to become connected with the greatest event of the age, the French Revolution.—The man who had, in the north of Asia, conquered Barbarians, came to the south of Europe, to conquer those who boasted of having arrived at the highest degree of civilization.—He who carried his battalions to the remote countries, into which the Romans had gloried in having made their

legions penetrate, conducted them into the country which had been the seat of their empire.—He who had surveyed the Caucasus, came to climb the St. Gothard.—The same man who had acquired great renown in triumphing over nations which opposed to him courage without science, supported it in fighting against enemies who opposed to him both.—The same man, in short, who had reduced to the rank of a private individual Schaim Gheray, and what is much more, the King of Poland, went to exert himself to restore the dominion of Italy to its lawful Sovereigns.—A destiny so singular, and in some respects so great, naturally fixed all eyes upon the man who was accomplishing it; and when it was seen that he himself was as eccentric as his destiny, the interest which both excited was increased, and had for some time no bounds. The man was as much scrutinized as the General, and his military and private qualities became the subject of admiration or of criticism with the public and the journalists.

It may perhaps be expected, that Marshal Suworow will here be considered in these two points of view. Only one of them, however, falls under the range of this work; and even

that, it is as difficult to treat faithfully, as it is delicate to undertake it. It felt with what caution, and it may be even said, with what reluctance, any judgment ought to be formed concerning a veteran warrior, to whom it is impossible to refuse titles of honour, more or less brilliant; concerning the Nestor of the European Generals; in short, concerning a man who has been engaged in such extensive and important interests. However strongly these considerations are felt, an opinion will be hazarded, which though given with reserve, will be given without disguise.

The most general defect in the human mind, that of forming extreme judgments, was perhaps never more perceptible than in those which have been given concerning Marshal Suworow. Some thinking him capable of doing all which they wished he should do, and, if it may be so said, seeing in him the Messiah of the Counter-Revolution, have not recognized his superior among the greatest ancient or modern Generals; others, either regretting what he has effected, or finding that he had not done enough, have lowered him to a very moderate rank among military

men. Both seem to be wrong, and more especially the latter. If it would be unreasonable to allot him a place by the side of Hannibal, Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick, still, however, he has always shewn some qualities which belong only to Generals of the highest class, boldness and decision of plans, vigour and rapidity in their execution, obstinacy in contending for victory; above all, the art of conducting and employing the troops of his nation, according to their particular genius.—It is by considering him in the latter point of view that his true rank can be best estimated. He was a General formed by and for the Russians; having a long time studied, and perfectly known two things, the qualities of his nation, and those of the neighbouring people with whom they had naturally to wage war; and having directed his ideas and military conduct to this double point of view. Certainly this is no little merit, and authorizes the conclusion, that if the man who was so completely possessed of it, had received his military education in the Prussian, Austrian, or French schools, he would have assimilated himself equally well to each of their different systems, and would have made

as great advances in the line of merits peculiar to each of these three people.

The singularity of the character and manners of Suworow has had no small influence upon the opposite opinions which have been formed of him as a General. Some, struck with every thing which is extraordinary, and constantly confounding it with what is great, have thought that a man who at the age of 70 years lay always upon straw, had a pail of water every morning thrown upon his head, never ate but when he was hungry, dined sometimes at eight o'clock in the morning, drank indifferently of brandy or water, went post upon a countryman's kibick, and had no other horses than merely those of the Cossacks; that a man who, in one word, lived as a Scythian, could not fail of being superior to Generals who possessed the effeminacies, tastes, and manners of the actual inhabitants of our part of Europe. Others, hearing that the same man was devout, that he would suddenly fall on his knees in the open fields or in his chamber, to return thanks to God for a piece of good news; that he was in presence of his Sovereign as a Turk before his Sultan, and that he enjoyed with some

degree of vanity the badges of honour with which he was covered, were not able to imagine that this assemblage of manners of the desert, of the cloister, and of the court, could be united in a head sufficiently well organized to be capable of conducting great armies and great enterprizes.—A small number of persons have explored the truth in the midway between two such opposite opinions. Though they are sensible that in the actual nature of war, the perfect knowledge of this art leaves behind it all other military qualities, and that a Sybarite, with a superiority of genius and talents, would be the greatest General, because he would be the most useful one; they know at the same time that in the moral as well as in the natural world there are few things which are not good for something; and suspect that the eccentricities of the character and manners of Suworow may have been as much the result of design as of the constitution of his mind. He may have reflected that a people still in many respects half barbarians, superstitious, credulous, acquainted with no other political sentiment but that of a devoted obedience, would be likely, and even must be impressed by rude

and ancient manners, by striking practices of external worship, and by the example of an unlimited devotedness to sovereign authority. Whatever the cause may be, the effect is not equivocal: it is certain that Suworow exercised over the minds of the Russian soldiers, an empire of a stronger nature than merely that of authority; that they had a degree of admiration, of respect, and of esteem for him, almost religious; that they considered themselves as invincible under him; and that every order which proceeded from his mouth appeared to them, if it may be so said, that of fate: nothing seemed impossible when Suworow thought it possible—he had but to speak—he had but to shew himself. To him, as well as to Corbulon, the words of Tacitus may be applied:

Summa auctoritate, quæ viro militari pro fecundia erat.

It was by this secret empire, that under him the Russian soldiers have performed marches almost fabulous; that he sent them to attack in front batteries; that he made them mount to the assault before the breach was ready; he kept them firm in the midst of the most

destructive fire : it was thus that he performed enterprizes which another General would not have dared to undertake, and which other troops would not have executed.—It was thus that he achieved victories which would have escaped any other than himself.

To conclude, to give in a few words a final opinion upon this man, it may be said, that he appears to have possessed rather the instinct of war, than any deep knowledge of its art—that he had more energy of character, than extent of genius—that he knew admirably well how to supply the want of one, by the other—that he must not be compared with any other General—that in that capacity, as well as in that of an individual, he stood single, by himself—that he was the best possible General for Russians—that if he was not great, he was however capable of doing great things, and that he has done some.*

* It is known that this General did not long survive the unsuccessful issue of the Campaign in Switzerland ; and that, sinking under the grief produced by the turn which affairs took at the end of the year 1799, he died

in the beginning of this year (1800) in circumstances which it is more proper to deplore than to relate.

The Author will take this opportunity of offering some explanation, which the events of the year 1800 render necessary. This Work having been finished by the end of April of this year, it was written under the impressions which the state of things up to that period had made upon his mind. He has praised or blamed what any power had, in his judgment, done right or wrong. He cannot be induced to regret the opinions which he has advanced, from any change which may have been effected in the principles or in the conduct of these powers. When he has said that they acted well or ill at a *particular time*, he could not pretend that they would *always* act well or ill. He has pronounced judgment only on the succession of events which he described. The duty of the historian is to distribute to each action the measure of praise or of blame which it individually merits. The first years of Nero have obtained the eulogiums of Tacitus.

The case is similar with regard to Generals; and hence it is that, however unfortunate has been, and however culpable may have been General Melas in the campaign of 1800, one cannot but acknowledge the successes which he gained, and praise the merits which he displayed in that of 1799. It could only be in pronouncing a definitive judgment upon his whole conduct, that the balance could be struck between his merits and his faults. It is well known, that though Marshal Crequi suffered himself to be defeated at Con-sarbruck, and afterwards to be taken at Treves, with the greatest part of his army, he was nevertheless in the sequel considered as one of the best Generals of

the age of Louis XIV.; and it is also known that Frederick the King of Prussia withdrew neither his esteem nor his friendship from General Fouquet, though he suffered himself to be surrounded and taken at Landshut, with all his body of troops.—The Author however is far from intending, from these instances, at all to presume a judgment on the conduct of General Melas in 1800.

CHAPTER XI.

Change operated in the relative situation of the Belligerent armies in Italy, by the departure of Marshal Suworow—Coni becomes the sole object of the campaign—General Melas marches from the Bormida and Scrivia to the Tanaro and the Stura, and takes up a position at Bra—Opposite movement made by Championnet—He dislodges the Imperial vanguard from Fossano and Savigliano—Is himself driven from those places, the day after, by Generals Melas and Kray—Signal advantage obtained by Prince Rohan upon the frontier of the Valais—The French are driven from Pignerol and Rivoli—Moreau gives up the chief command to Championnet on the 26th of September—Posture of affairs upon the Riviera di Levante and in the Upper Valleys of the Scrivia and the Bormida—March of the Neapolitans and the Aretines against Rome—Commodore Trowbridge blocks up the harbour of Civita Vecchia—General Garnier, commanding the Republican troops in the State of the Church, is compelled

by degrees to shut himself up in Rome and the neighbouring strong places—General Frœlich is sent into the Roman territory—He summons to capitulate with him General Garnier, who had already capitulated with Commodore Trowbridge—Conditions of the capitulation—General Frœlich at first refuses his assent to it, afterwards agrees to it, and sets off to besiege Ancona—Alternate success of the French and Imperialists in various valleys of the Alps—General Melas makes a movement upon his left in the Mondovi—Observations upon the topography of Piedmont, and the influence it had upon the latter operations of the campaign—This and the events that had taken place in Switzerland oblige General Melas to remain inactive during a part of the month of October—The French do not employ it more actively—Championnet unites a greater force near Coni—Movements and engagements between Coni and Mondovi—Slight success gained by the French in the Riviera di Levante—Important advantage obtained by them near Novi—Coup-d'œil upon the six weeks comprised in this chapter.

THE departure of Marshal Suworow for Switzerland, and the fall of Tortona, in the eyes of many persons, stripped the campaign of Italy of a part of that lively interest which it had till then excited; but to military observers it still remained the same in that respect. The game was become more equal, and consequently more difficult and more instructive; 16,000 men, excellent troops, detached from the Imperial army and not replaced, and the reinforcements that were daily received by the French army, had restored the equilibrium of force. The advantages of position on either side were balanced. The French were masters of all the summits and all the passes of the Maritime and Piedmontese Alps, but the Austrians had the support of the strong places in the plain.

One only was still untaken by them, and its capture became the sole offensive object that the Austrians had to pursue, and the French to oppose, during the rest of the campaign. Coni, from this time forward, was the military apple of discord, and upon this point was the greater part of the forces on both sides concentrated. General Melas, who had remained Commander

in Chief of the Imperial army, leaving only a corps of observation beyond Alexandria and Tortona, put in motion, on the 13th, the troops which had till then been encamped at Rivolta, or stationed at other posts in front of these two fortresses. They reached Feliciano that same day; the day after, they pushed on to Asti; on the 15th, to Alba; and on the 16th, to Bra, where General Melas united a disposable force of between 25,000 and 30,000 men. This intermediate position was extremely well chosen: it covered at once the two valleys of the Tanaro and Stura, was itself covered on the right by Turin, and on the left by Alexandria and Tortona; and it enabled General Melas to act with promptitude upon any side to which circumstances might call him.

While that General had made this movement towards Coni, Championnet had also drawn nearer to that place, leaving his left in the valley of Aoust, a second column in that of Suza, and a third in front of Pignerol. He had marched his right, consisting of about 12,000 men, through the marquisate of Saluzzo, into the valleys of the Stura and the Maira. His head-quarters were at Villa-Valletta. In taking that position,

which was nearly in the centre of the line formed in the Alps by the two French armies, Championnet had established an immediate communication with the left of Moreau, and could easily effect a complete junction with him, a junction which the true interest of the Republic required to have been made before. Besides this object, the former of these Generals had it in view to cover Coni, which he could not doubt that the Imperialists intended to besiege.

Wishing therefore to remove them as far as possible, he attacked their vanguard on the 16th, which was posted opposite to him, between Fossano and Savigliano, which was partly surprised. General Gottesheim, who commanded it, defended it himself with vigour and ability during the whole day, though he had only seven battalions and a regiment of cavalry; but in the night he was compelled to abandon the two posts above-mentioned, which he did not effect without the loss of some hundreds of men, mostly taken prisoners.*

* This General served in France before the Revolution.—He emigrated at the head of the regiment of hussars of Saxe, and has served with distinction during the whole course of this war.—He has now attained the rank of Major-General.

General Melas rightly judging that Marshal Suworow's departure had given confidence to Championnet and Moreau, and that in the hope of recalling the Russian General to Italy, or at least to profit by his absence, they would not delay making some attempt in concert, resolved not to give them time to deliberate. He determined, therefore, to attack Championnet, whom it was at once the most easy and the most important to defeat. Arrived at the camp of Bra, on the 16th, he set out from thence, on the 17th, in the morning, with two strong columns, one commanded by himself, and the other by General Kray. He appeared before the enemy in the afternoon, and after a pretty smart action, drove them from Savigliano that same night, while General Kray also dislodged them from Fossano. The loss of the French amounted to about 1500 men, killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; that of the Imperialists to about one-half of that number. General Seckendorf was severely wounded. The head-quarters were placed at Savigliano the day after, on which also the rest of the enemy reached that place.

Having thus repulsed the French upon the most important point, and stopped the general

movement by which they expected to establish, and perhaps to unite all their columns in the plain of Piedmont, General Melas now laboured also to arrest their progress in the northern part of Italy. Prince Victor Rohan, who, it has been seen, had been employed since the month of June to guard the *debouchés* of the Valais, and who had consequently been engaged in several skirmishes, of which the superior importance of other events has prevented an account from being given, attacked a French corps on the 22d, which had passed the Simplon, had seized Domo d'Ossola, and, the day before, had pushed beyond Vogogna. This corps was surprised and beaten by the Prince, who attacked it again, on the 23d, with so much success, that he compelled it to repass the Simplon, on the other side of which, he pursued it to Brieg, in the Valley of the Rhone. This check, which cost at least, 1000 men to the French, was locally of the utmost importance to the Allies, since it took place at the very moment in which Marshal Suworow was entangled in the Upper Alps.

While the Imperialists secured the extremity of their line, and freed themselves from the

anxiety excited, as to the safety of their centre, by the progress made by the enemy, as well upon the side of Suza, as on that of Pignerol, from whence they doubly menaced Turin, Prince Lichtenstein set out, on the 22d, with a division from the camp of Savigliano, arrived, on the 23d, at Saluzzo, and on the 24th, before Pignerol, near to which place he found the enemy assembled. Attacked with impetuosity, the French were driven from their post, and then from the town, with the loss of two pieces of cannon and some hundreds of men.

The same day, General Bellegarde, brother to the Lieutenant-General, had no less success upon another point. The French, to the number of about 5000 men, had, by degrees, been gaining ground upon the road from Suza to Turin, and driving the Imperial light troops before them, had ended by taking Rivoli, and were thus at only ten miles distance from the capital of Piedmont.* General Kaim sent General Bellegarde from thence to support the out-posts, who attacked the French corps, beat it, drove it from

* It was in the royal castle of Rivoli, that King Victor Amadeus was detained a prisoner, and died in 1732.

Rivoli, and pursued it to St. Antonio, half-way between that place and Suza. In that affair, the French lost 400 men made prisoners, and nearly as many killed and wounded. The total loss of the Austrians was about 400 men.

These four advantages, obtained in the space of six days, disconcerted the arrangements of the French, secured the march of Marshal Suworow, and extricated the affairs of the Allies in Italy, from the kind of crisis into which his departure had thrown them. Disappointed in his hopes, Championnet went in person to Genoa, where Moreau gave up the command of the army of Italy to him, on the 26th of September. The first use he made of his power, was to transfer the head-quarters from Cornegliano to Finale, thus placing them a little nearer to the centre of the long line occupied by the two armies united under his orders. Moreau returned to France, there to enjoy the military consideration which he had acquired by his conduct during the campaign. It cannot be denied, that his reputation was deservedly high amongst men of the profession, and that he had shewn combination, coolness, and considerable talents for a

defensive war. Having succeeded, first to Scherer and then to Joubert, he knew how to repair, almost as well as circumstances would permit, the faults of the former, and the misfortune of the latter.

At the southern extremity of the opposite lines, nothing important took place, from the 11th of September, till the end of the same month. General Klenau constantly had his head-quarters at Chiavari, and his out-posts sometimes at Rapallo, sometimes at Recco, according as the enemy reinforced theirs more or less, and according to the alternate issue of the slight actions which took place between his vanguard and that of the French. He attempted to approach Genoa, on the 26th, and to seize it by a *coup-de-main*, but he met with more resistance than the weakness of his corps permitted him to surmount, and after an action attended with the loss of 200 or 300 men, he was obliged to return to his positions.

The same kind of warfare was carried on during the second half of September, in the mountains and the defiles which lie between Genoa and the towns of Tortona and Alexandria. The corps of observation in front of each of these

places, and that in the valleys of the Scrivia and the Bormida, made several slight attempts, took and retook Novi, and some other posts of less importance: the whole position, collectively, of either party, was not more altered there, than in the Riviera di Levante. It is for this reason, that it is thought useless to dwell minutely upon all the military actions which took place in that quarter. A farther inducement arises from the desire of relating more important matters, which indeed, would occupy too much room in this volume, were more than the historical summary, the remarkable incidents, and the final result of them to be given.

It may be recollected, that the month of July was a decisive epocha for the deliverance of the lower part of Italy; and that while the Imperialists drove the French from Tuscany, the capital and kingdom of Naples were wrested from them by a debarkation of coalesced English, Russian, Turkish, Portuguese, and Sicilian troops, animated by the activity, and directed by the talents of Admiral Nelson, and of his worthy second, Captain Trowbridge. These were too desirous to rid Italy of its cruel and rapacious spoilers, to confine their efforts to restoring the

King of Naples to his throne, and scarcely was that done, when they bethought themselves of again setting up the Papal chair.

While, consequently, Commodore Trowbridge went to cruize upon the coast of the Roman state, and to block up the port of Civita Vecchia, a part of the small army with which he had taken Capua and Gaeta, marched towards Rome, under the orders of the Neapolitan General Bourcard. At the same time, Mr. Wyndham, the British Minister at Florence, also determined the march towards Rome, of a part of the army of the loyal Aretines, to which the Austrians added some squadrons of light troops.

These two small corps of troops entering the Roman State on the two opposite sides, made each successive progress, drove the Franco-Romans before them, took several posts by force, and fought several engagements, which, in respect to loss of men on either side, had no kind of comparative importance with what was then acting in the north of Italy; but of which, an extent of ground as considerable, if not more so, was the fruit. The months of August and September were consumed in this petty warfare. The French General Garnier, who commanded

the division left in the Roman State, which occupied chiefly the castle of St. Angelo, Civita Vecchia, and some other entrenched posts, defended himself with advantage. The Allies, though supported by a part of the population of the country, were yet not strong enough, especially in regular troops, to undertake the siege of the places above mentioned. Knowing, besides, that they must sooner or later fall into their hands, and preferring to receive them uninjured, they contented themselves, therefore, with straitening more and more, the posts held by General Garnier: they approached the Tiber, each upon its own side, and compelled the French to concentrate themselves in the castle of St. Angelo, Corneto, Tolfa, and Civita Vecchia.

While these things were acting, the Austrians became masters of the strong places of Alexandria, Mantua, and Tortona, and seeing themselves firmly established in the north of Italy, turned their attention towards obtaining the merit, and, no doubt, the profit also, of the reconquest of the interior part of that country, perhaps even at length to give some meaning to the title of King of the Romans. General Froelich was detached with some troops, reinforced by four battalions,

come from Dalmatia, and began his march, in September, towards the Ecclesiastical State. He arrived, on the 18th of September, at Ronciglione; where he placed his head-quarters, and round which he established a circle of out-posts, to protect it from the Republican troops, which yet kept the field. On the 21st, he made a diversion on the Upper Tiber, in favour of the Neapolitans, who were attacked by the French. On the 22d, he made a general reconnoitring party towards Corneto, Civita Vecchia, and Rome, driving back the pickets of the enemy in these three directions. As a sequel to this progress, he sent to summon General Garnier, who answered, that he had already commenced negotiations with the British Commodore Trowbridge.

The Republican General, who found himself with about 5000 men only, shut in the heart of Italy, without any possibility of receiving assistance either by sea or land, had felt, that, sooner or later, the Allies would succeed in getting possession of the whole State of the Church, and that, therefore, he ought to consider less the means of prolonging his defence, than of obtaining the best possible terms for

quitting it, and of escaping the vengeance of the people of the country, by capitulating with the Commander of the allied troops. Several reasons concurred to determine him to address himself in preference to the British and Neapolitan leaders. They, on their side, naturally desirous of having the honour of delivering this country, which they had long laboured to effect; fearing also that some gale of wind might enable the French to escape from Civita Vecchia, or at least to venture on the seas the rich and curious spoils of which that town and Rome were the depositories, were disposed to sacrifice every other military consideration to the speedy evacuation of the Ecclesiastical State.

Such a reciprocity of dispositions could not fail very shortly to produce an amicable arrangement; and, on the 22d, a capitulation was begun, which was concluded, on the 27th, on board the *Culloden*: it consisted of twenty articles, which cannot here be fully inserted, on account of their length. The principal of them, however, were:

That Civita Vecchia, Corneto, and Tolfa, not having been regularly besieged, but only blocked up, their garrisons should consequently have all

the honours of war, should retain their arms, and, without being considered as prisoners of war, should be sent back, either to France or to Corsica, and that the expense of victualling for the voyage, should, in the sequel, be paid by the French government.

That the castle of St. Angelo and its dependencies, with the town of Tolfa, should be delivered up to the troops of the line commanded by General Bourcard, that the garrison should march out forty-eight hours after the signature of the capitulation, and that it should be escorted to Civita Vecchia, by the troops of the above-mentioned General.

That Civita Vecchia should be put, as soon as possible after the signature of the capitulation, into the hands of the English.

That the sick belonging to the French garrisons should be attended by French surgeons, left behind for that purpose, and after their recovery, should be sent back into France.

That General Bourcard should furnish the garrison of Rome with carts and boats for the transport of the baggage, and of such of the sick as were in a state to be removed.

That all individual property should be re-

spected, but that all public property should be restored.

That the Romans who might wish to embark with the garrison, should be at liberty to do so, and to carry away their property with them; that those who should choose rather to remain, though having served the Republican cause by their actions or writings, should not be molested so long as they conducted themselves properly, and observed the laws.

That an English vessel should carry back to France, the French Ambassador to the Roman Republic, with all his suite and the other civil agents; and that the papers and archives appertaining to the Roman State, should be faithfully given up to General Bourcard; that the town of Ancona, being under the orders of a different commander, should not be included in this capitulation.

That every difficulty arising in the execution of these articles, should be interpreted in favour of the French and their Allies.

Three other additional articles were to this effect: That the English troops should take possession of the fort and town of Civita Vecchia, on the 29th of September, and of Corneto, the

day after ; that the garrisons of these two places should be united with a guard of honour in the barracks of the former of them, until their embarkation could be effected ; that General Bourcard's troops should take possession of Rome and of the castle of St. Angelo on the 30th of September, at two hours after midnight ; and that during that day and the two following, the French should evacuate the town and march to Civita Vecchia by Monteroni, having two pieces of cannon with them on their way thither.

That the embarkation of the divers Republican corps of troops should commence on the 1st of October, and should be complete on the 6th.

General Garnier had proposed some other articles, in one of which he fulfilled his duty to the Republic, by making the impudent demand that the *property*, that is to say the things robbed and got together in different places of the Ecclesiastical State, should be conveyed to Civita Vecchia, and from thence to France. Captain Trowbridge peremptorily refused to accede to this proposition, as well as those which required—that two covered vessels should be

granted for the French garrisons — that the officers should be permitted to return to France by land with horses, arms, and baggage — and that a promise should be given to this effect, that at any time the Roman Patriots should obtain passports to leave Italy with their whole property.

The capitulation agreed upon was fully executed, but nevertheless it was disturbed in rather a particular way. General Garnier had informed General Frœlich, on the 25th, of the articles of the capitulation already agreed upon, and had demanded from him, in consequence thereof, a suspension of arms and a line of demarcation. All this was rejected by the Austrian General, who continued to act in an hostile manner. On the 28th and 29th, he attacked the posts of the enemy in the two directions of Rome and Civita Vecchia, beat them, and carried the pursuit even to the gates of those towns. English officers were sent out of the latter, who communicated to him officially the capitulation that had been concluded. That General could then no longer look upon it as doubtful, and seeing that he had arrived too late for the intentions of the court of

Vienna, he set out with his army forthwith to take his revenge upon Ancona, the only post remaining to the French in the interior of Italy.

All the conditions stipulated between Commodore Trowbridge and General Garnier were then fulfilled without any obstacle; after having for the space of two years, oppressed, pillaged, profaned, and deluged with blood the States of the Church and the capital of the Christian world, the Vandals of the 18th century, who shewed themselves, more barbarous than those of the 5th, rid at length the theatre of their rapine and fury of their odious presence; and the modern Brutii descended from the Capitol. Thus the Roman Republic was overthrown, as the Parthenopian Republic had been before, by the disinterested efforts of the British navy; and thus, to the surprising events of this campaign, was added the novel sight of all the south of Italy, and several fortresses, reconquered by naval officers, and the Apostolical Chair re-established by the subjects of the successor of Henry VIII.

The checks experienced by the French at Fossano, Savigliano, Rivoli, and Pignerol, had

disconcerted, but not discouraged them. Championnet, finding that his force was nearly equal to that of General Melas, and wishing to second the attacks then making by Massena in Switzerland, renewed his efforts. On the 28th of September, one of his columns again advanced towards Suza, from whence it had been driven after the affair of the 24th, and reoccupied that town, the Imperialists taking post at Bussolino. The latter were attacked in that position, on the 30th, but made a spirited defence and repulsed the enemy.—The day before, the French had advanced a large detachment through the Col de Fenestres—On the 1st of October, they seized the Col de la Rousse, after a contest somewhat bloody.—During the same day, the Austrians retook the town of Aoust, and compelled the French to retire beyond the St. Bernard. The victorious march of Marshal Suworow across the canton of Uri, contributed not a little to hasten this retreat, which completed the security of the position of the Imperialists in Upper Italy, and enabled them to bring back upon the Stura that part of the column of General Kray, which had

been sent to Ivrea, after the capture of Aoust, by the French.*

On the 1st of October, General Melas transferred his head-quarters from Savigliano to Trinita. Those who consider the general state of things at that period, will not be surprised that he had not attempted any thing since the battle of the 17th, and had remained stationary upon the Stura. His situation confined him to a vigilant, able, and prudent defensive until the arrival of expected reinforcements from Germany, or till some fortunate events in Switzerland should furnish him with the means or the opportunity of realizing the only project which he could wish to accomplish before the winter. If Championnet's forces had been assembled, and had threatened only one point, General Melas might also have united such of his troops as would then be disposeable, and although they might not have been stronger than those of the French, yet he would, no doubt, have relied sufficiently on the bravery of

* It is well known that this last-mentioned town was a military colony, established by Augustus, who gave it his own name.

his soldiers and on the fortune of the campaign, to have assumed a decided offensive. But it has been seen that the war was become, more particularly since the month of August, a war of ubiquity; and that from the Riviera di Levante to the Simplon, the French had pushed heads of columns beyond all the defiles of the Apennines and of the different Alps. Masters of all the chains of mountains which shut in the plain of Italy from the Imperial fiefs to the Valais, they threatened it constantly on all the points of this semicircular line; and the Imperialists being under the necessity of appearing every where, they were, of course, nowhere in great force. General Melas, wisely placed in the centre, there held himself in readiness to succour any point of his cordon, as occasion might require. This situation would have been very dangerous, however, without the possession of the strong places, which were to him points of support, and of as much utility as a large body of troops. There was also another circumstance in his favour for a defensive war: Almost all the passes which lead from Italy to France, diverge from the same

centre, *viz.* the plain of Piedmont ; they then open beyond the Alps, and very far distant one from the other. Therefore, although the French, in coming by these several passes, had the advantage of tending directly towards one common centre, yet General Melas had also that of being able to send assistance with the same promptitude to each of the radii, and another still greater, that of making all his movements with unison ; while the different columns of the French, separated from each other by inaccessible masses of mountains, and having but a very distant communication one with another, could not correspond in their movements and attacks. This gives the key to the campaign made by Generals Melas and Championnet, and explains the facility with which the former successively repulsed the several columns of the latter, at the feet of the Alps.

If the reasons which have been stated held the Austrian General on the defensive during the end of September, the reverses experienced in Switzerland at the same period by the Allies, were a new and imperious motive to persist in it. Massena might be tempted to

push a strong column by the St. Gothard towards the Milanese. It was necessary therefore to be in readiness to oppose it, and for that reason did General Melas pass a great part of the month of October in voluntary inaction, contenting himself with securing his positions, and straitening Coni more and more; which he performed by transferring his headquarters and the bulk of his army from Trinita to Morozzo. He had already been strengthened by the arrival of several small corps of troops, come out of the Hereditary States: it had been agreed, too, that he should receive reinforcements from Switzerland, after Marshal Suworow should have established himself in that country; but the misfortunes which happened there during the march of that General prevented the effect of this arrangement.

Championnet had also been traversed in his operations. The victorious march of Marshal Suworow beyond the St. Gothard, had forced all the left of the French line, uncertain as to the side on which he might advance, to fall back precipitately beyond the mountains of the Valais and of St. Bernard. This re-

trograde movement held the centre in suspense, and, by a natural consequence, the right also. Before the turn of affairs in Switzerland was thoroughly known at the French head-quarters, and before new measures could be taken in consequence of it, and each division could be informed what part it was to act, almost the half of the month of October had elapsed, and the French had yet attempted nothing. No affair took place, therefore, important enough to supersede the detail of the general state of things, and the respective situations of the armies. The principal action took place on the 9th, at St. Marguerite and at Busca, near to Coni, places from which the French dislodged the Austrians, but of which the latter again recovered possession on the same day.

The position taken by General Melas near to Coni, at the gates of which he had his advanced posts, so imminently menaced that town, that Championnet, unable to protect it with the right of the army of the Alps alone, determined to reinforce it from the army of Italy, a measure which he ought to have taken in the preceding month; and he appointed the division of Victor to that service, which, as it

may be remembered, had acted the same part with the army of Macdonald. He caused it to march towards the Mondovian, through which it was to endeavour to penetrate, that it might take up a position on the left flank of General Melas, while that General would be attacked in front from Coni. On the 11th of October, Championnet transferred his head-quarters into that town.

That same day, General Victor came to action with the advanced posts of the enemy, in the Mondovian, but was not able to drive them back. On the 13th, the French attacked, on the side of Coni, the village of Bezinette, and took possession of it. This post being essential to the maintenance of the chain of the Austrian advanced posts, it was attacked and retaken, the next day, by six battalions and 500 horse. The French returned to the charge with fresh troops, and had the advantage at first, but General Mitrowsky, who had the care of this expedition, manœuvred so well, that he cut off a battalion of the enemy, and made it prisoner. The French were not discouraged, and returned twice more to the charge, but with as little success. This day cost them

about 1000 men, and the Imperialists 200 or 300. On the 18th, the French, being reinforced before Coni, gained ground upon the roads of Fossano and Savigliano. This induced General Melas to cause a part of his troops to make a motion upon their right, and to transfer his head-quarters to Montenara. On the 19th, the French renewed their attacks upon the chain of advanced posts belonging to the Imperialists, and carried the village of Bezinette; but the Imperialists being then as unwilling as they had been five days before to relinquish it to them, it was again retaken, after a smart action, after which the French were driven from Poverano, and pushed as far as the mountains. On the 20th, General Victor, who had succeeded in making some small progress upon the frontier of the Mondovian, made himself master of the small fort of Benietta. On the 21st, the Republicans seized the village of Villanova.

While the French were thus clearing the military horizon of Coni, they also disengaged for a time the right flank of Genoa. Having formed the project of surrounding General Klenau's corps in the Riviera di Levante,

they caused, on the 12th, a large corps of troops to file for that purpose into the mountains which border it. This corps dislodged the Austrians from Barbagalata, and fell, the next day, upon General Klenau's flank. But he being informed of the superiority of the troops marching against him, as well through the mountains as along the sea-shore, lost not a moment in retreating, and got as far as Sarzama. His rear-guard only came to action with the Republican, and a great part of it fell into their hands. The Directory magnified it in a double or a triple ratio, by estimating it at 1200 men. The French then spread themselves in the Riviera di Levante, and in the upper valleys of the Trebia and the Taro, and even pushed on to Pontremoli. This success, indeed, was not of long duration, for General Klenau, having assembled his forces, and manœuvred in the mountains, made the French fear in their turn they should be surrounded, and forced them again to retire to Sestri and Chiavari.

It is seen, that General Championnet had made an attack with his right, pretty much about the same time, and another with his

centre, both which succeeded but imperfectly; and that he had not been able to force any single point of importance in the line of the Imperialists. The efforts and the movements which he had made to compel them to quit their position before Coni, had not had that effect; General Victor having found it impracticable to take it in reverse, he hoped to oblige them to retire, or to weaken it by threatening strongly their left.

It was in consequence of this, that, on the 23d, he caused to be assembled all the disposable troops of the three divisions stationed in the state of Genoa. General St. Cyr put them in motion the day after, in three columns: the first directed upon Capriata, the second upon Pasturana, and the third upon Pozzolo. Attacked upon these three points at once, by a force almost double his own, General Karackzay, who guarded, with 6000 men only, the valleys of the Orba and the Scrivia, opposed a resistance as vigorous as his inferiority would permit. He held the French in check a long time, but after a pretty bloody combat, he was compelled to yield to numbers, and to retire with all that could follow him, behind the Bor-

mida, and under the protection of Alexandria. This affair cost him no less than 1200 men, of whom one half were made prisoners. The loss of the French was not much inferior. General St. Cyr, who had had a horse killed under him, placed his head-quarters at Bosco, where General Karackzay had had his. The French took post in sight of Alexandria and Tortona.

The result of this action, the most important of any that had taken place in those parts, since the battle of Novi, breaking the defensive line of the Allies, and placing the French upon their left flank, General Melas, though much occupied himself in the Mondovian, the capital of which was then blockaded by the enemy, but delivered the day after, caused General Kray to set out for Alexandria, on the 26th, with a large body of troops, and also recalled General Haddick thither from the valley of Aoust, with the brigade of reinforcement that had been left him in the beginning of the month.

On throwing a *coup-d'œil* upon the six weeks comprized in this chapter, it will be seen that they were marked by no great battle, by no siege, by no decisive operation, and that they were

employed on either side in a war of posts, movements, and demonstrations. The superiority accruing to the Allies from the victory of Novi and the capture of Tortona, had vanished at the departure of Marshal Suworow and his troops. This event had changed the nature of the war, and two new Generals in chief appeared at once upon the theatre. The circumstances, arising from the positions and respective interests, which gave the offensive to Championnet, have been pointed out. It may have been perceived, that though he exercised it with activity, he did not conduct it with much talent. He made a great number of attacks; but they were partial, irregular, and to all appearance ill concerted. He gave the alarm on all points, but struck no vigorous blow upon any: he did not seem, upon the whole, to act with fixed views. It is true, that the division of his force rendered any other conduct than that which he held rather difficult; but perhaps he would have done better to unite them in two or three strong masses, and to have then tried the fortune of a battle, as a victory alone could establish him in the plain of the Piedmontese.—Generals Melas and Kray defended the different avenues

to it with ability, vigilance, and vigour, and seemed to understand very well the mixed kind of war which circumstances required. They made head wherever the danger was most urgent; and it has been seen that they drove back the enemy successively across the Simplon, the two St. Bernards, Mount Cenis, and the valleys of Suza, Pignerol, the Maira, and the Stura. Weak in men on their left, which was strengthened by the possession of Alexandria and Tortona, they there met with a check; but it will soon be seen that they repaired it with promptitude and success. The scene which remains to be displayed will be more open and more animated. Events are about to become more decisive, and the *dénouement* of the campaign will be speedily arrived at.

CHAPTER XII.

Championnet, about the end of October, undertakes offensive operations in the centre of the line—He attacks the Imperialists on the Stura, and makes some progress—A division of his left gets possession of Pignerol—General Melas bearing upon his right, passes the Stura, attacks the French, and forces them to fall back towards Coni—The French advance again from that place, and make new progress on both banks of the Stura, their left approaching to Saluzzo—The Imperialists, on the 2d of November, evacuate Mondovi, and take a position behind Fossano—Two days after, they march against the French, who were coming to meet them—A general battle ensues, in which the French are completely defeated, as they are again the following day; and having been driven from before Coni, they are dispersed among the upper valleys of Maira, Grana, and Stura—Reflections upon the able conduct of General Melas—Operations of General Kray

on the Bormida, the Orba, and the Scrivia—He there restores the affairs of the Austrians, but not without receiving a check—Positions taken by the French army after the battles of the 4th and 5th of November—They are forced to fall back on all points—General Melas marches against Mondovi, and Championnet, who had concentrated his forces there, is obliged to leave it, and to take refuge in the Maritime Alps—Siege and taking of Ancona by General Frœlich—Political consequences of this event—State of affairs at the end of November—Siege and surrender of Coni—Conditions of the capitulation—Distress of the French army—The main bodies of the two opposite armies go into winter quarters—Championnet quits the command—Reflections on his conduct—He is succeeded by Massena—Unhappy situation of the State and City of Genoa—General Klenau attempts to surprise it, but after some success is repulsed with loss, and the campaign closes also in that part of the theatre of the war—Position and force of the contending armies at that period.

THE attack made on the 24th of October, on the right of the line, by St. Cyr, was only a prelude to that meditated by Championnet on the centre. He had wished to force the Imperialists to weaken themselves on that point, and the departure of General Kray shews that he had succeeded. Informed, without doubt, of this circumstance, the French General hastened to take advantage of it.—His operations prior to the 21st have been mentioned, and it has been seen that he had succeeded in opening, in some degree, the avenues of Coni. In the six following days, there were several affairs of advanced posts, the success of which was pretty equally balanced: those which took place on the 27th and 28th, near Vico and Mondovi, were particularly brisk.—On the evening of the latter day, Championnet began his operations with four divisions, exclusive of the light troops of his vanguard, and some brigades of reserve. The right division, commanded by General Victor, was, as has been said before, on the Tanaro, and in the neighbourhood of Mondovi.—That of Lemoine acted between the Tanaro and the Stura, upon the left bank of which was the

division of Grenier.—These three divisions formed the centre of the army; but a fourth, commanded by General Duhem, was to co-operate with them, first by attacking Pignerol, and afterwards by advancing by Saluzzo upon the right flank of the Austrians.

The movement commenced on the left.—The division of General Grenier advanced upon the left bank of the Stura, towards Centalo and Murazzo, thus exposing his flank to General Melas.—The latter immediately detached some thousand men from his camp at Montenara, and made them pass the Stura, at Castelletto. A very smart engagement took place, in which the French were worsted, losing a General, and some hundred men taken prisoners: but, nevertheless, the Austrians repassed the river. On the 29th, Grenier took possession of Murazzo, and sent on his patrols as far as Fossano. On the other side of the Stura, General Lemoine advanced towards Castelletto, and Victor towards Benietta. The forces assembled, and the movements made by the French on the left bank of the Stura, evidently combined with the operations carried on at the same time in the valley of Suza, left no longer any doubt with General Melas, that

they had formed a hope of cutting off his communication with Turin, and of establishing themselves in the plain of Piedmont. To frustrate their projects, he took the following measures: On the 31st, he sent to General Kaim, six battalions and four squadrons of reinforcements, drew back to La Trinita a part of his army, and, at the same time, passed with the rest the Stura, by the bridges of Montenara and of Castelletto. In spite of the efforts of the enemy, the Imperialists formed themselves on the heights which command the river, and marched in two columns towards the French, while a third column advanced likewise from Fossano. Attacked in front and on the flank, after a very obstinate contest, the Republicans were broken by the Imperial cavalry, and forced to retire on one side, as far as Runchi, and on the other to near Busca, leaving a thousand men on the field of battle, or in the hands of the Austrians. These remained during the 31st, upon the Grana, but fell back, the day after, towards Fossano and Savigliano. On the same day, the 1st of November, the division of Lemoine made itself master of the post of Castelletto, without much difficulty, and General Duhem, having driven the Imperialists,

with some loss, from before Pignerol, took possession of that place, and marched towards Saluzzo.

This last circumstance, together with the entry of the French into Suza, and the repeated attacks on both sides of the Stura, indicated a settled plan of invasion on the part of Championnet, who had received some reinforcements from Nice. General Melas, prudently yielding to what this state of things required, on the 2d of November, drew his left nearer to him, evacuated Mondovi, and by an oblique retrograde march on his right, the night following, went to take a position between Fossano and Marenne. In this manner, he could either retreat farther to his former and excellent position of Bra, or advance in a body against Championnet, a project, which, though he retreated, he was meditating.

On the same day, the French advanced in all directions, in one part driving back the Austrian out-posts as far as Genola, and in another, passing the Pesio and pushing on to Carru. They took, at the same time, possession of the Mondovian. All this progress was easy, for the Austrian light troops did nothing more than mask the retreat

of the main army. A part of the division of Victor passed the Stura; the evacuation of the Mondovian, the garrison of which had been thrown into Cherasco, leaving but little to be done between the Stura and the Tanaro. On the day after, the enemy having entirely quitted the right bank of the Stura, the remainder of the division of Victor passed it, leaving on the left, the division of Lemoine, which occupied La-Trinita and Bene. While General Victor advanced upon the road to Fossano, and even as far as to the suburbs of that little fortress, Grenier marched to Valdigi, and after a slight combat with the rear-guard of the enemy, pushed on and took possession of Savigliano.* On the same day, General Duhem likewise approached to that place, after having taken Saluzzo.

Thus it appears, that while the Imperial army concentrated itself between the Stura and the Grana, the four divisions of the French army

* Savigliano had formerly a fortress, which the French destroyed in 1706. This place is famous for a bold and sudden exploit of the Marquis de Feuquieres. He surprised and carried off four companies of men at arms, of the Duke of Savoy, and, in the space of thirty hours, marched more than 80 miles, passing and repassing the Po and two other rivers.

likewise drew nearer to one another : that those of Grenier and of Victor were posted between these two rivers, that General Lemoine was on their right, and General Duhem on their left.—The approach of the latter to the centre of the French army, determined at once the two Commanders in Chief to come to an action on the day after. Championnet had waited for that reinforcement, to make a decisive attack ; and General Melas, seeing his right flank menaced, would not give time to the enemy to make a complete junction, and to concert their offensive projects.

On the 4th, in the morning, the two armies were in motion, each in three columns, and in the same directions. Part of the division of Grenier advanced from Savigliano towards Marenne ; the other part directed itself by another road, towards the same place.—Victor's division marched to the attack of Fossano.—On the left, a part of the division of Duhem left Saluzzo, to go to Savigliano, and from that to Marenne.—A reserve was placed behind the centre, at Valdigio.—On the side of the Imperialists, General Ott, from the last-mentioned place, marched to-

wards Savigliano, as did also, from St. Lorenzo, the second column, commanded by General Mitrowsky; and the third, led by General Elnitz, directed its course against Genola.—On the left, General Gottesheim, with one brigade and the garrison of Fossano, was ordered to make two false attacks towards Murazzo and Madelena.—It will be remarked, that both armies were in three principal columns, with a fourth column upon their left; and that the greatest forces were placed on their right.

The opposed columns of Generals Ott and Grenier were the first to meet near Marenne, and engaged with great vivacity. They mutually sought to turn each other: several charges of cavalry were made: and a terrible fire of cannon and musquetry was kept up. At the end of two hours, the French were worsted, and began to retreat, part of them towards Savigliano, of which place General Ott was master, about ten o'clock, and where he was joined by General Mitrowsky, and part towards Genola.

The attack made upon this last point, by General Elnitz, was vigorously opposed by the French, who repulsed him several times with loss. In like manner, Victor successfully resisted

General Gottesheim, who could not *deboucher* from Fossano. The victory was thus uncertain in the centre and in the Stura, but it had already been decided on the other wing in favour of the Austrians, who made the following dispositions to obtain it on the other points: General Ott marched from Savigliano, by Valdignasco, to Valdiggio; and General Mitrowsky to Genola, where he joined General Elnitz. This accession of force, directed against the centre of the French, overcame their resistance, and forced them to retire to Valdiggio. Victor at the same time fell back towards Murazzo, followed by General Gottesheim. The left wing and the centre of the French being withdrawn to Valdiggio, Generals Mitrowsky and Elintz followed them there, while General Ott turned that position by taking the road of Valdignasco.

These three columns were ready about two o'clock to act in concert; and the French, attacked at once in front and on the left flank, could not keep their ground, but were obliged to retreat in a body to Centalo, where they took a new position. Again, hotly pursued and attacked, they were defeated, and took advantage of the night to seek for protection under the

walls of Coni. A part of the left took the road by Villa Fallet, which post General Ott sent a detachment to occupy.—While the army marched from Valdiggio, the division of General Duhem having arrived at Savigliano, had advanced to Marenne, and attacked an Austrian battalion and two squadrons which had been left behind. The noise of the firing having advertised General Melas of this incident, he sent back some troops under the orders of General Sommariva, who, before the close of the day, came up with the French column, which he defeated, making some prisoners, and putting it to flight. On the evening of the 4th, the main body of the Imperial army encamped near Centallo, its right reaching to Villa Fallet, and its left to Murazzo, from which General Gottesheim had not been able to expel the division of Victor.

However advantageous the result of this day had been to the Imperialists, it did not satisfy General Melas. He resolved to attack the French again the next day, and to strike a decisive blow, by driving them from before Coni. On the 4th, in the evening, their centre had taken post at Runchi ; their right, as has been already mentioned, was at Murazzo, having behind them

the Stura, on which they had a bridge; their left had divided, one part being in the valley of the Grana, and another in that of the Maira. There remained, then, only the posts of Runchi and Murazzo to be forced.

On the 5th, in the morning, General Ott advanced against the first of these points, and after a combat, which was but feebly supported by the French, he drove them from it, and forced them to retire in confusion towards Coni. The French column at Murazzo, was, in consequence, isolated and left to itself, having its retreat to Coni cut off by General Ott. Briskly attacked by General Elnitz, it was broken, and forced in great part to lay down its arms. the rest sought for safety on the other side of the Stura, and a considerable number were drowned in endeavouring to swim across that river.—The Imperial army, extremely fatigued with two days marching and constant fighting, stopped for the remainder of the 5th, at Runchi; but all the reports of prisoners and of deserters agreeing in representing the French army as more weakened, and more in disorder than had been imagined, General Melas, unwilling to give it time to rally, abandoned the project, which he had formed, of

crossing the Stura, and of falling upon the division of Lemoine, and marched, on the 6th in the morning, in two columns, one against the entrenched camp of the French at Madona del Almo, the other against Caraglio. The French did not wait for the attack, but retired among the mountains. General Melas made them be pursued in all the directions which they had taken. General Lat-terman advanced into the valley of the Maira, General Ott into that of the Grana, and Generals Elnitz and Gottesheim went up the two banks of the Stura, and cleared the country all round Coni.—The days of the 4th and 5th did not cost the French less than 4000 men, killed or wounded, and as many prisoners. Several pieces of cannon likewise fell into the hands of the victors, who gained these important successes at the expense of about 2000 men killed, wounded, or prisoners: General Adorian was among the first.

The conduct of General Melas, from the 2d to the 6th of November, appears to have been masterly, and it may even be said, that in point of manœuvring, nothing finer was done in the course of the whole campaign. It has been seen, that that General, well informed of the

movements of the enemy, and divining their projects, wisely sacrificed, for the moment, the possession of the Mondovian—concentrated his forces in the narrow space which lies between the Stura and the Maira—put himself in full retreat in the night of the 2d—returned suddenly by the same road on the night following—and marched forward in order of battle, ready formed. Never was an attack made more in time, than that which succeeded so well on the 4th. If he had deferred it for a single day, he would have had to sustain that which the French had concerted against him: the division of General Duhem would have co-operated immediately with that of Grenier; and placing itself on the flank of the Imperialists, might have cut them off from the Po and from Turin. The Austrian General was able enough to seize the moment when that division was come so near that he could reach it; and advancing against it, and against the centre, he cut off the one, and turned the other, so as to defeat them both. The detachment which he sent during the battle of the 4th, against General Duhem, recalls to remembrance that which Marshal Suworow sent, during the battle of the Trebia, towards Bobbio,

against General Lapoype.—Championnet, in several respects, seems to deserve praise, and in others blame. The former is his due, for having sent the division of Victor to the other side of the Stura, and having thus, like his enemy, concentrated his forces. But why did he not do it completely? and why did he leave General Lemoine on the other side of that river, and at such a distance? If he had united that corps to his centre, contenting himself with leaving a flying detachment of observation on the other bank, where it appears the Austrians had no other force but the garrison of Cherasco, he would have given himself a great addition of force, and most probably General Ott would not have so easily defeated his left. If it had stood firm at Marenne, or even at Savigliano, the diversion of General Duhem would, perhaps, have given a very different issue to the battle of the 4th.—The faults committed by the French Generals on the 5th were not pardonable—instead of retiring their right, as well as their left, towards Coni, they left it unsupported, and with a river in its rear. From the evening of the 4th, there seems to have been very little order, mutual understanding, or hope of victory,

on the part of the French army.—Upon the whole, it appears, that from the 2d to the 6th, General Melas completely avoided the faults with which the Austrian Generals have so often been reproached in this war, and shewed those qualities which have been so much vaunted on the part of the French. He boldly abandoned the system of ubiquity at the moment when he saw it would be dangerous: he engaged with all his forces, and pushed his victory as far as possible. Championnet, on the contrary, seems to have adopted the errors of the old Austrian system, and to have neglected the advantages of that of the French.

While General Melas thus added to the military reputation which he had gained at the battle of Novi, General Kray supported his with no less glory. The reinforcements detached to Alexandria after the affair of the 24th of October, had arrived before that town on the 31st, but so fatigued with their rapid march, that they could not be brought, next day, to the other side of the Bormida: General Kray contented himself with pushing a reconnoitring party along the river. In the interval, the waters swelled to such a degree, that the only bridge the Aus-

trians had on that river was carried away. This accident hindered the Austrian General from making, on the 2d, his proposed attack in the valleys of the Orba and of the Scrivja. Not to lose time, he resolved to drive the French from the valley of the Bormida, which the retreat of General Karacksay to Alexandria had permitted them to occupy. This was done the day after, 3d November, and the French were dislodged from Acqui, with the loss of 300 men taken prisoners, and a greater number killed and wounded.

The bridge on the Bormida having been repaired, General Kray passed it in the evening of the same day, and on the 4th, in the morning, attacked the enemy posted on the Orba at Bosco, and on the Scrivia at Rivalta, having behind these two posts a corps of reserve, and forming altogether about 10,000 men. Forced from these two positions, the French retired from the first to Bazzaluzzo, and from the second to Pozzolo Formigaro. General Kray did not attempt to drive them from them the same day, and took post upon the Strada Levata, establishing his light troops near the villages of Pozzolo, Gazzo, and Fressonara. On the 5th, the French

evacuated them, on the approach of the Imperialists, and concentrated their force upon the heights of Novi, occupying at the same time the Cassina di Spinola. Bad weather prevented General Kray from doing any thing that day ; but on the 6th, having reconnoitred their position, he attacked in three columns. That of the right, after having repulsed the left of the enemy as far as the heights, climbed them, and driving them from them, took post on the flank of the centre of the French ; at the same time, the left column penetrated as far as Mesma. But, as had happened upon the same ground, at the great battle of the 15th of August, the centre of the Imperialists could not succeed in the attack in front, and were constantly worsted and repulsed by the French. The obstinacy of their resistance, and the close of the day, obliged General Kray to renounce his intention of carrying the position at Novi, and consequently to call back his two wings into the plain, after having suffered a loss of at least 1000 men, which was greater than that of the French. Though the honour of the day remained with the latter, General Kray obtained, by his operations, the advantage of having cleared the valleys

of the Scrivia, the Orba, and the Bormida, and of having replaced affairs in the same situation they were before the 24th of October. Excepting Mondovi, all the French had gained since that day had been taken from them by the 5th of November, and the having acted a few days on the offensive, had cost them at least 10,000 men.

After the defeat of the 5th, the French army divided into two principal bodies; one of them composed of the division of Grenier, and forming the left, went to occupy, behind Coni, the entrenched position of Borgo St. Dalmazo; from which it retreated on the 8th of November to Tende, but to which it returned on the 10th, seeing that it was not followed by any great force of the enemy. A part of the same division, driven, after the battle of the 4th, in the upper valley of the Stura, had thrown itself on the road towards Demonte. The right went along with Championnet, to join, in the province of Mondovi, the division of Lemoine, and to post itself on the heights which border the Ellero. To maintain himself in this position on the flank of the Imperial army, was the only means

left to Championnet to prevent it from besieging Coni.

General Melas, who, since the victories of the 4th and 5th, found himself in a situation to think seriously of making himself master of that place, could not, however, make the attempt till he had driven the French from St. Dalmazzo and the other posts which they occupied in the neighbourhood, nor could he afterwards act with security as long as they were at Mondovi. He therefore took measures to secure three necessary preliminary advantages. On the 11th, he marched in three columns, commanded by Generals Gottesheim, Ott, and Sommariva. The first of them forced the French to evacuate the villages of Chiusa, Bove, and Poverano: the second, having attacked them at St. Dalmazzo, drove them from it, and forced them back to Robillante, on the road to Tende. The third pushed on as far as Demonte, in the valley of the Stura, and obliged them to retire into France by Argentiére.

These advances having cleared the country round Coni, General Melas, on the 13th, put in execution the attack which he had meditated against the main army of Championnet. For

that purpose he marched in three columns: that on the right directed its course, by Chiusa, to Monasterlo; that of the centre against the centre of the enemy, by Villanova; while that of the left went to the attack of Mondovi, by La Trinita. This last column, three days before, had been sent, under General Mitrowsky, to reinforce General Kray at Alexandria, but a letter from Championnet to St. Cyr having been intercepted, from which it appeared that the latter was not able to take any offensive advantage of the negative success he had gained on the 6th, General Mitrowsky had received counter-orders at Cherasco, and had consequently returned on the 12th. His assistance was not, however, more necessary to General Melas than to General Kray; for although they arrived very late at the points of attack, owing to the length of the march and the difficulties of the road, the Austrians found but few efforts necessary to determine Championnet to abandon his position, and to retire to Vico. On the night following, he evacuated the castle of Mondovi, and retreated towards Ormea, going up the valley of the Tanaro, and burying himself in the narrow passages of the Apennines: he placed

his head-quarters at Sospello, on the road to Nice. He did right in not deferring that retrograde movement, for if he had executed it with less promptitude, the Austrians, by pushing their right into the mountains, might have cut him off from the road of the Upper Tanaro, and left him no other retreat but by Finale and Savona, which would have separated him from his centre and his left, and then no communication with France would have remained to him but by the Riviera di Ponente.—It was not from the Austrians alone that Championnet fled in abandoning Mondovi. Its inhabitants, as has been already mentioned in this volume, had been the first to rise in insurrection, and had persisted in it. They had fought the French on several occasions, and had taken from them, and defended against them the castles of Mondovi and of Ceva. These faithful and brave inhabitants, who had been replaced for some days under the yoke of the Republicans, seeing the Austrians return, assembled themselves anew, to the number of 15,000 men, and co-operated very efficaciously with them in the action of the 13th.

The result of that day, which was the conse-

quence of those of the 4th or 5th, replaced the Austrians and the French in the same relative situations they had been in after the battles of Magnan and of the Adda, that is, gave a decided superiority to the former. From that time forward they were, if not peaceable, at least secure possessors of the plains of Italy, of the feet of the different chains of mountains which border on them, and of all the fortresses which defend the entry to them, except one. The moment was come for besieging this last bulwark with security and with a reasonable hope of success; and General Meias, transferring his head-quarters from Morozzo, where they had been placed after the affair of the 13th, to Borgo St. Dalmazzo, went to make and to cover the regular investment of Coni.

While preparations were making for the attack of this place, the conquest of which was to be the fruit and the termination of the campaign, the only post which remained to the Republicans, French or Italians, beyond the Po, was taken from them—Ancona fell at last. This place, as may be remembered, had since the commencement of the campaign been blocked up by sea by a Turkish and Russian fleet, which was after-

wards joined by an Austrian flotilla, and by land by Italian troops, commanded by the Cisalpine General Lahooz, and by some hundreds of Russians or Turks. After having made themselves masters of the fort of Senigaglia, the allied troops, early in August, had attacked and carried the different entrenched posts, which defended the approaches to Ancona, and had constructed some batteries to bombard them; but this town, placed upon the slope of one hill, and having a citadel upon another opposite, suffered little from an irregular and too distant fire. It was the same with regard to the attack by sea. Some Republican ships of war, which had taken refuge in the harbour, protected it by their fire, and the entry to it was moreover defended by a mole, which projected into the sea, and was fortified. These attacks, although double, were too feeble to reduce the place, in which last asylum were shut up the most violent Republicans of the State of the Church, and along with them the fruits of their rapine, and a great quantity of provisions. The Allies, occupied with the operations of the campaign, and certain of being able at any time to reduce that place,

destitute of every support, had contented themselves with continuing the blockade.

It has been mentioned, that after the capitulation of Rome and of Civita Vecchia, to the English and the Neapolitans, General Frœlich had marched to Ancona, with all the Imperial troops that were in the State of the Church. He took the command of the Russians and Turks, and placed his head-quarters at Varrano. On his arrival before the fortress, he sent home a part of the Italian militia, who had formed the blockade, and who had suffered much in a vigorous sally, made by the besieged during the night of the 9th of October. It was fatal to the General of the Insurgents, Lahooz; he, as it appears, having been betrayed by some of his adherents. After having invested regularly the place, and raised some batteries to protect the works of the siege, General Frœlich opened the trenches on the 17th of October. He was not retarded, either by the fire of the enemy, or by the slight sallies which were made, and, on the 1st of November, two parallels were finished, and five batteries ready to play; they began their fire the day after, and the same day, the enemy were driven from all the posts they still

occupied, out of the body of the place. The enemy returned the fire from all the batteries of the ramparts and of the forts; they made, afterwards, two desperate sallies, and at first succeeded in forcing the besiegers back into their lines, but were soon after driven into the place with much loss. The fire was continued with more or less violence, and nothing very important happened till the 10th in the evening, when the Commandant, the French General Mounier, seeing that the place was much damaged by the bombs, that all the defences were destroyed, and that the stock of provisions was exhausted (the inhabitants having had none for some time, and suffering under actual famine) proposed to capitulate. The terms were disputed till the 13th, and settled on that day. The garrison, consisting of about 3000 men, obtained permission to return into France, upon condition that they should not serve again till exchanged. Their loss in the siege had been about 600 men, and that of the Austrians about 300. The latter found in the place near 600 pieces of cannon, and in the harbour, three ships of the line, and several small ships of war. The conquest of Ancona secured the navigation

and the tranquillity of the Adriatic, and permitted the Austrians to reinforce the main army with some thousand men. If, in these respects, the acquisition of this place was advantageous to them, it was in others very fatal. Upon the reduction of it, the Russian troops were guilty of disorders and excesses, which General Frœlich punished with great severity. The Emperor Paul resented so warmly the treatment his troops had received, that his Imperial Majesty of Germany was obliged to assemble at Vienna, in the month of February following, a Council of War, in which the conduct of General Frœlich was examined. Although acquitted, this General was the victim, and was obliged to lose, in retirement, the fruit of the distinguished services which he had performed in the course of the campaign. This difference between the Courts of Petersburgh and of Vienna, contributed not a little, combined with other causes, to detach the former from its alliance with the latter.—A part of the troops which had been employed in the siege of Ancona, were sent, with their General himself, to the Scrivia, in which part, and in the Riviera di Levante, nothing important had taken place, except the recovery, by General

Klenau, on the 10th of November, of the ports of Torriglia and Scafterra, upon which occasion he took 200 men. This was the only action worth mentioning which took place on that part of the theatre of the war, during the month of November.

After having transferred, as has been mentioned, his head-quarters to Borgo St. Dalmazzo, General Melas himself attempted nothing farther against the French army. Satisfied with having separated and put it in disorder, he contented himself with driving farther and farther back, the different Republican columns, in the directions which they had taken, and with removing them from all the approaches to Coni. On the left, Major-General Bellegarde continuing to gain ground in the mountains, occupied Ormea, which was abandoned by the enemy, and sent his advanced posts to within a short distance of the Riviera di Ponente. General Ott possessed himself of Linone and Limonetta, and sent patrols as far as Tende, the passage of which was guarded by some thousands of French. From the valley of Barcelonette, General Sommariva sent parties into those of St. Anne and of the Vraita, in the former getting possession

of the post of Isola, and in the latter of Chateau Dauphin, and even of Chenale. At the same time, the French were defeated and driven from the town and valley of Suza. The want of provisions, of money, and of clothing, and the snow which had already fallen in abundance, forced them to remain behind Mount Cenis, the two St. Bernards, the mountains of the Valais, and the St. Gothard.—Such was the state of affairs on the whole length of the line, on the 25th of November, from which it appears, that the Imperialists had no longer any serious attack to fear from the French, and that they could in perfect security give their whole attention to the siege of Coni, for which the heavy cannon had already been sent from Turin.

Nothing but the great importance of the place could have induced the Austrians to undertake the siege, after so many months of fatigue, and at so advanced a season. The snow already covered the mountains which surround it, and the frost rendered the ground almost impenetrable. It may well be believed, that these circumstances, added to the natural and artificial defences of the place, would have made them delay the siege till the following campaign, if

they had not known, that at that moment it was ill provided with provisions and military stores. The French army having been for several months in the greatest want of every necessary, had been itself obliged to consume the magazines of Coni. The difficulties of carriage in such a country, and in so severe a season, had also prevented the French from conveying from it a great number of wounded, who had remained there since the battles of the 4th and 5th of November. General Clement, who commanded in the place, endeavoured to make up for this additional number of useless mouths, by forcing a part of the inhabitants to quit the place.


The brilliant conduct of the General Prince Lichtenstein, during the whole campaign, made him be entrusted with this enterprize, which was to complete the success of it; and he justified the choice by his activity, his talents, and his personal liberality.*

* This Prince is brother to the reigning Prince of the name, chief of a family equal in rank, and superior in fortune, to any in the Austrian monarchy. It has been said, and it is not improbable, that the siege of Coni cost him more than 5000 guineas. Prince Esterhazy, in 1793, during the short command which he held on the Rhine, had been still more lavish in his

He encouraged, by his example, and by his generosity, the workmen, both the soldiers and inhabitants of the country, who were employed to the number of more than 5000. The trenches were opened in the night between the 26th and 27th, at 400 yards from the covered way, opposite to that part of the place which is between the Stura and the Gesso, which rivers both pass by Coni; and were pushed with such activity, that, in spite of the very hot fire of the enemy, and the difficulties of the ground and season, the first parallel was established, and by the following morning, the workmen were under cover.

The fire of the place was kept up with great violence during the whole of the 27th, but it did not do much execution. In the following night, the works were continued with much vigour: the trenches were widened to near

private expenses. These examples are rare in all armies, and, it may be supposed, are totally unknown in those of the French Republic. The fortunes of the Austrian Generals are commonly so circumscribed, that they cannot be so frequent among them, as would be required for the good of the service, and to make up for the habitual economy of the Austrian government, which is too great in every thing which regards extraordinary expenses, such, for instance, as the obtaining of information, either on a great or on a small scale.




CON I.

REFERENCES to the PLACE.

1. Bastion of the Almo
2. Gate of Nice
3. Bastion of Notre Dame du Bois
4. Bastion Caraglio
5. Bastion of the Hospital
6. Bastion of St. François
7. Bastion of St. Anne
8. Gate of Turin
9. Bastion of St. James
10. *Fausse Braye* of St. James and of the Olmo
11. Demi-Bastion of St. James
12. Bastion of St. Maurice
13. Demi-Bastion of the Almo
14. Bastion of St. Carola
15. Bastion of St. Benedict
16. Bastion of St. Joseph
17. Bastion of St. Gaetan
18. Bastion of St. Anthony
19. Bastion of St. Felix
20. *Fausse Braye* of St. Anne
21. Redoubt of Gesso
22. Redoubt of the Centre
23. Redoubt of the Stura

REFERENCES to the SIEGE.

1. Battery of 4 mortars
2. Ditto of 4 howitzers
3. Ditto of 5 cannons
4. Ditto of 5 cannons
5. Ditto of 5 cannons
6. Ditto of 5 cannons
7. Ditto of 6 howitzers
8. Ditto of 6 mortars
9. Ditto of 6 howitzers
10. Ditto of 4 howitzers
11. Ditto of 4 cannons
12. Ditto of 4 howitzers
13. Ditto of 2 howitzers
14. Ditto of 2 mortars
15. Ditto of 4 cannons
16. Ditto of 4 mortars
17. Ditto of 4 cannons
18. Ditto of 3 mortars
19. Ditto of 4 cannons
20. Ditto of 2 cannons



Published by T. Cadogan, Prince Street Cavendish Square Jan^y 7 1822



two fathoms, and the branches of communication were rendered three feet deeper and four feet wider.—In the night from the 29th to the 30th, numerous batteries were prepared on the banks of the Stura, the fire of the place still continuing with equal violence. During the following night, the same works were carried on, and by the 1st of December the first parallel and the different branches of communication were finished. The batteries were mounted to the number of nineteen in the night, and at seven o'clock in the morning of the 2d of December, they began to play. Their fire was so violent and so well directed, that before mid-day the besieged were obliged to abandon all the outer works, and at the same time a redoubt was destroyed by the explosion of a powder magazine. The following night, the besiegers made a lodgment in that redoubt, and began the second parallel. It was not found necessary to finish it; for several quarters of the town having been already on fire, and, which was of more consequence, almost all the batteries of the place being rendered unserviceable, on the morning of the 3d, General Clement offered to capitulate. The conditions

were settled the same day, and were in substance—that the garrison, amounting to more than 2800 men, besides 800 wounded, should march out of the fortress, the day after, with drums beating, colours flying, matches lighted, and two pieces of cannon in front—that they should lay down their arms on the glacis, and be from thence conducted prisoners into the Hereditary States, under the escort of a strong Imperial detachment, a precaution which the hatred of the Italians against the French rendered very necessary—that the sick remaining in the fortress should be taken care of, and afterwards should follow the rest of the garrison—that private property should be respected—that hostages should be given on both sides, and that the inventory should be made of all the military stores in the place. To the demand made on this occasion, as on all others of the same kind, by the French—that the individuals who had shewn attachment to the principles of the French Revolution should not be ill treated, either in their persons or property, and that they should be permitted to sell their effects and retire wherever they pleased, the usual

answer was given—"This has nothing to do with military concerns."

Thus, for the first time, was taken by force this fine and formidable fortress, the bulwark of Piedmont, on the side of the Maritime Alps. It had been besieged in vain in 1691 and 1744; and if in 1799 it made so bad a defence, inferior even to those of the citadels of Turin and of Mantua, it must be attributed to the want of provisions, and the almost total deprivation of military stores, which the French army in Italy experienced at that time. This was the natural consequence of nine months of disasters, and of the complete disorder which prevailed in the last moments of the Directorial Government.

It has been already mentioned, that that government, in the month of June, had suffered a convulsion and a change among its members, and that in November it had been entirely upset by Bonaparte. The provisional authority which at that time he assumed in conjunction with Sieyes, was recognized by the army of Italy, with as much promptitude and unanimity as it was by the armies of Switzerland, Germany, and Holland. Championnet seized this moment

to try, by promises of better times, to reanimate the courage of his soldiers, depressed by so many losses and fatigues, to revive their confidence, destroyed by defeats without number, and by such frequent changes of Generals, and to restore discipline, which want of pay, of clothing, and of subsistence, had almost totally annihilated. That General, since the affair of Mondovi, had endeavoured to put himself in a state to make another attempt to relieve Coni, and having without doubt flattered himself that it would make a longer resistance, had, in the last days of November, assembled in the neighbourhood of Ormea all the troops he had remaining in the county of Tende, in the principality of Oneglia, and in the marquisate of Finale, and appeared as if he was again disposed to cross the mountains, when he learnt the surrender of Coni.

This event closed the operations of the Commanders in Chief. Nothing more remained which the one had either the desire or possibility of immediately acquiring, or the other of defending. They could only now dispute the possession of mountains, covered and rendered inaccessible by the snow. Repose on

both sides was therefore sought after, which was so necessary to the French, and had been so well earned by the Imperialists. General Melas, after having destroyed the works that had been raised for the siege of Coni, and established the cantonments of his advanced posts in the different passages of the Maritime and Piedmontese Alps, sent the rest of the army into winter-quarters, in Piedmont and Lombardy, and on the 7th of December fixed his head-quarters at Turin. Championnet, re-occupying his defensive posts in the Maritime Alps, made the principal part of his troops return into the position between Savona and Genoa, the ordinary asylum of the Republicans after their defeats. In the beginning of December he quitted this command, which he had neither held with much reputation nor with much success.* It would not however be just

* This General, in his way back to France, fell sick at Nice, and died on the 9th of January, at Antibes, of an epidemic fever, which broke out about the end of the campaign, and made great ravages in the left divisions of his army, and also carried off a great number of the inhabitants of the frontier towns in Provence, Dauphiné, and Franche Compté.—Championnet was the son of an innkeeper at Grenoble. He was the

to appreciate his talents by the result of the three last months of the campaign which he conducted ; for his army was left in such total want of money, of provisions, of clothing, and of all camp and military equipage, that he was, it may be said, less taken up with fighting, than with providing for the existence of his troops, with preventing and appeasing the discontents of his soldiers, always ready to break out, with repressing the excesses to which soldiers almost dying of hunger, and accustomed to pillage, naturally gave themselves up to, and with protecting them from the just vengeance of the inhabitants of the country. It would be impossible to describe what they all suffered during the last three months of the campaign, and still more during the rigorous winter which followed it. The soldiers, left almost naked on

particular friend of Hoche, and, like him, died in his bed, after having encountered all the dangers of war ; and, like him, likewise after having obtained very early the rank of General in Chief. He enjoyed considerable reputation in the French army, and yet had neither shewn great talents nor done great things. The principal service which he did the Republic, was in the war of Naples ; and the success of it has been attributed to General Macdonald, who served under him.

the summits of barren rocks, or of mountains covered with snow, without any regular distribution of provisions, and often in total want of all subsistence, in the very cottages forced at the point of the bayonet from the wretched peasants the last morsel of bread which remained to them. The situation of the towns was not much better. The vessels of the Allies, constantly cruising on the coasts of Genoa, prevented or intercepted all supplies of foreign grain, which is at all times necessary for the maintenance of the inhabitants of that country; and which was become much more so from the additional number of mouths. The scarcity of grain was at different times so excessive, that a real famine was to be dreaded, and the price of bread was always exorbitant. The wants of the French, as will easily be believed, were always the first supplied, and the people were left to all the horrors of their fate—while requisitions without ceasing, of money, of cloth, of leather, and of all kinds of provisions, exhausted also all their pecuniary resources. Such treatment could not fail to bring on despair, and such indeed was the effect. Several

insurrections broke out, not only in the country, but even at Genoa; and the French, as severe in punishing, as they were incapable of remedying the evils which occasioned them, under pretext of defending the town against the Imperialists, declared it in a state of siege, that is to say, suspended the authority of the government, and subjected it to their own. Thus they reduced to servitude their pretended ally the Ligurian Republic, which consoled itself for its destruction and its sufferings, by imitating, both in June and in November, the changes of government which took place at these periods in France.—It was in this state of things, not dissimilar to that in which he had left Switzerland, that General Massena took the command of the army of Italy, in place of Championnet, and, according to custom, announced himself before-hand by a proclamation, in which he promised plenty and victory.

Since the fall of Coni, from the St. Gothard to Genoa, the Austrians and the French were either separated by the Alps, or posted among them at too great distances from one another to be able to come to action. The Riviera di Levante was the only part of the theatre of the

war, in which military operations were not entirely obstructed by the season or by local difficulties. General Klenau, who had been reinforced by some troops come from Ancona, having been informed that a part of those opposed to him had risen against their officers and refused to serve, and that at the same time there was at Genoa a degree of discontent approaching to insurrection, thought that this circumstance might favour a *coup de main*, and he resolved to attempt it. On the 14th, he attacked the French posts in the Riviera, and on the mountains which surrounded it, defeated them, and forced them to retire under the cannon of Genoa, after having taken some hundred men, and among them a General. At the same time, General Hohenzollern, who had succeeded General Kray on the Scrivia, and who, on the 6th of December, had taken Acqui and Novi from the French, and blockaded Gayi, made a diversion in his favour, and penetrated to near Voltaggio, on the road to the Bochetta. On the 15th, General Klenau continued to advance, and drove back the French to the forts which cover Genoa. On his approach,

General St. Cyr had the preceding evening assembled his division and a part of that of General Watrin, and leaving a part to oppose the Austrian General in the Riviera, he marched on the 15th with some thousand men, and crossing Monte Creto, he fell upon an Austrian battalion posted at Torriglia, which he entirely took or destroyed. General Klenau, thus in danger of being cut off, his right being turned and unprotected, hastened to fall back. The enemy were already close upon him, and it was not without difficulty and loss that his rear-guard was able to resist them. The Austrian General, on the 16th, placed himself again behind the Magra, preserving however the line of advanced posts from Sestri to Varese and Santo Croce, where they were connected with those which occupied the heads of the valleys of Taro and of the Trebia. The French pretended that in the affairs of the 14th, 15th, and 16th, they had taken 1800 prisoners. One half of that number was about the real loss of the Imperialists, but the Consul Bonaparte was obliged to have recourse to a little exaggeration to compensate for the loss of Coni.

These events were the last of the campaign in those quarters, and the corps of Generals Klenau and Hohenzollern on the one side, as also those of Generals St. Cyr and Watrin on the other, took up their winter quarters. The positions of the two armies, at the end of December, were as follow : The Austrian army of Switzerland ended at the upper valley of the Tesino, and was there met by the army of Italy, which had absorbed that of the Tyrol.—General Dedovich occupied Bellinzona, and had his advanced posts on as far as Airolo, thus observing the *debouché* of the St. Gothard.—That of the Simplon was guarded by a part of the corps which Prince Victor de Rohan had commanded in the valley of Ossola, on the frontier of the Upper Valais.—The troops left in the valley of Aoust, by General Had-dick, when, at the end of October, he went to reinforce General Kray, were stationed along the frontier of the Lower Valais, and occupied the foot of the Great and Little St. Bernard.—The passages of the Maurienne, the foot of Mount Cenis, the valley of Suza till beyond Exilles, and that of Cluzon till beyond Fenes-trelles, which was blockaded, were guarded by

different detachments, all under the orders of General Kaim, who commanded at Turin.—There the right of the army ended. In the upper valleys of the Vraita, of the Maira, and of the Stura, were the troops of General Sommariva, who in all of them had posts on the very borders of France, and who upon his left commanded the valley of St. Anne, in which he possessed Isola.—General Ott watched the two roads which lead from Coni to Nice, across the Col de Fenestre, and the Col de Tende, and upon the latter he held the posts of Limone, and Limonetta.—Generals Gottesheim and Bellegarde occupied the three roads, which crossing the valley of the Tanaro and the Maritime Alps, lead from Mondovi to Oneglia, Albenga, and Finale.—There the centre ended, and the left of the army began.—Since the end of October, it had been under the command of General Kray, and, occupying the valleys of the Bormida, the Erro, the Orba, and the Scrivia, had, in the three first posts which reached to Cairo, Sassello, and Ovada, and in the fourth possessed Novi and Sarrevalle, and masked Gavi.—A small body of troops, placed in the Imperial fiefs, held the roads

leading from Genoa to Pavia and Placentia.—

Another was posted in the upper valley of the Taro—where it communicated with General Klenau, who had his principal force concentrated on the Magra; his advanced posts reaching as far as Sestri and Varese.—Such was the semicircular line occupied by the Imperial troops, opposite to the enemy. Some others were dispersed in Tuscany, the march of Ancona, the countries of Bologna, and of Ferrara, the Mantuan, and the Milanese. The reinforcements which had arrived during the last three months of the campaign, made the number of Austrians, spread over the face of Italy, amount to at least 60,000, and they had about 10,000 Piedmontese auxiliaries. About 20,000 Tuscans and Neapolitans likewise embraced their cause, but they had no enemies to contend with, or rather to punish, but the disarmed soldiers of the Cisalpine, Roman, and Parthenopian Republics.

The positions of which the French remained in possession at the end of the campaign, were as follow: the right wing of the army of Switzerland occupied the valley of the Rhone, and had its advanced posts in the different

small passages of the Valais, and of the Great St. Bernard.—The left of the united armies of the Alps and of Italy possessed the Little St. Bernard, Mount Cenis, and the extremities of the other passages of the Tarentaise, and of the Maurienne.—It was in pretty considerable force at the entries of the valleys of Suza, and of Fenestrelles, having a garrison in the latter place.—It supported with some detachments of infantry the Vaudois, or inhabitants of the valleys of Lucerna, St. Martin, and of Peroussa, who were armed in favour of the Republic, and it opposed the Imperial posts placed near to Chenale and to Argentiere, in the valleys of the Vraita, and of the Stura—there ended the left of the army of Massena. The centre guarded the two roads from Coni to Nice, and, in spite of the rigour of the season, had posts upon the Col de Fenestre and the Col de Tende.—It lined the Riviera di Ponente as far as Savona, and kept strong detachments in the middle of the Ligurian Alps, and on all the passages which lead to the valley of the Tanaro.—The right of the army garrisoned Savona and Genoa, as also the towns between them; and had cantonments

on the four roads which lead to the valleys of the Bormida, the Erro, the Orba, and the Scrivia. On the first their piquets went beyond Cairo; on the second beyond Sassolo; on the third beyond Campo Freddo; and on the fourth beyond Voltaggio, having also on the latter a garrison in the fort of Gavi.—They faced the Imperialists on the two roads which go from Genoa to Voghera and Bobbio, across the Imperial fiefs, possessed a part of that chain of mountains which separates the valley of the Trebia from the Riviera di Levante, and covered on that side the approaches to Genoa.—Upon this long and irregular line from the latter town to the Great St. Bernard, there were not more than 40,000 men: from the Var to Genoa there were scarcely 25,000, almost all infantry; the want of forage, and the inutility of cavalry having induced them to send it back into France along with the heavy artillery, about the beginning of autumn. 15,000 men of reinforcements from Switzerland, or from the interior, were on their march to join the army of Italy: others were likewise promised, but those which arrived were few in number; and so great was the void in the

ranks of the French army, produced by an epidemic fever and by desertion, that Massena, in the month of April following, had not more than 35,000 men in all the extent of the county of Nice, and of the state of Genoa. The idleness of winter-quarters made the soldiers feel more sensibly, and suffer with more impatience the state of misery, distress, and privation, in which they were left. Several insurrections broke out among the troops which occupied the state of Genoa.—Companies of infantry, and even whole battalions returned into France, with arms and baggage.—Bonaparte and Massena in vain exhausted their oratorical exhortations — Nothing but severe examples, and some hundreds of thousands of livres, extorted from the wretched Genoa, could stop this other contagious malady, which, no less than the fever before-mentioned, threatened to leave without defenders the mountains of Liguria, and the frontiers of France.

CHAPTER XIII.

Military result and political singularities of this campaign—Examination of the five periods into which it may be divided—Causes which determined its course—Original fault committed by the French—Short review of the conduct of Generals Scherer, Moreau, Macdonald, Joubert, and Championnet; and of that of Generals Kray, Suworow, and Melas—Estimate of the respective loss of men.

IN vain would a campaign be sought for in history, so calculated as that which has just been described, to instruct the military man, to interest the politician, and to astonish both. The French have been seen masters, at the beginning of March, of all the length of Italy from Turin to Naples, an extent of command without example, since that of the Romans: and they have been seen before the end of the year possessing only, in this vast country, the mountains of Liguria. Their enemies have been seen gain, in this lapse of time, six pitched battles, take

seven fortresses of the first order, and erect their victorious colours from the sources of the Po to the sea of Sicily. We have seen three Republics destroyed, as they had been created, by the force of arms: two monarchies calling for their legitimate chiefs: the Pontifical chair expecting a successor to the unfortunate Pius VI. in a word, Jacobinism losing the richest prey that it had yet seized. We have seen men born amidst the ices of the pole, fighting during the dog-days, under the skies of Italy: the disciples of Mahomet defending the rights of the successor of St. Peter: Protestants re-establishing the seat of the Catholic religion: fortresses besieged and taken by sailors: in short, Italy the rendez-vous and the prey of almost all the nations over which it reigned two thousand years ago.—Such military transactions leave far behind them all preceding campaigns: such political singularities find not their equal in the annals of the world.

It would be a long task to examine closely all the remarkable events of this wonderful campaign, and to inquire into every thing which, during its course, was done on one side or the other, worthy of praise or of blame. It will be shorter and more useful to consider it systemati-

cally, and first to fix its principal periods. It presents five perfectly distinct.—The first, which takes in about six weeks, comprehends all that passed from the beginning of hostilities, to the battle of the Adda, and the entire expulsion of the French from the Milanese. It exhibits the latter, having at first the offensive and the superiority of number, losing in a few days both the one and the other, reduced to a strict defensive, and to a continual retreat by the effect of the battle of Magnan, and forced by that of Casano to abandon to the Allies all Lombardy, and the command of the passes of the Rhetick Alps. This interesting period, in which the course of the campaign was decided, presents three pitched battles, the passage of a river by force, and an able combination of a war of plains and of a war of mountains.

In the second period, which comprehends the month of May, the Commanders in Chief opposed to one another are seen to have each a new plan of operations to form. Obligated to abandon to the conqueror either Piedmont or the south of Italy, Moreau has been seen giving the preference to this last interest, and taking the position of Alexandria and Valenza, to em-

barrass and retard the offensive measures of the Allies ; at last, obliged to quit it, and to abandon the plain to his enemies, going into the mountains of Mondovi and Montferrat, to cover at once his communication with France and the south of Italy. This period presents on the part of the Allies, an offensive rather hesitating and of little vigour; on the part of the French, an active defensive; and throughout a war of science and of manœuvres rather than a war of battles and of enterprize.

The nature of the campaign changes; Macdonald arrives in Tuscany, and advances victoriously across the country of Bologna, of Modena, of Parma, and Placentia, as far as the Trebia; Moreau makes a movement on his right, and from thence advances on the Bormida and the Scrivia: the offensive belongs to the French, and they again make the fate of Italy doubtful. Marshal Suworow decides it anew by a rapid march, and by three bloody battles: Macdonald is forced back into Tuscany; Moreau to the Maritime Alps. This terminates, towards the end of June, the third period, which presents a violent crisis, a co-operation ill-concerted between the French Generals, and a mixture of vigour and ability on the part of Marshal Suworow.

The fourth presents a war entirely of sieges and of fighting. The citadels of Turin, of Alexandria, and of Mantua, are reduced by open force. Tortona is threatened with the same fate: Joubert attempts to save it; he loses the battle of Novi, and Tortona falls—Marshal Suworow quits Italy.

Then begins the fifth and last period: the campaign takes a new character, that of war between equal powers. The Imperialists defend themselves in a better manner than they are attacked. The prudent ability of their conduct is recompensed by a victory, and by the capture of Coni, which is the consequence of it.

The principal transactions of this campaign having thus been related and classed, a view must be taken of the causes which led to, or influenced its result. The first and the most efficient of all was the folly that the Directory was guilty of, in wishing to make war at once on the banks of the Adige, and at the foot of Mount Vesuvius. If, instead of keeping their troops dispersed along that immense line, they had, as soon as they decided to renew the war, collected on the banks of the Po the army spread throughout the kingdom of Naples, in the State of the

Church, and in Tuscany, even though they had left garrisons in two or three principal places, they would have begun hostilities not with 45,000 men, as they did, but with more than 80,000: and it is not doubtful but that with this great superiority of forces, the army of Italy would have broken the line of the Adige, and have penetrated rapidly, on one side beyond the Friuli, and on the other beyond the Tyrol; which was already taken in reverse by General Lecourbe.

These successes would, as certainly as the presence of an army, have kept in submission the south of Italy; and doubtless, in the sequel, a few brigades and a little time would have been sufficient to recover possession of it. From the state of dispersion in which the French left their forces, it resulted, that after the three battles of the 26th and 30th of March, and of the 5th of April, and after the garrisons thrown into Mantau and Peschiera had diminished their numbers, they could not repair their losses with promptitude, and thus found themselves in a state of extreme inferiority, which was, without doubt, the principal cause of their subsequent disasters. There was another cause, which, though unconnected with the direction of mili-

tary means, nevertheless powerfully contributed to the reverses which they experienced. This was the profound sentiment of hatred, of vengeance, and of contempt, which the licentiousness and the outrages of the soldiery—the irreligion, the debauchery, and the insatiable rapacity of the civil agents of the Republic, had, for the last three years, engraved in the hearts of the Italians, and principally of the inhabitants of the country. The latter, following the natural disposition, which inclines us to consider as our friends, the enemies of our enemies, saw in the Allies, their avengers and liberators, whose efforts and whose support they ought to second and to merit. The peasants of the Mantuan set the example, in the first days of April, and the French found themselves harassed on their right by an unexpected increase of enemies. Their left was no less so, soon afterwards, by the inhabitants of the Brescian, the Bergamese, and the Italian bailiwicks. Their rear was seriously attacked by those of Piedmont, and principally of the province of Mondovi. It has been seen, that these latter went so far as to get possession of the castle of that name, and of that of Ceva.

Their courageous and obstinate insurrection did not a little contribute to induce Moreau to quit his excellent position of Alexandria; and the loss of Ceva particularly embarrassed his movements and his communications. The services which the Royalists of the Mondovian rendered the Allies, on the 13th of November, and what had before been done by the loyal inhabitants of Tuscany, of the State of the Church, and of the kingdom of Naples, cannot but be remembered; in short, the French paid in this campaign for their anterior conduct, by the lives of some thousands of soldiers, and by constant embarrassments, sufferings, and alarms. The interruption of their communications and of the carriage of their provisions, and the detachments which it was necessary to make, to keep in awe the insurgent countries, forced them, on several occasions, to abandon ground which they might have defended against the enemy.

It should seem, that a campaign so brilliant and so useful as that which the Allies had made, could leave room only for joy and admiration. To whatever degree it may inspire these sentiments, it will not be said, that it furnishes no cause for regret, nor that it is quite out of the

reach of criticism. The propriety of some partial operations has already been denied, or at least questioned ; but the whole system pursued by the Allies appears liable to a serious objection. One cannot but observe, that they always attached too great importance to fortified places, and that they placed too much value on the rapid reduction of them by open force. If, instead of devoting 25,000 men to the siege of Mantua, they had left there only 15,000, this force, joined to some thousands of armed peasants, would have been perfectly sufficient to confine the garrison within the fortress : for that, it was only necessary to guard and to entrench the extremities of the four causeways, which lead from Mantua, beyond the lake which surrounds it. The 10,000 men, who would thus have been spared, given to Generals Ott and Klenau, would have put them in condition to get possession, much sooner, of Bologna, of Ferrara, and Fort Urbino ; to hold in force the defiles of Pontremoli, and Sarzana ; to penetrate even into Tuscany ; in short, to prevent Macdonald from pushing forward beyond the Apennines, and definitively effecting his junction with Mo-

reau. They would thus have avoided the crisis, from which they were so happily extricated by the battles of the Trebia and of Novi. The error which brought them on vanished before the splendor of success ; but it would have been bitterly felt, had the issue of those battles been different.

The necessity of conquering on those two days, and particularly on the latter, might also have been avoided in another way. Either after the battle of the Adda or that of the Trebia, the superiority of Marshal Suworow over Moreau was such, that the latter was not in a condition to resist him in the open field. If then, after each of these victories, the former, leaving on his rear or his flanks some small corps to mask the fortified places and secure his communications, had followed the latter with all the remainder of his forces, and had determined to bring him to action, notwithstanding the obstacles which localities might present, it should seem that in a short time, he might have destroyed the small Republican army, or obliged it to abandon the Apennines, and to retire beyond the Var. In either case, Moreau and Macdonald would have been finally separated ; the fortified places left

behind, would have been besieged without risk, and with ease; the campaign would have been advanced some weeks, and must have had a result which it had not, the capture of the state of Genoa, which afterwards cost so much blood and trouble, and finally brought on so many great misfortunes. The advantage of a campaign ought not to be estimated solely from its immediate result, but also from the degree in which it prepares for the favourable opening of the next. Every thing leads one to think that it is not Marshal Suworow that ought to be blamed, for not having pursued this conduct: it would have been of a piece with his character, and the species of warfare which he always preferred, and consonant to the political views which his Sovereign at that time entertained.

Already, in the course of this volume, the merits or the military errors which may be attributed to the five Generals who commanded in chief the Republican armies in Italy, have been in part ventured to be pointed out. Scherer has, without doubt, justly incurred blame, but not to the degree in which it was lavished on him. He, as well as Jourdan, surely had a right to attribute, in part, his defeats to the disproportion,

which, in its senseless blindness, the Directory left between their projects and their force. An universal clamour was raised against these two Generals, and it could not well indeed have been otherwise. The campaigns of 1796 and 1797, and the treaty of peace which had followed them, had inspired the French with an extreme confidence, and with a conviction that they were essentially superior to their enemies, by the quality of their soldiers and their Generals. When their first reverses, on the Danube and on the Adige, had proved the contrary; not yet undeceived, they chose rather to attribute them to folly or treachery, than to the want of numbers or to the skill of their enemies. It was not till after repeated defeats, that their eyes were opened, and that, the illusion vanishing, they acknowledged the true causes.

It is admitted by every one, that Moreau shewed, in this campaign, much conception, talents, and judgment. The movement which he made from Milan to Turin, and from Turin to Alexandria, was excellent, skilful, and bold. Those which he made from Coni towards Genoa, and from Genoa to Tortona, were equally ably conceived; but the latter appears to have been tardy.

To appreciate properly his conduct, it must be recollected, that with forces very inferior, he maintained himself in the plain, from the end of April till that of May; and that afterwards, having retired into the mountains, he disturbed, till the beginning of September, the operations of the Allies. As has been observed by a man, who understood the art of war best, and has written best upon it, *defensive war consists entirely in the prudence and foresight of him who conducts it*. Moreau felt it, and has proved it: the defence which he sustained was intelligent, active, well calculated, and provident. His destiny in this campaign was rather singular, and what had not probably happened to any other General; having twice, in the space of four months, succeeded to the command in chief of the same army. The case was, indeed, similar with the army of the Allies, which, in the space of one month, had three successive commanders in chief. —The short time that Macdonald, and especially Joubert, appeared upon the scene, furnishes but little to say of them. That which the former performed, appears to be, in the total, rather favourable than disadvantageous to his reputation. He exposed his person courageously, and endea-

voured, but in vain, to make fortune propitious. —Joubert was still more ill-treated by her.—Championnet was not much entitled to her favours. He did not think early enough of uniting the army of the Alps with that of Italy ; and he attended too much to making useless attacks in the valleys of Susa and Fenestrelles. He could not expect to draw thither, in great strength, the Allies, to whom Turin answered for the safety of that part of Piedmont : he would have done much better, by carrying almost all his forces into the provinces of Coni and Mondovi. The last operations which he undertook to save Coni, present nothing which renders them more honourable for himself, than they were fortunate for his army. This General has too lately occupied attention, to make it necessary to say any thing more of him here.

What has been seen done by Generals Kray, Suworow, and Melas, speaks more highly in their favour than any thing which could be said. The skill which the former displayed on the 26th and 30th of March, very critical days, on which the fate of the campaign depended, cannot be praised too much. These two victories were as glorious to General Kray, as they were important to the

interests of his Sovereign : for this first combat was the only one in which the French had, in the course of the campaign, a superiority of number. This circumstance ought to be appreciated ; for, to gain a battle, having 10,000 men more or less than the enemy, is not the same thing. It is, besides, in war, the same as in commerce ; the first battle is like the first guinea, the most difficult to gain ; and he who opens the career of victory, renders a very different service, and has a much better title to renown, than he who has only to pursue the course. The battle of Magnan proved that General Kray knew how to conquer, and, what was still more, that he knew how to profit from a victory : the rest of this campaign discovered the wish and power he possessed of rendering himself as useful in the second and third, as he had done in the first rank of Generals.

If Marshal Suworow found his road already marked out, every thing authorizes the belief that he would have known how to open it himself, and, what is more, that no other would have advanced upon it with such rapidity : in truth, the merits of this General, in this campaign, must principally be estimated by the rapid, decisive, and advantageous course which he gave to it. He stamped

upon it the double and energetic impulse of his own character and of the views of his Sovereign; and it is at least doubtful, whether a General, more dependent on the Aulic Council of Vienna, would have dared to undertake, or would even have had permission to accomplish so much. It is not probable that Austrian prudence would have allowed him to march to Turin, before Mantua had been reduced; and to besiege, or blockade those two places, at the same time with those of Alexandria and Tortona. Some persons have thought, that Marshal Suworow should have made himself master of one or other of these last fortresses, before he advanced his right wing to Turin; and have taxed with precipitancy and imprudence, the movement which he made towards this city. A different opinion, however, seems more reasonable; and, if this occasion give any ground to reproach the Russian General, it would rather be, that he had delayed too long to make this movement, and that he had suffered himself to be stopped in his course for nearly three weeks, by the small army of Moreau. It would, however, be presumptuous absolutely to condemn him on this point; it may be thought to have been wise for him to wait till General

Wuckassowich had taken, on the Po, the points of support of Casale and Verrua, and till Moreau had quitted his position of Alexandria and Valenza.—The General of the Allies has also been blamed, for having suffered Macdonald to arrive in the Plaisantin, and for having thus endangered his situation. But those who have hazarded this judgment, have, doubtless, not recollected, that though he was superior in number, he was far from being sufficiently so, and had too much employment in Upper Italy, to be able to extend his left so far, and with so great a force as would have been necessary to stop Macdonald in the Apennines, and to prevent his junction with his colleague. That being granted, Marshal Suworow could only wait for Macdonald at a point where he might fight him with the greatest part of his forces, and from which he might also rapidly advance against Moreau, whom he could not lose sight of for any time. It is agreed, that if Macdonald had gained the battle of St. Giovanni, the campaign would have been probably, if not lost, at least much limited in its advantages; but the risk ran, on this occasion, could not be avoided. The Allies could not fail, sooner or later, to have to encounter the army of

Naples, and it was fortunate for them that that did not take place sooner. If the battle of the Trebia was the most critical period for them, it was, at the same time, the most glorious for their commander, and appears no less calculated to prove his talents, than those of the Adda and of Novi did his boldness. The new enterprizes, which, after this event, he went to attempt in Switzerland, have been described and appreciated in the preceding volume, and in this a judgment has been already hazarded on the military merits of this old warrior. To whatever degree opinions may be divided on this subject, all the world must agree, that few Generals, perhaps not one, have ever performed, in five months, so many great, difficult, and advantageous exploits; and that his name will for ever remain attached to that of the most brilliant campaign that has been made in modern times.

Although the same degree of renown does not attach to General Melas, he nevertheless proved himself worthy to second his two predecessors, and afterwards to complete what they had begun. It is not forgotten that the victory at Novi was owing to the able dispositions made by him, and to the bravery with which they were

executed by his troops. He sustained with prudence and talents the difficult situation in which Marshal Suworow had left him; patiently waited till he received reinforcements, and till Massena could no longer come to seek in Italy the fruits of his victories in Switzerland; maintained in the interval, but it is true with more advantageous means, a defensive as able as that of Moreau; and, what is most glorious in war, passed suddenly from this system to a decided and victorious offensive.

Having collected and represented, in a narrow space, the numerous transactions of this campaign; fixed, systematically, its different periods; endeavoured to mark the spirit in which it was conducted; and tried to estimate, justly, the Generals who respectively directed it; having also, antecedently, traced the positions in which its conclusion left the opposed armies, there remains no other military result to be considered, than that of the loss of men which was sustained, on one side, and on the other. It may be here again repeated, that it would be to wish to abuse public confidence, to pretend to present on this subject an arithmetical certainty, which no person, not even those at the head of armies, could ob-

tain. Where is the man, who could reckon all the soldiers who fell at the same time in the different provinces of Upper Italy, in the states of Genoa, of Tuscany, of the Church, and in the kingdom of Naples? Where is he, who, amidst the torrents of blood with which unhappy Italy was moistened, could number and distinguish the French, the Germans, the Russians, the Italians, and the Poles, who were at once the victims of this terrible war? Who, alas! would be disposed, even were he qualified for it, to enter into this melancholy calculation? Who would not rather fly from, than seek the scene of horror; stifle the sentiment of curiosity, under that of humanity; and prefer ignorance to knowledge on this subject? Why cannot the historian shut his eyes against this afflicting picture? But condemned as he is to open those of the public, after having examined, with attention, all the calculations of the daily losses worthy of notice, after having compared and weighed all the estimates that have been made on this subject, he will find himself not far from the truth, in stating the loss experienced by the Allies, in killed and wounded, at 30,000 men; in prisoners, at 10,000; and that of the French, in the first respect, at 45,000, and

in the second, at 35,000. From this it results, that it cost the Republicans twice as many men as it did the Allies, a natural consequence of six great defeats, of a great number of fortresses being lost, and of a campaign entirely of disasters. It is also seen, that it caused a sacrifice of 75,000 soldiers, the victims of the silly and barbarous ambition of five men, who replunged the world into the horrors of war. So much blood, happily, was not entirely lost in the cause of justice, of reason, and of social order ; and one of the most beautiful parts of Europe, though not immediately restored to its legitimate possessors, was at least freed for a time from revolutionary despotism, rapacity, irreligion, and immorality.*

* Since the completion of this Work, the Author has been induced to undertake a History of the Campaign in Holland, in the year 1799, having, for that purpose, been furnished by his friends with numerous and authentic documents on that interesting and too little appreciated subject.

THE END.

Published by the same Author.

THE HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN
IN HOLLAND, in the Year 1799, illustrated
with Five Maps, &c. One Volume 8vo. Price
12s. Published by T. GARDINER, Princes-
Street, Cavendish-Square; and may be had of
the rest of the Booksellers.

This Day is published, in 8vo.

Price Seven Shillings,

A NARRATIVE OF THE PRINCIPAL
EVENTS of the Campaigns of 1809, 1810,
and 1811, in Spain and Portugal; interspersed
with Remarks on Local Scenery and Manners.
In a Series of Letters, by Captain WILLIAM
STOTHERT, Adjutant Third Foot Guards.

Printed for P. MARTIN, (late of the Firm of
CATHELL and MARTIN) Corner of Orchard-
Street, Oxford-Street.

Where also may be had, Price One Shilling,

A LETTER TO THE OFFICERS OF THE
ARMY; explaining the Cause of the Plan for
an Officers benefit Fund, being for the present
abandoned, by DAVID ROBERTS, Esq. Major
of the Fifty-first Regiment, and late Major of
Brigade in the Severn District.

And, Price One Shilling and Sixpence;


THE LAST PLAN FOR AN OFFICER'S
BENEFIT FUND, with the Rules and Regu-
lations, according to which Pensions were to
be granted to Veterans, Officers from length of
Service, Widows of Officers, and Children.

ALGY
strated
Price
since
and in

PAL
and
and
and
and

A
B

C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z



UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN



3 9015 06573 8992

DC
220
.H67
1812
v.4



The history of the
campaigns in the
years 1796 ...

015779

A 535648

